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INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate on public employment service (PES) in Italy can be considered as historically full of 
unanswered questions. The current Italian government is currently discussing the possibility to 
empower this field in the perspective of a new comprehensive reform strategy concerning passive 
and active labour market policies (PLMPs and ALMPs). These kinds of policies, in recent times, 
are increasingly receiving much attention because of their potential to ease a wide range of labour 
market problems. Last labour market reforms have brought in a new light the Italian system of 
PES, gaining a renewed strategic role in the redefinition of the labour market policies of this 
country. The reorganization of PES represents one of the four main delegations introduced by the 
so called “Jobs Act”, together with the restructuration of unemployment benefits (UBs), the 
flexibilization of work contracts and the creation of new benefits for work-life balancing. PES has 
already represented one of the most recent new areas of public services subjected to contracting-
out. This sector usually is organized as a large public bureaucracy with local offices that offer 
labour market information, placement services, and other active labour market policy measures 
for the unemployed. In addition, in some countries PES also administers the provision of income 
support for jobseekers (OECD, 2001; Thuy et al., 2001). Between the nineties and early two-
thousands, many countries have reformed traditional systems, previously characterized by public 
monopoly. Whereas placement services traditionally have been delivered in-house by public 
servants, the outsourcing of part of these services to private providers gained considerable 
importance internationally (Mosley, 2003; Sol and Westerveld, 2005). At the same time, the 
European Employment Strategy (the so called “Luxembourg process”, launched at the end of 
1997, by European Council held in Luxembourg) has very much emphasized the role of PES in 
implementing a preventive and active approach against long term unemployment. Also Italy has 
experienced strong changes in this field, before now. In the last twenty years, there has already 
been an important process of reorganization of PES. An essential ingredient of this process is 
represented by PES decentralization towards regional authorities, starting from the decree 
469/1997. While such decentralization is part of a larger process of devolution from central 
government to regional authorities, the principle of bringing PES governance closer to local 
labour market needs is deemed to be important in transforming this field. It has been a deep 
rescaling of competencies in social and employment policies, where regions are now responsible 
for social and labour policies. As a matter of fact, since the second half of the nineties, various 
innovations and reforms have been promoted in order to, firstly, increase the flexibility of the 
market regulation and, secondly, develop a new approach towards ALMPs. Beyond that, the 
opening to private operators, first with the tool of temporary work, introduced by “Treu Reform” 
(law 196/1997), and then completed with the “Biagi Reform” (decree 276/2003), enabled the 
access of new private providers in the system, the so called “employment agencies” (agenize per 
il lavoro). PES passed from the management of the State to the one of the regions, flatly modifying 
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their functions from the bureaucratic and numerical regulation of demand and supply to the 
promotion of network coordination among local actors and the delivery of ALMPs. The juridical 
status of unemployed has turned into a contractual and conditional one, depending on some 
binding conditions: to be without a job and immediately willing to be employed and/or involved 
in the active measures proposed, besides undertaking active job searching. The framework 
dramatically changed, due to the decentralization process that moved the legislative power to 
regions and the delivery and planning functions to provinces and local actors (public and private 
ones). The main effects of these reforms became immediately visible in terms of both new duties 
and responsibilities for the regions (planning, coordination and definition of general aims of 
regional labour market policies) and a new and wider involvement of private actors (for-profit 
and non-profit organizations) in the delivery of services. In this way, reforms to improve the 
quality, accessibility and universality of welfare services went hand in hand with reforms of the 
governance of these services, with an increasing weight of the horizontal and vertical subsidiarity 
principle. Often dissatisfaction with “traditional” institutions created a climate favouring the quest 
for new forms of governance. This process of devolution demanded drastic organizational 
changes, including: the adoption of more function oriented forms of counselling; an attempt to 
define common basic functions to be performed in the new PES, in order to avoid differences 
between regions; the diffusion of “individualized” services offering tailored project of re-
employment or training to some specific target groups, such as long-term unemployed, women 
and young unemployed (CNEL 2002; Dau 2003; Fargion 2003; Ministero del Lavoro e delle 
Politiche Sociali 2003). The relationship between public and private operators started to be 
regulated on regional basis. In particular, local governments received the opportunity to exploit 
the competences acquired to differentiate their policies in order to obtain legitimacy and consent. 
As consequence, a plurality of regional models has been implemented, revealing high level of 
regional differentiation concerning the degree of market exposure of their PES, conditioned to 
their level of capacity building. The link between the regulation of market-based governance and 
the level of discretion for regional actors, as consequence of the decentralization, would be then 
affected by their policy histories. Local contexts of policy-making and their suitability and 
willingness to become marketized affect the usage of local discretion (Zimmermann et al., 2014). 
Within the frame of rules defined at the national level, regions have created very different PES 
models. There could have been an equalization between public and private operators, in terms of 
power and tasks, showing a decline of public hands, or otherwise, the employment centres can 
continue to be at the core management of the system, ensuring the (ex-)provincial employment 
centres to be the main providers. Anyway, the existence of a regional regulation is not a full 
guarantee of operability and efficiency of the system and Italian PES, therefore, despite the deep 
reorganization process started in the Nineties, still show limitations and problems, due to a 
significant delay in the implementation and a high degree of territorial fragmentation. The 
question of the relationship between public and private operators is, in fact, still uncertain, 
articulating itself on very different local governance models. Furthermore, the decentralization 
process, implemented without promoting ideas, modes and structures of coordination (among the 
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regions, among the different policies, among the local and national institutions appointed to 
manage active and passive measures) has brought to a strongly differentiated asset in the various 
territorial contexts, where different constellations of private and public actors, under different 
regional means and regulative approaches, create disparate and even divergent fields of 
opportunities and binds. In addition to this, apart from some local exceptions, the employment 
services developed just some basic functions on the labour market activation policies and 
maintained a bad reputation among people and firms, thus ending up continuing to play a marginal 
role in the development of the labour market dynamics (Borghi and Van Berkel 2007). The 
implementation of the Jobs Act has been directed precisely at the overcoming of such limits. In 
particular, one of the decrees implementing the Jobs Act, the no. 150/2015, aims at the 
reorganization of the entire legislation about Italian PES and ALMPs.  
To achieve this goal policy-makers decided for a new shift of policy competence, from regions to 
the State again. This change required a constitutional reform, which failed with the rejection of 
the constitutional referendum held on the 4th of December 2016.  
However, many changes introduced by the decree 150/2015 remained in place. In particular, we 
identify two innovations, specifically conceived in the perspective of a neo-centralistic design, 
despite the failure of the constitutional reform: the creation of a new organization on national 
level, the National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies (Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche 
Attive del Lavoro - ANPAL); the introduction of a new national active labour market scheme, the 
“reintegration voucher” (assegno di ricollocazione – AdR), attempting to promote a quasi-market 
model of service delivery. This last scheme represents one of the major innovations in the renewal 
of the active labour market policies in Italy, relying on a quasi-market mechanism to deliver the 
employment services. According to this scheme, the jobseeker, after an accurate profiling phase, 
carried out by staff of the employment centre, receives a voucher quantified in terms of his 
difficulty to get a job. The same jobseeker, at that point, can freely choose how to spend those 
resources, among the provision of services provided by public and private operators, in 
competition to “gain” the public resources directly assigned to the user, whereas the public 
provider can continue to act as one of the competing actors.  
The implementation of this tool, together with a national accreditation regime, in the aims of the 
ANPAL, should create the ground for the homogenization of the regional public-private 
contracting arrangements. Carmel and Papadopulos (2003) define this kind of changes as 
“operational policy reforms”, distinguishing them from “formal policy reforms”, where the first 
affect the organization of services delivery, that is, the PES governance, the second the content-
related aspect of services. The main interest of this work will be on the “operational” aspects set 
by the Jobs Act related to the field of ALMPs and PES. The awareness of the policy-makers about 
the limited effectiveness of Italian PES represents the motivation that probably has induced them 
to opt for a greater market exposure of regional PESs. This has resulted in the promotion of the 
AdR, as new national active labour market scheme introducing a quasi-market in employment 
services. Marketization can be considered one of the main governance aspects of PES mainly 
because supported by the assumption that contestability increases the efficiency and effectiveness 
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of provision. Not by chance marketization has probably been discussed and investigated most 
(Van Berkel et al., 2011).  Studies in this field have made clear that this phenomenon is not related 
exclusively to liberal welfare states (Considine, 2001; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2005; Sol and 
Westerveld, 2005; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2005). At the same 
time, marketization of employment services can be characterized with problems of opportunistic 
behaviour from the side of private providers, related to the risk of adverse selection of the subjects 
assisted. 
Given the greater market exposure required for the implementation of the AdR, and considering 
that, since the previous decentralization and marketization reform processes, each region has been 
confronted with the implementation of different public-private contracting arrangements, 
generating even divergent trajectories in their models, the following questions arise:  
- what are the consequences of market-based governance in regional contexts? 
- may quasi-market models produce better results than other models? 
- may the AdR represent an optimal design of public-private contracting arrangement for Italian 
regional PESs?  
 
An “optimal design” could be approximated as the one able to take into account both economic 
(efficiency and effectiveness of the performance) and social goals (equity of the performance, 
avoiding opportunistic behaviour of private providers involved). In this way it will be possible to 
know what the consequences of a greater market exposure of Italian regional PESs could be, 
considering both the impact in terms of effectiveness and equitability of the outcomes.  
This analysis is realized by means of a comparison between two regions considered as the two 
most dissimilar cases in the context of PES Italian regional differentiation: Lombardy and Emilia-
Romagna. These two cases can be placed at the extremes of a hypothetical continuum defined on 
the basis of the degree of market exposure of PES regional models. Lombardy in particular has 
caught the attention showing a quasi-market model very similar to that of the AdR, giving the 
possibility to test the mechanisms of the new national scheme, not yet fully implemented, using a 
local experience already well established.  
More in general, the two cases are comparable not only in terms of capacity building and level of 
economic development, but especially regarding their political and institutional contexts, being 
characterized by a symmetrical and divergent trajectory of formation of their models. This has 
been the result of a layering process favoured in both the cases by a similar strength of different 
actors’ coalitions.   
The research then will go for an in-depth analysis of market-based governance in regional 
contexts, relying on the methodology of policy evaluation, much used for studies in this field. 
Since we are interested in the outcomes of such aspects towards jobseekers, the work will solely 
consider ALMPs addressed to labour market supply, putting aside in the research the interventions 
for labour market demand. Anyway, the most interest drawn by ALMPs’ studies is usually 
oriented mainly towards interventions for jobseekers (Marocco, 2013).  
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The work will proceed as follows. Chapter one will introduce the topic concerning ALMPs and 
PES. Much attention will be given to the tools applied in this context and to the role of the PES, 
as well as to its governance, as major determinant of its success. Current feature of ALMPs and 
PES can be considered the result of the emergence of the current activation paradigm, with a 
relevant and influent role exerted by the international organizations, as OECD and, in particular, 
EU, inducing countries to converge towards a similar policy agenda, but remaining in a context 
of persistent diversity. The comprehension of the way the concept of activation has evolved over 
time, will be then fundamental to understand the reasons why today some particular features 
concerning PES governance are required and much stressed in supporting it. These characteristics 
will be described in chapter two, introducing the theoretical background used to study 
marketization of employment services, as one of the main traits arising, and on the basis of which 
the empirical analysis of this work will be conducted. Before to conduct the empirical analysis, 
we will need to reconstruct the main features of the Italian PES system, showing the reasons 
determining the situation of high regional differentiation and describing the framework of the last 
labour market reform process. Each of the two regions selected as cases for the research will be 
analysed in a specific chapter, number four for Lombardy and five for Emilia-Romagna. Last 
chapter will be left to some conclusion. We will see how the trade-off presented by literature about 
marketization in PES between effectiveness and equity is completely confirmed. The situation of 
great exposure to the market of Lombardy boost the employment opportunities for the participants 
to active labour market initiatives, following a quick-job entry approach which appears to be not 
adequately able to mitigate the opportunistic behaviour of private providers largely involved. On 
the contrary Emilia-Romagna region will show how the limited market exposure of its system 
reveals a very low level of effectiveness, however showing that probably the efforts are 
concentrated on the most disadvantaged participants to active labour market initiatives. There will 
be few rooms to talk about an optimal design of public-private contracting arrangements looking 
at these two cases, considering that both are not able to take into account both economic and social 
goals at the same time. Anyway, this analysis can lead towards important considerations related 
to the new quasi-market model promoted at the national level and concerning the extent of 
regional differentiation still in place in the context of Italian regional PESs. Further considerations 
will follow, focusing on the other obstacles still limiting the performance of Italian PES and 
marking the attention on the policy proposals currently at the top of the agenda.  
 
The author is grateful to his supervisor Paolo Perulli for his constant guide and support in the 
research.  
Special thanks also to Wolfgang Streeck, Marco Leonardi, Francesco Giubileo and Raffaele 
Guetto for their very helpful and valuable interaction.  
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1.  ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND THE ACTIVATION 
PARADIGM 
 
1.1. What are active labour market policies? 
 
Labour market institutions are deemed to have a great influence on the level and structure of 
employment. This holds for institutional features such as the regulation of employment protection 
(e.g. dismissal protection, fixed-term contracts), minimum wages, tax/benefit system as well as 
active labour market policies (ALMPs). This is the reason why policy makers implement labour 
market reforms in order to stimulate job creation. Labour market reforms are always linked to 
expectations for a sustainable reduction of structural and cyclical unemployment. Most notably, 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession there is renewed interest in the potential for ALMPs to 
help ease a wide range of labour market problems.  
Over the last two or three decades, both macro and micro studies have greatly improved our 
understanding of labour market institutions. At the same time, empirical evidence has also 
influenced the design of labour market reforms themselves, not least in the area of ALMPs. While 
the broader institutional setup of labour markets, comprising wage setting, the tax-benefit system, 
employment protection or training regimes plays an important role with respect to employment 
and unemployment rates, well-designed ALMPs can also make a positive difference (Eichhorst 
and Konle-Seidl, 2016). According to Dar and Tzannatos (1999) they can be used for the 
following purposes: increase the allocative function of the labour market, direct the distributional 
outcomes of them, increase the political acceptability of reforms, correct market failures or, even 
when such a failure does not exist, to divert an “economically efficient” outcome to a “socially 
desirable” one. Not by chance, this wide range of tasks has made this field an object of study at 
the same time both for economics, sociology and political science. Anyway, the notion of ALMPs 
encompasses different kinds of tools.  
Crepon and Van der Berg, in their review (2016), decide to start from the distinction between 
policies that are supposed to improve the individual matching process and those that are supposed 
to improve individual productivity1.  
Other scholars rely on broader classifications of ALMPs and this could be better in order to depart 
from the risk of oversimplification of the real world. Dar and Tzannatos (1999) have identified 
three constitutive elements to define the function of ALMPs: mobilization of labour supply, 
development of employment-related skills, promotion of efficiency on the labour market. Within 
                                                        
1 At the same time, they add a third category, represented by interventions aimed at improving the knowledge of the 
job-seekers about their labour market conditions, not in relation to the properties of vacancies but rather concerning 
the knowledge about their real range of opportunities. 
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this framework, the more common ALMPs are represented by: direct job creation, through public 
works programs; job search assistance; training/retraining for unemployed adults and those at risk 
of unemployment; micro-enterprise development, consisting in supporting unemployed people in 
starting up small businesses; wage/employment subsidies to firms in order to hire unemployed 
individuals.  
 Bonoli (2010) suggests distinguishing between four different ideal-types of ALMPs: incentive 
reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation and human capital investment. The first ideal-
type refers to measures that aim at strengthening work incentives for benefit recipients (tax-
credits, in-work benefits, benefit conditionality and time limits on recipiency); the second to 
measure in which the main goal consists in removing obstacles to labour market participants 
(placement services, job-subsidies, counselling and job search programmes); the third in 
promoting labour market (re-)entry, in keeping jobless people busy to prevent human capital 
depletion associated with unemployment spell (job-creation scheme in the public sector, training 
non-related to a particular job); last ideal-type consists in vocational training and basic education. 
We can rely on a classification inspired to the ideal-types of Bonoli, distinguishing six categories 
of ALMPs: employment assistance, training, self-entrepreneurship, public works, subsidized-
employment, work incentives.  
 
Employment assistance refers mainly to the matching function, to the main objective of matching 
jobs with job-seekers, consisting of measures aiming at removing obstacles to labour market 
participation, without necessarily impacting on work incentives. The reference here is not only on 
job-matching, but also job-counselling/orientation, job-search programs and also monitoring on 
job seekers efforts.  
During their search, job-seekers may experience personal obstacles finding information about the 
labour market. They can use services set up to assist them in their job search and receive training 
on how to use them by meeting with a counsellor. Sometimes, this involves only a workshop 
lasting a few hours, but it can also involve regular meetings over long periods. The intensity of 
the assistance received is often linked to the number and frequency of the appointments. 
Nevertheless, such assistance does not always come alone. Sometimes it is accompanied by 
monitoring of the job-seeker’s efforts to get a job. Appointments between counsellor and job-
seeker also serve to check if the latter is trying hard enough. As we will see, active job search is 
considered a prerequisite for the benefits that job-seekers receive. Thus, monitoring should 
involve the threat of sanctions. These may be triggered by a missed appointment, by an effort 
considered lackadaisical (such as a low rate of applications), or by rejecting a suitable job offer, 
deemed as acceptable by the counsellor.   
The main advantage of employment assistance is twofold: it may help to reduce the length of 
unemployment and it may represent very often a point of “access” for unemployed people, that 
may address also to find other ALMPs of interest for them and to get key resources to face their 
unemployment spell. The main limitation of this ALMP, instead, is represented by the need of 
continuous performative efforts necessary to provide assistance with effectiveness and efficiency. 
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Especially in periods characterized by huge unemployment phenomena it becomes difficult to 
assist effectively all the job seekers needing assistance.  Public staff and resources could become 
no more sufficient and this leads to the need to involve private services to deliver employment 
assistance, a circumstance which, as we will see further, is not always easy to manage.  
We have never to forget that it matters also the proportion between placement and other activities 
within the category of “employment assistance”. This may become a relevant issue when it is 
taken into account, as we will see in the next chapters, the risk of unintended consequences. This 
could be the case for situations of high reliance on provisions like counselling, orientation, job-
search programs, providing less effective job-placement that could be considered more expensive 
in terms of both resources and efforts for the operators.  
 
Training, respect to the previous category, concerns the priority given to skill acquisition (or its 
consolidation/improvement/reorientation), that will enable job-seekers to compete for jobs, 
increasing their potential for productivity. It refers to the help for new entrants to the labour force 
and redeployed workers, with the idea to provide new chances to people not being able to profit 
from their education or whose skills have become obsolete. For these reasons training may be 
considered the “cornerstone” of ALMPs  (Crepon and Van der Berg, 2016, 15). In the expectations 
it should lead towards better quality jobs. Training programs may differ in priority given 
according to different trade-off: general education vs. specific skills, soft vs. hard skills, and to 
the type of learning activities, whether in classroom, on the job, or alternating educational courses 
and work (id.). They differ also for the high investment they represent in terms of money or time. 
Since it can be considered the most expensive ALMP, especially in period when the economy is 
not growing, it is often exposed to the risk of being put in second order. The attempt to save costs 
concerning human-capital development may led to rely more on “soft skills courses” at the 
expenses of the traditional skill training. These are courses, often group-based, aiming at 
improving basic skills concerning job-search, motivation and orientation (Weishaupt, 2011).  
Lechner et al. (2011), in a similar way, distinguish between short training periods, as lasting less 
than six months, and long ones, lasting more. When well-targeted they can be addressed at the 
beneficial of specific disadvantaged groups, such as youth and women. On the contrary, if poorly 
targeted, they may result in deadweight loss. This circumstance happens when those who benefit 
from the training program are the same who would have got jobs anyway. Another potential 
limitation could be represented also by the decrease in job-search intensity during the course of 
the training.  
 
Self-entrepreneurship corresponds to programs aiming at creating and promoting small-scale new 
businesses, start-ups and providing self-employment, by means of technical assistance and, above 
all, credit support. They take very often the form of tax-credits, which could be or not targeted to 
the purchase of specific stuffs concerning the start-up phase.  
The main goal here is to promote entrepreneurial spirit, especially related to youth. These 
programs, in fact, are often associated with either age requirements favouring young people or 
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local development programs related to economically depressed areas. However, the risk of 
deadweight loss is present also here when we consider that for some subjects this kind of new 
businesses could have been formed anyway without assistance.  
 
Public works are publicly funded low-wage employment programs used to address poverty and 
create temporary employment, especially for disadvantaged groups (Dar and Tzannatos, 1999). 
They consist of work experience programs in the public or non-profit sector. These programs 
should be intended as mainly income-generating schemes with the objective not to promote labour 
market re-entry, but to keep job-seekers busy, also in order to prevent the depletion of human 
capital associated with frequent or long-lasting unemployment spells (Bonoli, 2010). More often, 
we are talking about jobs of low productivity. In some cases, they can be associated to short 
training courses. They can be linked to access of benefits, in order to deny this access to 
unemployed people refusing this kind of jobs. One of the main limitations of these programs may 
derive from the stigma associated to these jobs, with the risk of penalizing individual 
employability. 
 
Work incentives refer to measures mostly aiming at strengthening the incentive-induced behaviour 
of benefit recipients. It is possible to distinguish between positive and negative work-incentives. 
The formers may not be related exclusively to benefit recipients, but targeted groups, and consist 
of tax credits. More often, work incentives are considered from the negative point of view, 
representing all the measure introducing benefit conditionality. The conditionality can be 
achieved curtailing benefits, both in terms of duration, benefit rates and recipiency, leaving rooms 
for sanctions in the event the behaviour of the recipient has not fulfilled its commitment. This 
kind of measures very often can be applied, as we will see, by means of quasi-contractual 
arrangements between operators and job-seekers, introducing commitments for both. Benefits can 
also be made conditional on participation in work-schemes and public works.  
 
Subsidized employment is used to make employers willing to take the risk to hire unemployed 
people who may (or may not) have a low productivity (Crepon and Van der Berg, 2016). In this 
case, the government pays part of the salary for a period of time following which firms may decide 
to hire the individual and pay the entire salary.  
 These interventions are usually designed for specific targets, such as long-term unemployed or 
youth. These subsidies may vary according to the population targeted, not only in terms of 
particular disadvantaged categories, but also in terms of the entire category of employee or only 
newly minted jobs. They usually correspond to: direct transfer to the employer, tax rebate, payroll 
tax subsidies for workers, vouchers attributed to the eligible public handing them over the 
potential employer.  
At the same time, the rate of subsidies may vary or not according to the length of contracts 
(Caliendo et al., 2005). These interventions could be advantageous because they can create 
incentives for employment on permanent basis. However, there could be deadweight loss if we 
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consider that it could be possible that those hired with subsidies would be hired anyway. We 
should also consider another limitation due to the opportunistic behaviour of the employers, in 
the situation in which they look at these workers as cheap labour, laying them off once the period 
of subsidy is finished.  
  
Tab 1.1 Classification of ALMPs  
Active labour market policy types Aim Tools 
Employment assistance  remove obstacles to labour 
market participation 
job-counselling/orientation, 
job-search programs, job-matching   
Training  increase skill acquisition soft-skill training vs. hard-skill training, 
return to education  
Self-entrepreneurship promote small-scale new 
businesses 
technical assistance and tax-credits 
Public works  keep the jobseekers busy 
preventing from the risk of 
human capital depletion 
publicly funded work experience 
programs 
Work incentives strengthening the incentive-
induced behaviour of benefit 
recipients 
Positive: tax credits, in-work benefits 
Negative: benefit conditionality 
 
Subsidized employment  make employers willing to 
take the risk to hire 
unemployed people who 
may have a low productivity 
direct transfer to the employer, tax rebate, 
payroll tax subsidies for workers, 
vouchers 
 
 
1.2. The role of Public Employment Service 
 
In this context we refer to Public employment services as the «the governments most important 
delivery arms of labour market policies» (Weishaupt, 2011, 63), especially ALMPs. PES is then 
related to the organization of ALMPs’ delivery.  We will focus on the main features of PES, first 
looking at its contribution for institutions, jobseekers and firms and then deepening PES 
governance, as major determinant of its success.  
If we try to find what could be the outcomes of PES for institutions, we are substantially 
interested to know how it can affect formal and informal rules around the transitions of people 
from unemployment to employment and vice-versa.     
We have to start from the consideration that labour market regulation is closely linked to 
macroeconomic management. Across Europe, nations are facing the consequences of economic 
changes and, thus, governments need to predict proactive measures and plan sufficient skilled 
workforce. The predictability of economic developments and the effects on employment still 
remain within the short-term events. The development of models to predict the needs of the 
workforce is necessary for a closer link between the policy of the labour market with the dynamics 
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of the economy. The growing changes on attitudes and actions on labour markets and public 
service providers have been responsible for a growing attention to the role and outcomes of PES. 
It can be generally considered as an instrument to support the effective functioning of the labour 
market. Particular importance is assigned to the ability of the PES for vigorous action aimed at 
ensuring the maximum impact of LMPs (Terziev and Arabska, 2015). Its core activity, in 
particular, is represented by the improvement of the correspondence between demand and supply 
of labour force. In order to achieve this objective, PES should have a more comprehensive look 
at the demand and supply of labour force, considering the numerous transitions that constantly 
take place in the labour market and in the individual professional development (Terziev and 
Dimitrova, 2015). 
PES then should represent part of a comprehensive framework, being intertwined with effective 
systems of social protection and education, ensuring continuity between various transitions in 
professional development and going beyond institutional and geographical boundaries.  
Some of the major transitions in the professional development are the transitions between the 
labour market and the education system and transitions from job to job. In this context PES should 
closely interact more than ever with various stakeholders in order to identify and profile skills and 
bringing them in compliance with the demand, as well as skills training. Persons seeking or 
changing their jobs should receive an opportunity to self-ensure continuity, improving the control 
of their own careers. At the same time, PES has also to perform a very important socio-distribution 
function, especially in the presence of disadvantaged groups in the labour market, taking into 
account the transition from employment to unemployment and preventing extreme poverty and 
social deprivation (id).   
However, the question whether the PES is able to reduce search frictions in the labour market, the 
core goal set by governments, which finance the PES, still remains unanswered. On this point, we 
can consider the role and contribution of PES respect to jobseekers in relation to their supposed 
efficiency in terms of ability of crowding out private search effort (Pissarides, 1979). As is often 
the case, not all vacancies are registered with PES, despite the advances in technology would 
make possible for PES to centralize job applications and vacancies, in order to mitigate 
coordination frictions (Holzner and Watanabe, 2015).  
Formal and informal rules can interact also concerning the outcomes of PES for jobseekers. 
Jobseeker will be one of the fundamental actors of this work. Here, we will limit to say that the 
role of PES, in a wider perspective, can be measured in terms of opportunity provided for 
jobseekers as alternative to the search for a job using private or informal channels. We can move 
from the consideration that this is only a way unemployed or employed people find or change 
their jobs. Almost always, they are able to place only a small part of jobseekers compared to the 
other means. Concerning job-search methods there the most recurrent distinction is between 
formal and informal means (Reyneri 2011). The former included those channels regulated both 
by “market mechanisms” such as newspaper ads, private placement agencies not involved in PES, 
direct application, firms’ databases, and public authorities, where we find PES and also open 
competition for bureaucracy roles. The latter, instead, included all those channels regulated by 
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personal contacts, both related to relative and friends and professional area, often coming from 
previous workplace acquaintances of previous experiences. There are a lot of studies about the 
positive effects coming from the use of personal contacts in term of the easiest way to find a job, 
explaining the advantages of what is known as “old boys network” in terms of an easier 
transmission of information (Rees 1966, Holzer 1988) and gaining also an advantage in terms of 
wages (Corcoran et al. 1980; Simon and Warner 1992; Rosenbaum et al. 1999). The most classical 
and remarkable contribution is that of Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983), finding an explanation in 
the social structure, with the conceptual powerfulness of the distinction between strong and weak 
ties. The idea at the basis of Granovetter’s study is that people find jobs thanks to the information 
conveyed by social networks and, in this context, weak bonds (interpersonal relationships) are 
more important than deep-rooted relationships, like those between relatives or friends. The author 
argued that for diffusion across networks, weak ties are more valuable than strong ones. Weak 
ties can act as a "bridge" which connects otherwise disconnected social groups, differently from 
strong ties, because if someone is strong tied to someone else, those around their tie will also be 
tied to them and ties will be redundant. This because all social networks offer various resources, 
such as information about job opportunities, and so, by connecting with a greater number of social 
networks, via weak social ties, it is possible to gain access to more possible employment 
opportunities. However, these results are also connected with an inefficient placement, with 
suboptimal allocation in the labour market. Job opportunities coming from informal means result 
in poorer positions, in terms of both job-quality and wages, because vacancies are not assigned to 
the most skilled for those positions, but to those better connected. In consideration of this, PES 
and public regulation acquire a crucial role in relation to equity reasons, in order to grant an equal 
distribution of opportunities, promoting people not well connected despite having good skills 
(Reyneri 2011). The transitions support should, at the same time, be directed to the employers as 
well. On this point it is relevant to consider firm differences in terms of their size. In particular, 
small and medium firms more often need support in announcing job vacancies that require 
qualifications and are attractive to job seekers, development of human resources management 
based on qualifications and creation of measures to retain staff (Terziev and Dimitrova, 2015).  
Concerning services addressed to employers, it is sufficient to say here that, inside employment 
offices of PES, there could be teams dedicated both to jobseekers and employers as well as 
separate professional teams dedicated to each client category. Some caseworker has direct, more 
intensive contacts to employers, while others rely more on indirect contacts. The latter 
comprehends intermediation channels such as vacancies posted in newspapers or on the Internet. 
It also comprehends a specialization within the employment office, where some caseworkers 
specialize on maintaining close contacts to employers while the other caseworkers use them as 
intermediaries. Caseworkers differ also in their perception of the role of employers: some consider 
them as an additional client group, which should be offered good services; others would not treat 
employers as a client group by itself but rather consider employer contacts only as a means to 
offer better services to their unemployed. In these respects, a more intensive contact with firms 
could provide caseworkers with additional insights on the job market. Such an informal 
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knowledge might assist caseworkers in matching unemployed to appropriate employers. 
Caseworkers might also gain some private information on job openings or receive information 
earlier. The most effective traditional approach is visiting firms regularly, but, on the other hand, 
such an approach could be time consuming and thus it could reduce the amount of time available 
for counselling and further assistance for recruitment processes (Behncke et al., 2007). It is for 
this reason that, at the same time, web-based tools to reach employers are increasingly important. 
Other possibilities are represented by: employers’ weeks, job fairs, speed meets, networking with 
the help of mass-media, goal-oriented visits, the development of consultancy services and the 
prevention of (collective) redundancies. 
Anyway, many employers still conceive PES as a sort of last resort, perceiving that the vacancy 
notification is more often an additional administrative burden instead of a concrete possibility (de 
Koning and Gravesteijn, 2011). 
 
1.2.1. PES governance 
 
When PES is considered it is very important to have a clear understanding of the concept of 
“governance”. This concept could be subjected to different definitions. Weishaupt defines it as 
«the institutional structures of authority transposing public law into action» (ibidem). According 
to Fuertes et al. governance should be understood generally as «an all-encompassing framework 
of interactions (including the principles funding them), institutions, structures, mechanisms and 
processes for solving societal problems and creating social opportunities», and specifically as 
«modes of coordinating individual or organizational actions» (2014, 73). Where the conception 
of “coordination” should be considered in relation to working jointly for the pursuit of a common 
goal, or to the process aiming at achieving a state of minimal redundancy (Peters, 1998). 
Considine and Lewis (2003) draw a specific typology to analyse governance of PES. They 
distinguish governance forms between procedural, corporate, market and network, with specific 
claim, source of rationality, mechanisms of control and key drivers behind service delivery. 
“Procedural governance” is related to bureaucratic organisations using top-down approach, with 
central regulation of service delivery aiming at achieving universal treatment of clients. 
“Corporate governance” refers to the introduction of business-type managerial models, basing its 
regulation on goal-driven plans. “Market governance” can be distinguished for the reliance on 
contracting-out and marketization. “Network governance” is characterized by joint-action, co-
production or cooperation, with leadership shared within collaborative structures. As we can see, 
the concept of governance is widely discussed in this context, and more in general in social 
policies. We can refer to the definition of Kooiman and Bavinck (2005, 17) considering 
governance as «the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems 
and create social opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding 
those interactions and care for institutions that enable them». According to this definition, PES is 
a public agency, that could also involve private actors, aiming at solving a societal problem called 
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unemployment, where principles guiding its interactions are laid down in the operational policies 
above mentioned, requiring particular organizational capacities.  
To go deeper in the comprehension of this concept, we shall adopt the distinction of Weishaupt 
(2011, 65) between the “forms” of PES, or we would say its “structural governance”, referring to 
the institutional structure of authority, and the “functions” of PES, or its “functional governance”, 
referring to the operational principles and methods. The former can be further divided along two 
crossing dimensions: vertical, related to the distribution of power between levels of government, 
and horizontal, related to the kind of relationship between public and non-public providers. The 
vertical dimension refers to the main distinction between “state-operated services”, correspondent 
to a state-led governance, and a “locally operated services”, correspondent to a shared governance. 
In the first case the power is concentrated at the central level, following a top-down approach, in 
which the minister in charge has direct authority over and responsibility for PES, using both 
regional and local offices. In the second situation the power is shared with local authorities. These 
can rely on their exclusively autonomy over the choice of policy measures or they can act in 
cooperation with the central level. However local governments may be conditioned from the 
national one by government funding. According to the horizontal dimension PES can vary a lot 
depending both on the degree of involvement of non-public operators and on the forms of these 
ones, including “private for-profit”, “private not-for-profit” and “membership-based” forms (id., 
64).  Concerning the degree of involvement we can find situation of high involvement, in which 
we find either mainly “private oriented services” - this can be the case especially for contracting-
out and marketization, in which services are outsourced to a large extent to private for profit 
providers -, either mainly “public oriented services”, referring to the case in which public 
operators concentrate the functions in their hands.  
Private for-profit operators correspond to the form of private employment agencies. They may 
work alongside public offices, or they could be involved in PES. Alongside PES and private for-
profit operators, there could be private not-for-profit operators, corresponding mainly to social 
NGOs. Very often the role of not-for-profit agencies originates from their traditional involvement 
in providing social services for the long-term unemployed, poor or socially excluded in the past. 
There could be also “membership-based” entities, set up by social partners, either in the unilateral 
or bilateral form. These represent the first original and spontaneous forms historically raised at 
the end of the 19th century. As we will see, they have been challenged, sometimes becoming 
forbidden, and very often replaced by the State authority. However, they resist in many countries, 
above all Nordic ones.   
Functions of PES or functional governance, as well, can be further divided along two crossing 
dimensions concerning main goals of PES, from one hand, and the kind of relationship between 
operators and users, from the other. According to the main goals of services, the trade-off could 
be identified in economic vs. social concerns. Economic goals are associated with efficiency and 
effectiveness of measures delivered, while social goals are related to equitability concerns. 
Considering the relationship between operators and users, instead, the trade-off is between 
administrative vs. managerial approach. The first case corresponds to public bureaucracies, as 
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historically in the form of State monopolies. Here operators consider their action as compliance 
with procedures and the relationship with users is hierarchical. In the managerial approach, which 
we will see being very common in recent reform trends of PES, users are approximated to 
“customers” and operators considers their action as maximization of the service quality and 
customer satisfaction. The relationship between them is (quasi-)contractual, relying on tools that 
commit both the operators and job-seekers to tasks and duties.  
Table 1.2 reassumes all the governance dimensions of PES. These analytical tools show their 
usefulness in order to analyse PES in case studies. They combine each other allowing us to 
identify main characteristics of PES models, although we should never consider each dimension 
always in a pure form.  
 
Tab. 1.2 Governance dimensions of PES (Weisahupt, 2011) 
Structural governance (Forms of PES) Functional governance (Functions of PES) 
Vertical level Horizontal level Relationship between operators 
and users 
Main goals of the 
system Distribution of powers 
between levels of 
government 
Involvement of non-public operators 
Kind of non-public operators Degree of 
involvement 
State 
operated 
model 
Locally 
operated 
model 
Private 
for-profit 
operators 
Private 
no-profit  
operators 
Membership-
based entities 
Private 
oriented 
services 
Public 
oriented 
services 
Administrative 
approach 
Managerial 
approach 
Economic 
goals 
Social 
goals 
 
 
 
1.3. The concept of activation 
 
Active labour market policies are often considered as synonymous of “activation policies”. 
Nevertheless, this equivalence would need be more clarity. In making sense of this ambiguity, 
ALMP should be considered as a key component of activation. Or rather, the latter should be 
intended as the result of the application of the former. This means that, depending on the kind of 
ALMPs applied, the concept of activation might be described by different approaches. The 
starting point could be identified in the dichotomy between human investment and incentive-
based policies (Bonoli, 2010): the former improving human capital essentially by financing 
extensive vocational training programmes (Swenson, 2002), the latter referring to approach 
developed in various English speaking countries, which combines placement services with 
stronger work incentives or penalties (like time-limits on recipiency, benefit reductions, and the 
use of sanctions) to move people from unemployment assistance into employment, the so called 
“workfare” approach (King, 1995; Peck, 2001). As Martin argues in his review (2014), the 
question is often posed in terms of a sort of trade-off between a “work-first approach” and a “train-
first approach”. The rationale for such a shift in the way the activation concept is declined is 
related to the opportunity costs of investing in training for the unemployed, especially those 
exposed to high risks of long-term unemployment, fall during periods of steep downturn. 
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Investment in training risks to be more expensive than spending on other ALMPs relying more 
on the faster way to bring people back into employment.  
Further authors have attempted to produce various denominations, always related to the same 
meanings. Torfing (1999), for example, consider the “workfare” not as a specific declination of 
activation, but as an equivalent of activation, to distinguishing subsequently between “offensive” 
and “defensive” workfare. “Offensive workfare”, in these respects, relies on improving skills and 
empowerment, finding its example in the Danish case, while “defensive workfare” relies on 
sanctions and benefit reduction, finding its example in the US case.  
This distinction appears very similar to that of Taylor-Goby (2004), simply replacing “offensive 
workfare” with “positive activation” and “defensive workfare” with “negative activation”. 
Barbier (2004), at the same time, refers to “liberal activation” for the use of work 
incentives/sanctions and benefit conditionality and “universalistic activation”, whereas the 
reliance is more on human capital investment. Quite similar also the distinction found by Clegg 
(2005) between “circulation” and “integration”. The former should correspond to policy 
mechanisms in which there is an improvement of the chances of an unemployed person to get in 
contact with potential employers. The latter refers to policy mechanisms that more directly bring 
jobless into employment, like in the case of work incentives and benefit conditionality. Dingelday 
(2007) gives her contribution putting again specific emphasis to the concept of “workfare”, related 
to incentive-based policies to move jobless from social assistance towards employment, approach 
characteristic of English-speaking countries, respect to “enablement”, more related to human-
capital investment to increase the level of employability of jobseekers, approach characteristic of 
Scandinavian countries. 
More in general, we can consider activation as a paradigm evolved over time, as it changes the 
role played by ALMPs in the economy over time. The OECD defines the objective of activation 
as «to bring more people into effective labour force, to counteract the potentially negative effects 
of unemployment and related benefits on work incentives by enforcing their conditionality on 
active job search and participation in measures to improve employability, and to manage 
employment services and other labour market measures so that they effectively promote and assist 
the return to work» (OECD, 2013).  
In this consideration, we are referring to the activation paradigm emerging since Nineties. Until 
that period, the concept of activation was viewed in a very narrow sense: it meant increasing 
public resources going into a range of ALMPs tools as opposed to spending public resources on 
PLMPs. Then, ALMPs started to be embedded since late Nineties and early Two-Thousands in 
an activation framework favouring a combination of supportive and demanding policies 
(Eichhorst et al., 2008). In the context of activating labour market policies benefit receipt has been 
made conditional upon job search activities and/or participation in ALMP scheme. Activation 
regimes may differ greatly in their scope and intensity across European countries, reflecting their 
different starting points, histories, institutional settings and cultures. Nevertheless, the main issue 
in studying activation paradigm is represented by convergence on a same agenda of labour market 
reforms across countries. In particular, starting from Nineties, even in presence of very difference 
 24 
conditions, countries seem to have shared common core elements characterizing the emergence 
of the modern activation paradigm.   
However, we cannot go further if before we do not go deepen in this evolution of the activation 
paradigm, understanding why and in which direction this concept has changed over time. 
 
 
1.4. The emergence of the activation paradigm 
 
1.4.1. Active manpower policies, crises and divergent responses 
 
The post-WWII period, throughout the Fifties, has been characterized by rapid economic growth 
across European countries, unemployment remaining very low, to the point that it is called the 
“golden age” of welfare state, characterized by policies expanded both in coverage and rates of 
compensation (Regini, 1995; Toniolo 1998). Full employment became an attainable goal2, then 
signing an inversion in priorities, passing from unemployment to labour shortages. ALMPs and 
other labour market interventions were limited to voluntary participation and used for small 
groups. In the context of full employment, whatever form of labour exchange were first concerned 
with filling job-vacancies and paying out unemployment benefits. 
From this perspective, the main change occurred during Sixties, spreading from the concept of 
“active manpower policies” (AMPs) throughout western Europe (Weishaupt, 2011, 83). The born 
of this concept is credited to two trade union economists, Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. Their 
model was adopted by Swedish government after elections of 1957 giving mandate for Social 
Democrats and spreading the Swedish view for ALMPs. 
The two economists were able to place their discussion about manpower policy in the context of 
economic growth and full employment, seeing it as a means for sustaining non-inflationary 
growth.  According to Rehn-Meidner model, ALMPs were able to help to reduce structural 
unemployment and ensuring that counter-cyclical policy did not run into inflationary spiral. Wage 
increases were settled at the central level, at the highest rate possible and equalizing wage level 
for workers. This meaning that firms which survived only paying low-wages needed to rationalize, 
otherwise if inefficient they would be forced to shut down. The combination of these two elements 
then led to increases in overall productivity of the system, keeping low the rate of unemployment. 
Workers laid off by firms were to be retrained by means of specific programs or treated with 
mobility grants in order to improve the adaptability of them. The success of this model was soon 
evident for the fulfilment of three very desirable social and political goals: enhance overall 
productivity of the national economy; keep inflation low; improve individual skills (id.).  
                                                        
2 As envisioned in ILO Convention 88/1948 and later with ILO Convention 122/1964 
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The spread of the “Swedish view” was due also to the appointment of Gosta Rehn as director of 
the OECD’s Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate, from 1962, soon after the born of the 
organization3, until 1974. This model then became disseminated throughout western advanced 
economies (Lenert, 1964; Rothstein, 1985). Not by chance, in 1963 OECD choose Sweden as first 
case study for its first country review4 on manpower policy, presenting it as a benchmark for other 
countries (OECD, 1963). However, it was the key recommendation developed the subsequent 
year to represent the milestone of the dissemination of ideas about “active manpower policies” in 
this period from OECD, frequently used as reference point for national reform efforts (OECD, 
1964). To summarize these key recommendations, we shall follow the three categories used by 
Weishaupt (2011, 87): “goals”, presenting the main objectives to be fulfilled in national reforms; 
“governance”, focusing on the design of PES to organize and implement policies; “instruments”, 
regarding the contents for policies (Box 1.1).  
 
Box 1.1 OECD 1964 Key recommendations 
                                                        
3 The OECD was founded in Paris on the 14th of December 1960, in correspondence to the termination of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, born in 1948 to manage the “Marshall Plan” of economic help 
from the United States. Its main objective was to assist advanced industrial economies in their economic growth, 
keeping inflation under control. The dissemination of innovative economic ideas and the exchange of national 
viewpoints were the main means through which to achieve this goal.  
4 Country review procedures have represented the most applied tool for policy diffusion by OECD.  
Goals of  active manpower policies  
1. Promote economic growth by contributing to the increase overall productivity potential and its utilization 
2. Supplement fiscal and monetary policies designed to maintain high levels of employment and business 
activity 
3. Pursue an expansionist effect on employment and production but an anti-inflationary effect on cost and prices 
4. Assist firms’ economic restructuring efforts  
5. Encourage geographical and occupational mobility  
 
Governance of labour market policies 
1. Creation of a central labour market authority to organize PES 
2. Develop local/regional PES offices to assist flow of labour 
3. Endow Pes with sufficient resources in order to provide access to vocational guidance and job-counselling to 
all categories of workers 
4. Employers’ and workers’ organizations shall play a positive role in promoting economic growth and better 
life-standards of people 
5. Gathering and dissemination of information and labour market data from a public body 
 
Instruments of AMPs 
1. AMPs designed as supply-side measures, improving skills of jobseekers 
2. Public authority supervising that the total training capacity is adequate for the entire economy, in a context 
of training opportunities provided by employers 
3. Dissemination of information about job-openings outside the home area and collaboration between PES and 
local housing authorities 
4. Special measures for disadvantaged groups to promote their participation in “useful employment”, 
particularly in cases of labour shortages 
5. Provide adequate unemployment benefits and compensation in case of either redundancies or need of 
retraining or readjustments 
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These provisions were reinforced, in the same year, by ILO Convention 122, compelling countries 
to an active labour market policy, «designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen 
employment» (art. 1). The aim of these policies should be oriented towards: provide work for 
everyone who is available to work, make this work productive, freedom of choice for the 
individuals, with opportunities to qualify and use skills.  
What we can register in this phase is also the consideration that, progressively, PES was not 
anymore considered as a “passive” institution, designed almost exclusively to the registration of 
unemployed people to determine their eligibility for benefits. They started to receive 
responsibility to provide adequate implementation of AMPs, despite until that moment the use of 
manpower policies across Europe had been marginal and typically relegated to assist special 
targets, like youth.  
More in general, national labour policies regimes, across western countries, during this period 
were characterized by processes of partial convergence and institution-building, characterized by 
the modernization of PES, through the establishment of centrally steered systems, supply-side 
AMPs above all conceived to promote non-inflationary economic growth and general trust in 
economic planning.  
However, labour market policy regimes, after the “golden age”, began to be under stress after the 
first oil crisis in 1973, registering an important grow in unemployment as a consequence of the 
jump in the prices of oil and other commodities (Table 1.3).  
 
Tab. 1.3 Increase in unemployment as a percentage of civilian labour force between sixties and seventies 
Country/Years 1960-1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1974 - 
1979 
Austria -1,33 1,42 1,85 1,91 1,70 2,20 2,23 0,81 
Belgium -0,83 2,54 4,56 6,02 6,83 7,40 7,67 5,12 
Denmark -1,08 3,60 4,93 6,41 7,42 8,38 6,05 2,45 
France 1,14 2,56 3,42 3,80 4,27 4,45 5,03 2,46 
Germany -0,02 2,16 4,03 4,00 3,89 3,72 3,24 1,08 
Ireland 0,03 5,39 9,33 9,09 8,81 8,29 6,83 1,44 
Italy 0,76 5,42 5,92 6,75 7,21 7,28 7,75 2,34 
Netherlands 1,59 2,81 5,31 5,64 5,45 5,43 5,49 2,68 
Portugal 0,75 1,78 4,56 6,42 7,55 8,13 8,19 6,41 
Spain 1,25 3,25 4,69 4,60 5,23 7,00 8,71 5,46 
Sweden 0,74 1,98 1,62 1,71 1,96 2,46 2,27 0,29 
United Kingdom 0,84 2,08 3,28 4,91 5,25 5,16 4,69 2,61 
Source: OECD.stat 
 
As we can see in table 1.3 countries experienced an increase in unemployment during the 
seventies, which appears very relevant in comparison to the previous decade.  
The initial response taken by European government was characterized by continuous reliance on 
typical Keynesian measures based on deficit-spending. With the economy changing respect to the 
previous period, from one of labour shortages to one of oversupply, policy makers changed also 
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the way AMPs were applied, from supply-side measures to more demand-side ones. They became 
socially-oriented, explicitly counter-cyclical tools supporting employment during economic 
downturns. The main goal was no longer to assist firms and workers in phases of economic 
restructuring, but to ease the transition back into employment (Weishaupt, 2011). More programs 
were introduced regarding wider training, subsidized employment in contexts of local 
development, wage subsidies and public works (OECD, 1976).   
However, policy makers and economists started to cast doubts about Keynesian paradigm 
observing that unemployment remained high during the Seventies, as well as inflation. According 
to the critique to Keynesian economic policies expressed by Milton Friedman (1991), Nobel Prize 
in Economics in 1976, the inflation was caused by the excessive expansion of the money supply, 
while the unemployment was a consequence of labour market frictions. Friedman disseminated 
ideas about the impossibility to reduce unemployment by means of expansionary demand policy 
and the level of it should be considered as a reflection of wages set at levels exceeding the 
workers’ productivity and labour market institutions which were too “rigid” and then responsible 
for the frictions.  
Despite these new policy options remained in minority during Seventies, the response designed 
by the economist would have soon signed the shift of paradigm, from “Keynesianism” to 
“Monetarism”.  It was with the second oil crisis, in the 1979, that another rise in unemployment 
was triggered, also because of the surge of a new generation of workers when the baby boom 
generation reached the working age. In addition to this, European industries began increasingly 
to face with global competition from various emerging economies, in particular from the countries 
of South-East Asia (the so called “Asian Tigers”).  
At the beginning of eighties Keynesianism was largely abandoned or phased out and three main 
explanations became mostly used in public debate among economists and policy-makers: the 
weakness of the demand, the rising costs of labour and the role of rigidities in labour, capital and 
products markets. It is during this period that started to emerge divergent responses of labour 
market policy regimes across western Europe. By the end of eighties three different patterns had 
emerged, representing what Esping-Andersen (1990) would have called “the three worlds of 
welfare capitalism”. In his important contribution this author explains in terms of historical-
institutionalist approach the reasons leading to qualitative different development trajectories in 
welfare regimes. Considering the extent to which the welfare states “decommodifies”, we can 
distinct three ideal-types: “social-democratic welfare regimes”, “conservative (or corporative) 
welfare regimes” and “liberal welfare regimes”. Many historical-institutionalist scholars identify 
welfare state origins and initial trajectories in the strength of actors’ coalitions engaged in 
struggles over distributional outcomes. Coalitions across societal groups together with the 
existence of large political parties, such as Social Democratic or Christian Democratic families or 
market liberal orientation, holding power over different periods of time, determine the form and 
the generosity of states social regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Korpi, 1983; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Large labour union movements, coupled with a hegemonic Social 
democratic party have led to the creation of generous and universal welfare states (Stephens, 
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1980). Christian democratic prevailing parties have ruled welfare states more reliant on the role 
of families in providing social services and making generous benefits conditional on employment 
(Epsing-Andersen 1985, 1990; Kersbergen, 1995). The lack of both the two previous parties in a 
strong position, together with fragmented social interests, have led to liberal welfare states, 
characterized by universal but minimalist welfare provisions. 
In the trajectory of “social-democratic regimes”, Nordic countries did not completely abandon the 
“Swedish model” affirmed in the previous period. During the seventies and the eighties, they 
continued to extend the welfare services and were characterized also by important participation 
of female labour force, whereas employment opportunities for women were due to good provision 
of work-life balance measures. Policy choices and programs continued seek the legitimization of 
social partners, whose role in influencing labour market policies was never doubted. The massive 
welfare state was maintained with high taxation but keeping on the same time to provide generous 
and prolonged benefits both for firms and for unemployed people.  
In the trajectory of “conservative regimes”, continental countries unemployment was addressed 
relying on demand-reducing measures, like early exit, protracted education opportunities and 
reduction of working hours. The first one, in particular, consisted of three strategies: measures 
assisting older long-term unemployed to receive benefits and then passing progressively towards 
retirement; early retirement offered to older workers with long-work history; options for workers 
in ill conditions. These measures became important for firms because they gain the possibility to 
cut exceeded labour force in a more “pacific” and “socially-responsible” way.   
 The male-breadwinner model was consolidated, leaving no rooms for gender equalization, with 
low rate of employment for women, differently from Nordic countries. ALMPs, in this case, were 
mostly applied to long-term unemployment, but expenditure for PLMPs was still largely 
predominant anyway. The maintenance of the welfare state came most from payroll-taxes, as well 
as with the influent contribution of social partners. More in general, these countries in this period 
were still able to keep inequality low.  
The trajectory of “liberal regimes”, mainly during Margaret Tatcher era in UK, and to a lesser 
extent also Ireland, represented the experiences mostly relying on the monetarist paradigm, 
following strategies of deregulation, privatization and marketization. In addition to this, the role 
of social partners was fully emptied, from welfare state in general and in particular labour market 
regulation. Benefits were also cut and reduced in a flat rate form. From the point of view of 
ALMPs, both demand-side and supply-side measures were reduced. In particular, only very young 
school leavers maintain the right to participate to training initiatives (Lindsay and Mailand, 2004). 
Many other forms of training and work programs were dismantled in favour of work incentives 
fostering faster transition of job-seekers back to employment. The end of the “welfare 
dependency” represented the main goal of this age, reducing the role of the State in favour of that 
of the market, consequently spreading inequalities.  
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1.4.2. The role of European Union and international dimension 
 
At the beginning of the Nineties unemployment remained a salient issue across western European 
countries5 (figure 1.1) 
 
Fig. 1.1   Rate of unemployment in 1990 
 
Source: OECD.stat 
 
 In addition to this, the issue of skills shortages started to emerge, highlighting the increasing 
mismatch of jobseekers’ skills and employers’ demands, facing both the rapid changes in 
technology and the challenge brought to the European system by the globalization of the economy 
(Blanchard, 2006). At the same time, during this period, further important demographic changes 
occurred, especially with the birth rates decline and the growth of life expectations, bringing in 
the public debate the issue of the sustainability of old age social security systems. Due to the 
budget constraints introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, there were not anymore rooms to address 
unemployment managing aggregate demand, registering an increasingly reliance on monetarist 
agenda for economic policies. For what concerns employment and social policy, instead, the 
framework created by EU started to play an important role, as new actor in this context. In 1993 
the European Council settled in Copenhagen started to conceive the need to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to the pursuit of growth, competitiveness and the reduction of 
unemployment. For this purpose, the Council invited the Commission to present a White Paper. 
The Commission at that time was headed by the French socialist Jacques Delors, who presented 
the White Paper “Growth, competitiveness and employment. The challenges and ways forward 
                                                        
5 The rate of unemployment was 10.6%, with considerable levels for youth (20.6%) and women (12.2%) (OECD, 
1994b) 
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into the 21st century”, outlining his perspective of a strong social-dimension to counterbalance the 
essential neo-liberal view underlying the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, Delors proposed to adopt the 
same logic of Maastricht. Alongside the new European economic governance, strengthened with 
the pursuit of a single currency, the White Paper set medium and long-term targets for social 
policies, imaging a model bringing together competition and solidarity at the same time. The main 
goal was then to build a sort of "Social Maastrich", aiming at creating, by the year 2000, 15 million 
new jobs. In this sense, it was no longer enough to focus only on economic growth, but deep 
interventions on the labour market were also necessary, in order to overcome the problem of 
structural unemployment, especially youth and long-term unemployment, addressing also the 
problem of skill shortages and mismatch. Education and training became, now, the fundamental 
tools to combat long-term unemployment and to facilitate the employment of young people. In 
particular, the strategic role of new active labour market policy regime emphasized not only the 
importance of training and qualification for the job-seekers, but also the operational principles 
regarding the relationship between state and job-seekers, to be characterized by new “contractual” 
forms.  
By reorganizing the educational and training system, it could be assumed that some of the 
resources allocated to UBs would be diverted, instead, to training programs, in particular for 
young people without qualifications and for the long-term unemployed. According to the 
Commission document, the distinct element of all actions concerning training must be the 
recognition of human capital, a basic element underlying the entire structure of the proposals in 
the White Paper. Investment in human capital as resource able to make the economic system more 
competitive (European Commission, 1993).  
The following year, also OECD demonstrated dynamicity on these issues, publishing the “Jobs 
Study”, which would become the focal point for all subsequent OECD reform proposals, with 
ten recommendations to its Member states (Box 1.2)(OECD, 1994).  
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Box 1.2 Ten recommendations of the OECD Jobs Study, 1994 
 
The emphasis for ALMPs here was strictly connected to the need of more flexible labour markets 
as key instrument for economic growth and job creation, to the point that the OECD Jobs Study 
was interpreted as neo-liberal prescriptions and deregulatory approach, giving particular weight 
to five labour market institutions: minimum wages, employment protection legislation (EPL), 
unemployment benefits, tax wedge, wage-setting arrangements (Watt, 2006). ALMPs in the 
context of the OECD became more related to the need of making more efficient and effective job-
matching and placement services, relying on work-incentives reinforcement, differently from the 
more employability-oriented recommendations. In this context, with the aim to encourage the 
participation of all groups in society, these prescriptions included also the expansion of atypical 
or non-standard employment relationships.  
In the same year the Essen Council recalled the objectives of the White Paper, reaffirming the 
importance of taking a strategy to face the unemployment problem inside the EU, while further 
steps towards the consolidation of the single currency were occurring, with many implications for 
national budgetary rules of Member countries. Among the conclusion of the meeting in Essen, the 
Council advanced five guidelines (Box 1.3) (European Council, 1994). 
 
Box 1.3 Five Guidelines of the Essen Council 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1) Central role of the vocational training in improving employment opportunities;  
2) Increase employment-intensiveness of growth by means of more flexible organization of work, a wage policy 
encouraging investments and productivity and the promotion of local initiatives creating jobs.  
3) Reduction of non-wage costs;  
4) Improvement of the effectiveness of labour market policies moving from passive to ALMPs;  
5) Facilitate the access to the labour market for categories such as young people, long-term unemployed and women.  
 
 
1. Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and, in conjunction with good structural 
policies, make it sustainable, i.e. non-inflationary.  
2. Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by improving frameworks for its 
development.  
3. Increase flexibility of working-time (both short-term and lifetime) voluntarily sought by workers and 
employers.  
4. Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, and restrictions on, the creation and 
expansion of enterprises.  
5. Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that prevent wages from reflecting local 
conditions and individual skill levels, in particular of younger workers.  
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of employment in the private sector.  
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their effectiveness.  
8. Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging changes in education and training 
systems.  
9. Reform unemployment and related benefit systems — and their interaction with the tax system — such that 
societies’ fundamental equity goals are achieved in ways that impinge far less on the efficient functioning of 
the labour markets.  
10. Enhance product market competition so as to reduce monopolistic tendencies and weaken insider-outsider 
mechanisms while also contributing to a more innovative and dynamic economy.  
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The institutionalization of a “European Employment Strategy” (EES) was achieved at the 
Amsterdam Summit in 1997. The White Paper and the Essen European Council thus inserted, for 
the first time in the body of the original Treaty, a Title dedicated to the employment (Title VIII), 
in the context of the revision work that would create the Amsterdam Treaty, indicating that 
employment policy objectives became equally as important as macro-economic objectives.  
Member States agreed on a multilateral surveillance process and on a permanent, treaty-based 
Employment Committee, with the aim of policy coordination among national LMPs. In relation 
to this, EES should not to be considered a policy, in the strict sense of the term, not corresponding 
to effective powers, rather as procedure, which defines objectives and issues recommendations to 
Member States to achieve them (Raveaud, 2007). 
 On the basis of this procedure, the European Council, every year, together with labour ministries 
of each Member State, should agree on “employment guidelines”, following a Commission 
proposal and establishing common priorities for Member’s States LMPs. Then, every Member 
State should draw up a “national action plan”, addressed to Council and Commission, describing 
how the employment guidelines would be implemented at the national level. Commission and 
Council would examine these plans jointly collecting the feedbacks in a “joint employment 
report”. Finally, the Commission intervened to review the action plans and to propose country 
specific recommendations, issued by the European Council.  
This procedure was based on the definition of objectives by the EU ruling bodies and the 
transposition by Member States, representing a kind of governance relying on a continuous and 
participate learning process (Zeitlin, 2008) and attempting to encourage Member States to 
exchange best practices, transfer and adapt them to different contexts, in order to improve national 
policies. The EES, at least in its first phase, was conventionally referred to as "Luxembourg 
Process" since, at the Luxembourg European Council in November 1997, it was decided to 
immediately apply the provisions on employment included in the Treaty, despite the revisions 
decided in Amsterdam were not yet in force. The employment guidelines, adopted from that year, 
were divided into four "pillars": improving employability; developing entrepreneurship; 
encouraging adaptability of business and their employees; strengthening policies for equal 
opportunities (Box 1.4)(European Councilropean Union, 1997). 
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Box 1.4 First Guidelines of the EEC for the period 1997-2002. 
 
We have to focus, in particular, on the first pillar, which was the only one in which quantitative 
targets were included. The concept of employability was becoming one of the key words of the 
process of convergence in this field, aiming at increasing people's ability to actively seek 
employment, to find and maintain it, or to find it once it is lost (Gualmini and Rizza, 2013). 
The fulfilment of quantified targets with respect of early interventions, preventive strategies, the 
individualization of services and increase in ALMPs’ participation rates, went necessarily through 
the creation of an adequate “infrastructure” of PES, capable of delivering such measures 
adequately.   
Objectives explicitly addressed by the European Commission through communication 641/1998 
- with the emblematic title “Modernizing employment services to support the European 
Employment Strategy”- specified that national PESs were a key tool for the EES. An essential 
institution for the development of all pillars, with an absolutely central role in the functioning of 
national labour markets. The Commission made the case that four basic requirements should be 
fulfilled in order to discharge PES’s responsibilities under the EES: gain substantial access to 
Employability Pillar  
Guidelines 1 and 2: Implementing preventive and employability-oriented strategies, building on the early 
identification of individual needs and ensuring that young/long-term unemployed persons are offered a new 
start in the form of training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measure after 6/12 months 
respectively. 
Guideline 3: Shifting people from welfare dependency to work and training by increasing the number of 
unemployed people in ALMP measures, gradually achieving the average of the three most successful Member 
States, and at least 20 percent. 
Guidelines 4 and 5: Developing partnerships as a framework for the provision of training and lifelong learning.  
Guidelines 6 and 7: Facilitating the transition from school to work.  
 
Entreprenurship Pillar  
Guidelines 8, 9 and 10: Reducing overhead costs and removing the administration burden to promote business 
activities, especially for small and medium-sized business enterprises, exploiting all of the available 
opportunities for job-creation, including the social economy, encouraging self-start-ups. 
Guidelines 11 and 12: Making the tax system more employment friendly by reducing labour and non-wage 
labour costs, in particular for unskilled and low-paid work. 
 
Adaptability Pillar 
Guidelines 13 and 14: Inviting social partners to negotiate flexible working  arrangements and to examine the 
possibility of more adaptable types of work contracts. 
Guidelines 15: Re-examining the obstacles to investment in human resources and possibly provide for tax and 
other incentives for the development of in-house training.   
 
Equal Opportunities Pillar 
Guideline 16: Reducing the gap in unemployment rates between men and women and actively supporting the 
employment of women.  
Guideline 17: Improving access to care services. 
Guideline 18: Facilitating the return to work after child bearing. 
Guideline 19: Giving special attention to people with disabilities.  
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vacancies, make arrangements for systematic case management for all registered unemployed 
jobseekers, contribute to the coordinated delivery of counselling, guidance, training services, 
implementation of job subsidy schemes, transforming employment offices into “one-stop shops” 
at the local level and implement a large part of the measures in favour of reintegration of workers 
on the labour market and develop strong partnerships with other relevant actors on the market 
(European Commission, 1998). The Commission later added further specific recommendations, 
concerning: the development of service enterprise features, the use of modern information and 
communication technologies to improve client services, case management and early interventions, 
the need to continuous monitoring and in-depth analysis of labour markets, coordination of PES 
functions and the need to build partnerships with labour market stakeholders (European 
Commission, 1999). Following the guidelines drawn up at EU level, PES should then represent a 
potential tool for employment growth. In these terms, the increase in public spending for its 
operation would trigger a reduction in unemployment, (almost) correspondingly to the investment 
made. The Commission, aware of the economic and organizational effort thus imposed, ensured, 
at the same time, that it would co-finance the investments necessary for the modernization of 
employment services through the European Social Fund6(ESF).  
In particular, the EU recognized the need for the modernization of the national PESs along the 
principles of New Public Management, as new emerging paradigm of public administration, 
becoming increasingly popular in public sector reforms. Principles concerning the way to manage 
the public sector applying principles taken from the private sector (Hood, 1991; Pollit et al., 2007). 
The main idea, in this context, is the transformation of state bureaucracies into modern 
management agencies, by means of incentives for contracting-out, increasing competition, 
deregulation and more contractual relationship between bureaucrats and users, to be considered 
like customers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Pollit and Bouckaert, 1995, 2000, 2004; Weishaupt, 
2010). Particular emphasis is put on performance evaluation and on the concept of “Management 
by Objectives” (MBO), used to verify, on the basis of measurable indicators, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services. The practical principles of MBO consist of target setting, 
decentralised operationalisation and implementation, monitoring of (ongoing and final) results, 
and practical conclusions based on a final performance assessment. The comprehensive study 
conducted by Mosley et al. (2001) about MBO developments in PESs of European countries, led 
to the main conclusions that they help to set priorities in labour market policies and standards in 
terms of which PES work can be assessed, focus on the policy outputs and impacts, provide means 
to improve both effectiveness and efficiency of policies, support adequately the implementation 
of EES.  
                                                        
6 The Regulation (CE) n. 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the European Council, addressing the use of 
the ESF for the programming period 2006-2013, established that, among the activities for which the Member States 
could have availed themselves of the Community co-financing, included those addressed to 'modernizing and 
strengthening labour market institutions, in particular employment services' (Article 3, paragraph 1, lecter b). 
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Parallel to the EES, then, the OECD assessed Member countries’ policies and their application of 
the “Jobs Study” recommendations, by means of “Jobs Study implementation reviews” and 
various “Employment outlooks”. These studies progressively moved towards conclusions very 
similar to those of the EU regarding the need of PES modernization by embracing NPM and 
private service orientation. OECD stressed the need to integrate core functions of PES - job 
brokerage, PLMPs administration and referral of the job-seekers to ALMPs - by setting up “one-
stop shop offices”, as well as the use of profiling techniques and reliance on NPM lines, focusing 
on MBO and contracting-out (OECD, 1997). In particular, the introduction of market signals was 
considered fundamental to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of PES operations. This “market 
competition” should have been made possible liberalizing rules and regulations governing private 
employment agencies.  
In this regard, it is important to underline two judgments produced by the European Court of 
Justice, at the beginning of the Nineties. The sentences “Macrotron” (C-44/1990) and “Job Center 
II” (C-55/96), declared the monopolistic system of PES incompatible with the Community 
competition law, due to abuse of a dominant position. Consequently, the ILO also ended up 
adapting itself to the new panorama of the labour market and producing new regulatory processes, 
in order to overcome the restrictions introduced with the past regulation. The new Convention n. 
181 of the 1997 has made a fundamental change in the liberalization of the placement function, 
leaving, after almost fifty years, full space to private employment agencies, and thus giving 
impetus to the dismantling of public monopoly. Among the functions pertaining to private 
providers, in addition to the intermediation between supply and demand, it also made provision 
for temporary employment, consisting of hiring workers in order to make them available to firms, 
establishing their tasks and supervising their execution. Free services for users represented the 
only condition posed to private employment agencies.  
The Lisbon European Council, held in March 2000, marked a significant change in the path of the 
EES, configuring what is considered to be its second phase, known as "Lisbon Process" or “Lisbon 
Strategy”. This Strategy has introduced two different kinds of innovation. The first, concerning 
policy agenda, related to the commitment of the EU towards medium-term goals for economic 
competitiveness, employment and social cohesion. The second, concerning the governance 
approach, inaugurating the so-called “open method of coordination”, based on «iterative 
benchmarking of national progress towards common European objectives and organized mutual 
learning» (Zeitlin, 2008, 436). Such approach would represent one of the most important legacy 
of the Lisbon Strategy, being used for many social policy areas, such as social inclusions, 
pensions, health care, encouraging mutual learning both among member countries and between 
them and the European institutions (Zeitlin, 2005). 
According to the conclusions of the Lisbon Council, the overarching aim of the EU has been «to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion» (European 
Council, 2000, 2). In this context, EES became part of the new Lisbon Strategy for what 
concerning employment. The following year, with the Stockholm Council, EES was strengthened 
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with hard targets to be achieved by the 2010, of which the main one was an overall EU 
employment rate equal to 70% and, in particular, 60% for women. In addition to this, the 
Stockholm Council of 2001 set further targets, both for the 2010 - raising the average EU 
employment rate for older men and women (aged 55–64) to 50% - and for the midterm – overall 
employment rate for 2005 of 67% and 57 for women.  
In 2002 the European Commission conducted a five-year review of the EES. To underpin the 
review of the EES the Commission coordinated an impact evaluation, based on national policy 
impact evaluation studies following a common thematic breakdown, and carry out an EU-wide 
employment performance assessment. The evaluation of the past five years points to clear 
structural improvements in the EU labour market, considering some successful outcomes such as 
10 million jobs being created in Europe between 1997 and 2002, unemployment declined by more 
than 4 millions and labour participation, driven largely by women, grew by nearly 5 millions.  
Despite marked differences between Member States and the difficulty of establishing clear causal 
relationships between overall performance and specific policies, over the same period a significant 
degree of convergence of national employment policies towards the objectives and the guidelines 
defined under the EES can be discerned. However, despite progress, the review still identified 
some challenges in terms of responding to demographic trends, the emergence of bottlenecks, 
regional differences in performance, and the ongoing economic and social restructuring, 
globalisation and enlargement7 (European Commission, 20028). 
The slow progress toward Lisbon targets led the EU institutions to set up a task force with the aim 
of revising the Strategy. Two mid-term reviews, in 2003 and 2004, were realized by the “High 
Level Group”, chaired by Wim Kok, former Dutch prime minister (Kok 2003, 2004). These 
reports sharply criticized the Strategy. The first report ended up with three priorities to reform 
EES: improving the supply of labour (i.e. by means of more effective activation strategies, 
increased female participation, active ageing); enhancing the adaptability and flexibility of labour 
markets and augmenting the share of investments in human resources. The second one 
emphasized the weakness of the open method of coordination, proving to be ineffective and 
underlining that governments do not show commitment to implement the Strategy nationally, 
lacking political will, whereas in many cases the legislation resulted not in line with the original 
directive or excessively complex. Some observers address this lacked political will to the aspect 
that government were frightened by the risk of loosing consensus with the implementation of the 
Strategy, revealing the failure of the EES in the objective of de-politicize employment policies by 
creating grounds for European convergence. In these respects, the Commission recommended to 
                                                        
 
8 EC (2002a) ‘Taking Stock of Five Years of the European Employment Strategy’, COM (2002) 416 final. Brussels: European 
Commission.  
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intensify peer pressure on Member States, relying on more transparency of the process of national 
implementation.  
These critiques were welcomed by the incoming president of the European Commission Barroso, 
announcing a “New Start” for the Lisbon Strategy. This relaunched Lisbon Strategy was 
characterized by a new institutional design, resulting from the combination of the European 
Employment Guidelines with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines into a single framework of 
24 “Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs”, dividing for macroeconomic, microeconomic 
and employment specific chapters.  
Searching for a new model of employment policy, Lisbon Strategy saw in the growing paradigm 
of “flexicurity” a new possible avenue (European Commission, 2007). A concept that certainly 
has been widespread and much abused. Despite it was born in Netherlands9, in the public debate 
it has been always referred to the Danish labour market policies, in the form of the so-called 
“golden triangle”(see box 1.5), represented by the interplay of three key aspects: flexibility, given 
by easy “hiring and firing” for employers; social security for workers, given by both generous 
PLMPs and well-functioning ALMPs, enabling them to easier transitions from unemployment to 
employment. The attractiveness of this model, then, came by its potential role of third way 
between flexibility ascribed to liberal welfare states and social safety nets of the traditional 
Scandinavian welfare regimes (Madsen, 2004).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 A new approach to labour market flexibility and security was adopted at the end of 1995 when the Dutch Minister 
of Social Affairs and Employment, Ad Melkert attempted, in a memorandum called ‘Flexibility and Security’ 
(Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid, December 1995), to strike a balance between flexibility and (social) security. This 
memorandum contained an interrelated set of starting points and proposals for modifying the dismissal protection 
enjoyed by employees in standard employment relationships, abolishing the permit system for temporary work 
agencies in respect of their placement activities and enhancing the legal position of temporary agency workers, whose 
relationship with the agency is to be considered, in principle, a standard employment contract. In the autumn of 1995, 
the very concept has been developed. The sociologist and member of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor hot Regeringsbeleid, WRR) Hans Adriaansens launched the concept in 
speeches and interviews. Adriaansens defined the concept as a shift from 'security within a job' toward 'security of a 
job', holding a plea a for different attitude towards flexibility (among workers) and for flexible and activating social 
security system (Wiltaghen and Troos, 2004)  
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Box 1.5 The Danish model  
 
 
During the nineties Denmark caught international interest experiencing a dramatic decline in unemployment. From 
9,6% in 1993 the rate of unemployment fell to 4,3% in 2001, while registering at the same time an increase in the 
employment rate up to 76,2% marking a record level among EU Member States. This has stimulated the ideas about 
the existence of a unique Danish model. 
Despite being traditionally associated to Nordic countries, Denmark has showed a lower level of employment 
protection, much more comparable to liberal welfare states than Scandinavian ones. The non-restrictive employment 
protection legislation allows employers to dismiss workers with short notice. On the contrary the UB system has 
been aligned with other Nordic Countries, characterized by universalism and high net income replacement rates. In 
that period, the vast majority of unemployed people members of an unemployment insurance fund received 
unemployment benefits calculated at the rate of 90% of their previous earned income, with a ceiling of Dkr 162 000 
(21 800 euros) per year (2003), for a maximum period of 4 years until 1994, then reduced to 2 years in 1996 and to 
one year in 1999.  
The third element, ALMPs, has been characterized by a decentralized system implemented after a general labour 
market reform coming into force in 1994, after strong political pressure to break long-term unemployment. The 
decentralization of policy implementation relies on regional tripartite labour market councils, which are empowered 
to design interventions to fit local needs.  
The labour market reforms introduced in between 1994 and 1999 realigned the whole set-up of passive and positive 
incentives. The time “threshold” for activation was decreased to 4 years in 1996 and to 12 months in 1999. An option 
for early activation at three months was introduced for users at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Compulsory 
activation started to increasingly rely on individual action plans. At the same time was introduced a wide range of 
non-financial incentives, including high-quality training, remaining in the hands of the State.  
 
 Fig. represents the so-called “golden triangle”. The two arrows linking the flexible labour market and the generous 
welfare system are indicating workers affected by unemployment and returning into employment after a short spell 
of unemployment. Those not able to return quickly into employment are assisted by ALMPs, favouring their re-
entering into the labour market (Madsen, 2004).  
 
 
 
At the same time, however, a series of conditions has to be met in order to implement flexicurity as in the Danish 
model:  
- Labour market policies cannot generate jobs by themselves, therefore pressure from the demand side is 
required, creating ground for favourable economic and labour market conditions, where ALMPs play an 
important role in securing workers’ skill supply;  
- Trade unions and employers’ organizations, together in a corporatist governance framework, have always 
played an important role in the implementation of flexicurity;  
- The system is costly, both generous PLMPs and well-designed ALMPs require massive injection of 
resources in order to provide good level of security.  
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In these respects, flexicurity had the potential to represent an alternative to the traditional common 
idea of making employers more responsible by setting high employment protection. As ALMPs 
are one of the components of flexicurity, there is an obvious role for PES to play in supporting 
flexicurity. In particular, in this context, PES plays a crucial role to provide people with the 
assistance they need to keep their skills up, as well as providing them with adequate UBs if they 
were to lose their job for a period of time. This role calls for PES to enable and motivate inactive 
people capable of work so that they can move from passive benefit schemes into employment. 
The increasing flexibility and diversity of the labour market represent the double challenge of 
supporting unemployed jobseekers in the transition to employment and to offer services to 
employers to improve labour market transparency (European Commission, 2007).  
Flexicurity became strongly supported by the European Commission, seeing in it a means to 
reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, suitable for the modernization of labour 
markets and the creation of “more and better jobs” (id.), by increasing at the same time 
adaptability, employment and social cohesion. Elsewhere in Europe the flexicurity debate has 
been highly politicized, receiving much attention and being taken up for reforms in many 
countries. However, as it resulted from a first comparative assessment of flexicurity 
implementation made by Wilthagen et al. (2003) at the end of the Nineties, reforms showed 
different kind of combinations between flexibilization and security, revealing that these different 
possibilities of trade-off between the two factors seemed to correlated with corporatist systems 
and other traditions of social partnership, consultation and coordination where it is always 
required a certain degree of mutual trust. This aspect is related to the fact that flexicurity’s 
implementation, in these respects, is largely connected to path-dependency considerations.  
Nevertheless, the role of flexicurity after the outbreak of the economic crisis, from 2007, seems 
to be not unambiguous. If we look at Danish levels of employment and unemployment in this 
period it comes no surprise that the low level of EPL has led to more volatile changes over the 
business cycle (Madsen, 2013). A positive assessment of flexicurity has been expressed by the 
OECD (2012), underlining the role Danish welfare system as “buffer” in periods of crisis, where 
the decrease in GDP per capita is compensated by generous benefits and social policies aiming at 
helping especially lowest incomes. However, other observers, like Crouch (2014), have 
highlighted how, despite EU have embodied flexicurity in its strategy, policies imposed on the 
debtor countries involved in the crisis have put in second order the positive contribution to 
economic success that might be made pursuing most possibilities of security, stressing much more 
the need for flexibilization than high levels of income retention and hindering the role of trade 
unions in the official literature.  
During this period, influenced by the policy framework created by the EU, the OECD reassessed 
its decade-old JS in 2006 (OECD 2006). The “Reassessed Jobs Study” seemed to gradual move 
towards EES. Prescriptions in terms of deregulation of labour market institutions, charged to be 
neo-liberal oriented, left partially the floor to activation, need for generous UBs, removal of 
existing barriers to labour force participation, especially for under-represented groups, flexicurity, 
lifelong learning. Despite the underlining that there was no golden road for labour market 
 40 
performance, English speaking and Scandinavian countries were appreciated for their results. 
Concepts like activation, new issues concerning PES and flexicurity, in these regards, acted as 
“bridges” between EU and OECD, helping the exchange of ideas and practices between the two 
organizations (Weishaupt, 2011).  
More in general, the bursting of the international economic crisis has undermined the revival of 
the Strategy. The objectives set for 2010, which were already proceeding slowly, would have been 
completely missed, although in some countries, according to the EU Commission (2010), some 
interesting progress were made, and, at the overall level, EU institutions underlined the positive 
influence of the exchange of good practices. 
Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the Commission in 2010 gave a new name 
to the Strategy, calling it “Europe 2020”, and reformulating the targets, setting them on the same 
year to which the title referred (European Commission, 2010). Europe 2020, in particular, has 
been designed to deliver socially and environmentally sustainable growth. Employment goals 
have been changed around the new target of 75% employment rate, integrated together with other 
objectives related to education, energy, research and development and social exclusion10.   
This new framework wanted to lay the foundations for a sort of EU exit strategy with respect to 
the crisis. On this basis, layered into Europe2020, we can identify in particular two initiatives set 
to address and improve the social dimension of the EU: Social Investment Package (SIP) and 
Youth Guarantee (YG), adopted both in 2013 (Box 1.6).  
 
                                                        
10Europe 2020 is organized around five EU Headline Targets. In addition to the employment target there are: 3% of 
EU GDP must be invested in R&D; the "20/20/20" goals concerning climate / energy must be achieved; the school 
dropout rate must be less than 10% and at least 40% of young people must have a degree or diploma; 20 million 
fewer people anymore at risk of poverty. The headline targets are supported by 10 ‘Integrated Guidelines’ covering 
economic, environmental, employment and social issues, and seven ‘flagship initiatives’, the latter concerning 
institutional innovations. The policies adopted in these areas have to be reported in “National Reform Programmes” 
(NRPs). Concerning the policy objectives, two of the Integrated Guidelines are devoted to employment policy, and 
one to social exclusion.  
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Box 1.6 Social Investment Package and Youth Guarantee 
At the same time, the role of PES to support these measures and, more in general, to be capable 
to deliver ALMPs adequately, was remarked by the creation, in 2014, of the “European Network 
of Public Employment Services” (PES Network)11. This new institution has aimed at 
strengthening cooperation between Member Countries and the European Commission12 and 
developing joint initiatives for the exchange of information and practices, inside the framework 
of the EU 2020 Strategy, in order to improve effectiveness, efficiency and quality of services 
offered at the national level. PES Network is consulted by the Council and the European 
Parliament, the Commission and other European institutions and is governed by a steering 
committee (PES Board) made up of representatives of national governments and the Commission.  
However, it has been observed that Europe 2020 and its framework created to provide ground for 
EU to leave behind economic crisis, can be considered very weak if compared, both in terms of 
goals, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, to the EMU initiatives concerning the fiscal 
consolidation of the eurozone, namely “Fiscal Compact”, “Six Packs” and “Two Packs”. We 
might say that the instruments developed in response to the crisis have even altered the existing 
EU institutional framework with regard to labour market and social policy, putting as first-order 
objective the fiscal consolidation in the crisis context (De la Porte and Heins, 2015).    
  
                                                        
11 Decision 573/2014 / EU 
12 The PES Network include salso non-Member European countries as Norway and Iceland  
SIP represents a comprehensive paradigmatic approach that emphasizes the need to invest on individuals and their 
skills enhancing their labour market participation and combines this with other priorities, such as care responsibilities 
(European Commission, 2013). It implies investing in early childhood, schools, vocational training, upper tertiary 
education, activation and life-long learning (Morel et al, 2012). At the same time, temporary leave from the labour 
market should be facilitated without fear of job loss, putting emphasis on a universalist welfare state concept. SIP 
provides then an overarching policy framework to coordinate economic, labour market and social policies. Member 
States can receive specific recommendations in the area of social investment through Europe 2020 (European 
Commission, 2013) 
Parallel to the launching of the SIP, the initiative “Youth Guarantee” has attempted to address youth unemployment. 
It was another instrument layered onto the existing Europe 2020 framework. This program has aimed at ensuring 
that all young people under 25 get a concrete offer, either in terms of employment or education, within 4 months 
after having left formal education or become unemployed. The purpose has been to avoid the inactivity trap among 
young people, particularly those not in education, employment or training (the so called “NEET”). Member State 
progresses in this area are reported in “National Youth Implementation Plans’”, started to be reported in 2014. The 
importance of this initiative came also from the massive amount of resources - 6 billion of euros - reserved for its 
implementation (co-funded with Member States) (De la Porte and Heins, 2015). In particular, PESs have been central 
players in the implementation of the Youth Guarantee in almost all EU countries, becoming the main YG service 
provider and in charge of coordinating relevant partnership experiences (European Commission, 2014). At the same 
time YG has provided many possibilities for PES to improve their structures and functioning.  
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1.5. Three national experiences of reforms between Nineties and Two-Thousands 
 
In this paragraph we will present reforms implemented between Nineties and Two-thousands in 
Sweden, Germany and United Kingdom. We can use this short overview about these three 
national cases, each one representative of one of the “worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), in order to observe how they started from that period to rely on a similar policy 
agenda for their national reforms concerning LMPs. This exercise will be useful to understand to 
what extent we can effectively talk about “convergence” and how effective have been also the 
prescriptions formulated by supranational levels, in particular the EU level.  
 
1.5.1. United Kingdom  
 
The most recent configuration of British’s PES is the result of the projects implemented during 
the second half of Nineties, strongly oriented to the NPM principles. With the victory of the New 
Labour in the 1997 elections, there has been the introduction of new ALMPs schemes, in which 
PES assumed an absolutely central position, starting from the development of one-stop shop 
centres at the local level, in order to create a strong integration between social services and a 
single point of reference for a wide range of subjects and functions. In 2001, “Jobcentre Plus“ 
(JCP) was created, resulting from the merger of the Benefit Agency, responsible for the delivery 
of social benefits, and the Employment Service, responsible for employment assistance and 
matching services. According to the MBO approach, the functioning of the JCP is characterized 
by a strong emphasis on monitoring and performance evaluation. This new central structure agrees 
a series of annual targets with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. On the basis of these, 
the performance of services is shown for each month, highlighting the relative deviations from 
the expected value, either positive or negative. The most important target for understanding the 
British case is surely represented by the “job outcome”, relative to the number of unemployed 
people leaving the system of subsidies to enter the labour market. Each subject placed corresponds 
to a score, depending on the category to which it belongs, which is higher in terms of level of 
disadvantage for particular local areas. The reliance on this target makes immediate the idea of 
the typical work-first approach of this system and the new balance between rights and 
responsibilities on which all the welfare reform plans of the New Labour were focused. This is an 
approach characterized by short-term initiatives aimed at including the unemployed person in the 
labour market, according to a "quantitative" logic, which overshadows the quality of the work 
itself. The objective of JCP has been, in fact, to place the unemployed in the short-term period, 
“pushing” them into the occupational circuit, through a service that is as "holistic" as possible 
(Sartori 2013). Users follow a path with several stages, the so-called “jobseeker's journey”. After 
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a first contact with an operator, who acquires all the personal information of the applicant to verify 
the existence of the conditions to receive the benefit, it follows (within few days) an appointment 
with a personal advisor. This is one of the key figures in the whole process. The personal advisor 
provides a work-focused interview to the user, aimed to define his work profile, based on previous 
skills and career, in order to address him towards the most appropriate placement program. The 
interview produces a specific report, the “claimant commitment”, better known as “jobseeker's 
agreement”, which defines the obligations and rights of the unemployed, specifying actions and 
programs on which the Jobcentre commit to assist the jobseeker (the so-called action plan). To 
the jobseeker has been then required to go there every two weeks for an interview aimed at 
verifying the active engagement in the search for a job. If difficulties persist in the placement, 
every six months a new “restart” is scheduled, by means of a new in-depth interview, again with 
the personal adviser, to update the action plan. The job placement programs to which the seekers 
were addressed were an integral part of the reform plan designed by the New Labour government, 
under the ambitious name of “New Deal”. Some of them were mandatory, others optional, 
depending on the category of users interested. Mandatory were the “New Deal for Young People”, 
for under-24 unemployed for at least six months, and the “New Deal 25 Plus”, for over-25 
unemployed for more than 18 months. On the other hand, the optional programs have been turned 
to particular categories, in order to avoid their exposure to the danger of social exclusion. These 
categories were: over-50 after six months of unemployment (“New Deal 50 Plus”), unemployed 
recipients of disability benefits (“New Deal for Disabled People”) and unemployed lone parents 
(“New Deal for Lone Parents”). The dynamic was the same for everyone. After an "entry phase" 
(gateway period), under the individualized assistance of the personal adviser, further options 
followed, intensified according to the level of employability of the seeker, varying between: 
subsidized employment, return to education, training courses, voluntary works and public works. 
During these programs jobseekers hold their benefit, the “jobseeker allowance”. Those who 
refused a program had to be sanctioned with the suspension of the payment of the same benefit. 
The New Labour put a lot of emphasis on the New Deal underlining even the injection of some 
elements typical of the Scandinavian model (Gualmini and Hopkin 2012). Later on, with the 
advent of conservative government in 2010, it was announced the goal of creating a single 
welfare-to-work scheme. In 2011 the “Work Program” (WP) has been launched, a universal 
program aimed at assisting all recipients of benefits. The role of PES and the figure of the personal 
adviser remained central, but at the same time private providers and organizations outside the JCP 
circuit were gaining space. The characteristics of the conditionality remain in the hands of the 
JCP, which maintains both the monitoring of the actual job-search efforts performed by jobseekers 
and the sanctioning power over them, acting on the basis of the providers' reports regarding waste 
or lack of commitment. More in general, UK PES has never been found under a public monopoly 
regime. The degree of freedom for private employment agencies has always been very broad. 
There has never been a real coordination with public agencies, prevailing a competitive design 
among the services delivered. Indeed, we can neither talk about real competition, given that public 
and private providers have always insisted on different user basins: the private ones on the “white 
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collar sector”, the public ones more focused instead on the working class (Sartori, 2013). Despite 
the increase in the market share of private providers wanted by the Thatcher governments, it was 
the New Labour, starting from 1997, to decisively enhance and strengthen the role of private 
operators in PES. Not necessarily through a competitive logic, but also through innovative 
partnership strategies. From this perspective, the most significative experience has been that of 
the “Employment Zones” (EZs). These were areas defined on the basis of weak employment 
conditions, where the jobseekers were assigned to private providers, even with the task to deliver 
subsidies. For each EZ, providers could act in a monopoly or in competition with each other 
depending on the type of contracting arrangement defined at the central level. The financing was 
then based on the results achieved. The job-placement in the context of the EZs followed three 
phases, retracing the strategy of the New Deal programs: the first one consisting of four months, 
with the identification of the objectives through the action plan, the second one, of twenty-six 
weeks, with the start of a placement program, the third one, depending on the persistence of 
difficulties at the end of the twenty-six weeks, when the job-seeker returned to the JCP and, after 
eighteen months, had to be redirected to another EZ. In some areas there was a greater 
effectiveness in placement of the weaker subjects, rewarding the flexibility applied by providers 
(Hales et al., 2007).  
 
1.5.2. Germany 
 
At the beginning of the new century, the "red-green" coalition government presided over by Social 
Democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder decided to set up a commission that would have the task 
of producing an "important structural reform of the German labour market. The proposals of the 
Hartz Commission, named after the president chairing it13, were collected in a broad report which, 
from 2003 to 2005, was largely transposed into four separate legislative acts (“Hartz I-II-III-IV”). 
The Hartz reforms represent the legislative frameworks on which LMPs in Germany are currently 
held. The reform of PES, starting from 2004 with Hartz III, became, together with the reform of 
social safety nets (“Hartz II”), one of the main steps of the changes made. One of the first 
transformations occurred with the change in the name of the national coordination organization, 
from "Federal Office for Labor" (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) in "Federal Employment Agency" 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit). However, this should not be considered as a fully-fledged agency 
(Konle-Seidl 2008), since it independently sets targets and objectives to be pursued. At the basis 
of the reform, above all, the design for which the local employment centres, also under the new 
name of "local employment agencies" (Agenturen für Arbeit), must assume the characteristics of 
unitary structures according to the model of the one-stop shop, tracing a new system of multi-
purpose centres, competent for both employment services and the delivery of different types of 
                                                        
13 Peter Hartz was an important German manager, as human resources director of Volkswagen. The commission also 
registered the participation of a team of personalities from the German business landscape, as well as representatives 
of employers 'and workers' associations. 
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benefits. At the intermediate level of the Länder are placed the "Regional Directorates" 
(Regionaldirektionen) with the task of coordinating the activities of local agencies. Above all, it 
is the Federal Agency holding the task of ensuring homogeneity throughout the country. In reality, 
the current system of PES in Germany is divided into several one-stop shops, due to the resistance 
encountered in the implementation by municipalities, concerning their prerogatives with regard 
to social assistance14.  
Local employment agencies, competent for the unemployment insurance benefit 
(Arbeitslosengeld I), are associated with the municipalities in another structure, the Jobcentre, 
with the aim of coordinating active measures with social assistance managed by the 
municipalities, combining the delivery of the social assistance benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II) by the 
BA and the payment of the rent or other social expenses by the municipality. As a consequence, 
more often, agencies are responsible for the short-term unemployment, whereas, on the contrary, 
the Jobcentres are addressed more to the long-term unemployed. The need to build a system that 
was tailored to the needs of users meant that the rationalization of the employment centres took 
place at the sign of the reduction of the load of users for each operator, in order to facilitate the 
“customization” of the services offered. Each centre has its own budget and a wide discretionary 
power, with the objective of being able to organize services and interventions as much as possible 
respondent to the specific needs of users. At the first contact by the user corresponds an initial 
pre-profiling phase. Subsequently, an operator responsible for the subsidies intervenes, in order 
to verify the rights of the subject and after this the same jobseeker is assigned to a personal adviser, 
for an in-depth interview. This should provide a more accurate profiling, placing the user in one 
of the six targets built through the criteria of employability (distance from the labour market and 
risk of long-term unemployment). The jobseeker can be directly placed, on the basis of available 
vacancies, or alternatively destined to the program deemed most appropriate for him by the 
personal advisor. Unemployed and personal advisor agree on an action plan, formalized through 
an “integration agreement” (Eingliederungsvereinbarung), which contains obligations and rights 
of the unemployed and the program for which it is intended. Programs can be: training, job 
creation, subsidized work and self-employment support. The training is divided into different 
types: short-term training, basic professional training, return to education, German language 
courses for foreigners. Different, especially at the level of basic vocational training, are programs 
that start from the school, such as supported placement and incentives for firms offering 
apprenticeships to hire young people. The programs related to continuous training are instead 
intended to favour the job reintegration of the unemployed or the retraining, perhaps achieving a 
professional qualification that allows to find an employment in another sector with greater 
demand. A fundamental innovation at the base of the new Hartz schemes has been the design of 
                                                        
14 With the “option clause”, 69 municipalities have been given temporarily exclusive competence for administering 
the new system.  
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job-to-job placement, the preventive approach such as all workers, at least three months before 
the termination of the relationship, are obliged to communicate to the local agency the coming 
status of unemployment, in such a way as to favour an immediate relocation. The penalty against 
the person who fails to comply corresponds to a temporary curtailment of UBs.  
It should be emphasized that the Hartz reforms also went in the direction of strengthening the 
market devices in the outsourcing of PES (Kone-Seidl 2005), enhancing the role of third parties 
to improve the system. The public monopoly of the placement was abolished in 1994, as a result 
of the “Macrotron sentence”. The role of private providers is very similar to the English context, 
where the devices used do not replace the public service but try to integrate and complete the latter 
and innovate the practices (Finn, 2005). One of the more discussed tools in this sense have been 
the “personal service agencies” (Personal Service Agenturen - PSA), no longer in force since 
2009. Each local agency would have activated one of these structures internally or stipulating an 
external contract with a private employment agency. These were temporary employment agencies, 
which employed the hardest unemployed people to place. The agencies were selected through 
tendering procedures, whose participation was subjected to the particular requisites (competence, 
experience, performances), building a ranking on the basis of which the public administration 
stipulated contracts with the private employment agency deemed most deserving in terms of the 
best price and quality of the service provided. The contract contained vacancies to be covered in 
relation to certain "target" groups of disadvantaged individuals. The private employment agency 
would have received remuneration for every unemployed hired, established ex-ante by the call for 
tenders, aimed at covering the costs of the assistance, plus a share for the achievement of certain 
results in the placement of the subjects. In particular, a sum was established for a first placement, 
which increased depending on the duration of employment. At the PSA, however, the possibility 
of rejecting the unemployed assigned by the local agencies was reserved, if considered to be 
particularly hard to assist. It is not difficult to think about what may have been the reasons that 
led to the rethinking of this system. 
The PSAs were naturally brought to "welcome" the easiest to place subjects, according to the 
phenomenon of the “creaming”, about which we will talk deeper later on. Practice facilitated by 
the absence of sanctions against private employment agencies. Indeed, the possibility for the 
public administration to terminate the contract with the PSA was guaranteed, but this choice was 
almost never implemented due to the high transaction costs associated with the call for a new 
public tender (Sartori 2013). The search for greater effectiveness and efficiency through the 
introduction of market mechanisms, by encouraging competition between private employment 
agencies, clashed also due to the excessive rigidity at the entrance, due to the requirements for 
participation in the tender. Currently, the activation of such mechanisms is left to the discretion 
of the public local administration. Private providers may also be involved through another 
mechanism, represented by the voucher system. Those unemployed for more than 6 weeks are 
entitled to a voucher of 2.000 euros amount, which can be spent at the private employment agency 
chosen by the subject. These agencies are then paid only on condition that the jobseekers are 
placed in an employment relationship of at least fifteen hours a week and for at least three months. 
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Here, once again, there is the search for a competitive dynamic among private providers. This 
does not equally avoid the risk of adverse selection, taking charge only of the most desirable 
subjects, as well as the search for an employment in the shortest possible time, even at the cost of 
providing unsuitable jobs for the characteristics of the jobseekers. 
The framework of German LMPs would not be complete if we did not mention what was the 
fundamental objective of promoting a "low-wage labour market area" (Gualmini e Rizza 2011). 
Measures of this type concerned the stimulation of marginal work, as an instrument for stabilizing 
regular work and encouraging the emergence of informal work. These are the “Mini-jobs”, 
granting a “wage” up to 450 euros, and the “Midi-Jobs”, from 450 euros to 850 euros, “salaries” 
aimed at both unemployed and workers employed in other marginal jobs, and who can therefore 
perform more Mini-jobs. In the first type, social security contributions are not paid by the 
employee, while in the second they tend to contribute to the standard contribution as close to 850 
euros as the maximum remuneration possible (Schmid and Modrack, 2008). 
 
1.5.3. Sweeden  
 
The Swedish PES change has occurred in the mid-2000s, starting from the structure, oriented 
towards a configuration supposed to be more efficient. This new "Administration for the labour 
market" (Arbetsförmedlingen) is articulated in a "National labour market agency" (AMS), with 
ramifications in "Areas of the local labour market". Specifically, the national territory is divided 
into four macro-areas, which in turn are divided into several regions of the labour market, 
identified on the basis of hiring percentage of firms and commuting. At the local level, the 
employment centres operate in every city. Every year, they must achieve results that meet the 
targets set by the central level, which then monitors the trends. However, there is no reward 
mechanism, neither for the achievement nor for the non-achievement of these (Sartori 2013). 
According to the same reform process, we could also talk here, with a good approximation, about 
experiences of employment centres built on the one-stop shop model. The current system 
provides, in fact, that the "Tax Agency", the "Agency for pensions" and the "Agency for Social 
Insurance", have to deliver a series of services at the same time in terms of both social assistance 
and employment assistance. However, these are experiences that do not include, among the 
services offered, the delivery of UBs, and that only concern certain areas of the country, usually 
characterized by a fairly problematic unemployment rate. The registration of the jobseeker is 
however a mandatory condition for the eligibility of UBs. 
He is assigned to a tutor (“coach”) for the entire period of unemployment. Within one month he 
agrees with the subject on an "individual action plan" (individuell handlingsplan), updated every 
six months. Every month the subjects are required to prepare a "report" on the activities 
undertaken for the job search (aktivitetsrapport), together with the further initiatives included in 
the individual action plan. In the first interview, using profiling techniques, users are placed in 
one of the four targets built according to the risk of long-term unemployment, in order to offer the 
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program that best suits the needs of the subject (Konle-Seidl 2008). In any case, the unemployed 
person is obliged to accept any proposal made to him, even for jobs that involve disqualifying 
tasks or particular territorial movements. The relationship between public and private employment 
can be defined as "peaceful coexistence" (Sartori 2013). The public monopoly fell in the nineties 
as well and then private employment agencies have been completely liberalized. Despite this, 
there is not a fully competitive configuration between public and private sector, because the two 
are aimed at different groups of users: those who are less specialized and less qualified to the 
public; subjects with a higher professional approach instead, to the private providers. The logic is 
the same as in the German case, private providers are kompletterande aktörer, they intervene in a 
complementary way rather than becoming a substitute for the public actors, sometimes 
establishing cooperative mechanisms. For example, as previously mentioned, since all 
unemployed are obliged to enrol in employment centres in order to receive UBs, private 
employment agencies refer to the same database of public operators. It should be stressed, 
however, that ALMPs are almost completely outsourced. The public administration, in any case, 
announces tenders that can also be attended by trade unions and other public bodies, based on the 
proposed projects. ALMPs have traditionally played a strategic role in the Swedish 
macroeconomic equilibrium as we have seen in the previous pages, becoming influencing in other 
countries following the initiatives developed by Gosta Rehn. It is not by chance that ALMPs in 
Sweden absorb an important share of state resources. The Swedish secret concerning full 
employment achievement corresponds to a high level of labour supply that can be used through 
measures aimed at increasing the skills and adaptability of workers. In this context, the 
government has repeatedly stressed the need to focus on segments of those most at risk such as: 
young people, disabled, long-term unemployed and over fifty. In this respect, the profiling 
techniques of employment centres play a key role. The unemployed are assigned to an active 
labour market program, distinguishing between two macro categories: training / retraining and 
work programs, which give entitlement to an allowance, equal to 65% of the previous income if 
insured, or if not insured, equal to a flat amount; work placement programs, usually public works 
(of which Sweden has a great tradition) which instead give the right to a real salary. Since the end 
of the Nineties, significant elements of workfare have been introduced in Sweden, both by centre-
left governments and by centre-right governments, aimed at injecting greater elements of 
conditionality on subsidies. Among these, very important, when the subject ends his period of 
perception of UBs, is the activation of a so-called “umbrella program”: the “Job and Development 
Program” (Jobb-och utvecklingsgarantin - JOB), evolution of the previous “Activity Guarantee” 
(activitetsgarantin - AG), which was a framework within which a series of measures are offered 
to users. In the first phase, with a total duration of 450 hours, the jobseekers participate in the first 
type of programs, of short duration, related to research, advice and guidance, pretraining, 
vocational training, work experience, work training, support for self-employment. Everything 
takes place with a close relationship with a personal coach. If within the 450 days the participants 
have not yet found an employment, they are assigned by the respective coach to a job placement 
program, mainly concerning public work, accompanied by measures such as incentives for hiring 
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and social security contributions for employers. After two years the subjects are again subjected 
to an examination of their skills in order to get a new destination within further training activities. 
The subjects lose their economic benefits at any time they choose either to abandon the program 
or to refuse a job without justified reason. 
In any case, it should be said that, in terms of LMPs, Sweden, like other Scandinavian countries, 
should be distinguished by the role historically assumed by social partners. They are very "third" 
operators, alternative to both the public sector and the private sector, providing member-based 
organizations of unemployment insurance and employment assistance for workers. These are 
entities created on the basis of collective agreements between trade unions with employer 
representative organizations. This phenomenon, going ever more expanding (to date there are 
about 20 collective agreements of this type), has further marked the plural and diversified 
character of the Swedish PES system. The initiatives of the social partners do not act as 
complementary structures to the public ones, but they are conceived as "substitutes", where the 
public is deficient 
 
1.6. Understanding institutional change 
 
To understand the rise of the modern concept of activation we have focused on temporal and 
cross-national institutional changes occurring in labour market policy regimes. This exercise has 
been important to understand how the activation paradigm has emerged, with implications arising 
from its features that will be at the centre of our next steps of analysis in the following chapters.  
Before going on with this, we are able to say something about direction of institutional change 
and addressing questions concerning the trajectories of it (Weishaupt, 2011). On this point, 
scholars associated with the historical-institutionalist school have produced the most influential 
scholarship on welfare state development (Ebbinghaus 2006; Esping Andersen 1990; Hall and 
Soskice, 1997; Palier 2010; Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001; Rothstein and Steinmo 2002; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). 
Many historical-institutionalist scholars identify welfare state origins and initial trajectories in the 
strength of actors’ coalitions engaged in struggles over distributional outcomes. Coalitions across 
societal groups together with the existence of large political parties, such as Social Democratic or 
Christian Democratic families or market liberal orientation, holding power over different periods 
of time, determine the form and the generosity of states social regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 
1990; Korpi, 1983; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Large labour union movements, coupled with a 
hegemonic Social democratic party have led to the creation of generous and universal welfare 
states (Stephens, 1980). Christian democratic prevailing parties have ruled welfare states more 
reliant on the role of families in providing social services and making generous benefits 
conditional on employment (Epsing-Andersen 1985, 1990; Kersbergen, 1995). The lack of both 
the two previous parties in a strong position, together with fragmented social interests, have led 
to liberal welfare states, characterized by universal but minimalist welfare provisions.  
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Once welfare state has been structured, when explaining institutional continuity, historical-
institutional analyses argue that subsequent government’s room for manoeuvre is conditioned by 
historical policy “legacies”, that is to say that these legacies make policies path dependent, where 
«path dependency refers to the idea that the longer an institution remains in place, the more actors 
adjust their behaviour and expectations according to this particular institutional setting, and thus, 
the more resilient it will become to radical changes» (Weishaupt, 2011, 39). The reliance on 
particular institutions generate “winners”, who in turn will have the interest in preserving the 
status quo and, at the same time, will make investment in alternative institutions costly. Pierson 
(2004) called this “institutional inertia”, whereas positive feedbacks lead to a single equilibrium, 
which will be resistant to change. In other words, institutions become “locked-in” as politicians 
refrain from pursuing policies that damage their political consensus. Hall and Soskice (2001) 
identify a different causal mechanism explaining institutional continuity, consisting in 
“institutional complementarities”, a set of institutions that reinforce each other. In this view there 
could be two different types of equilibrium: “liberal market economies” (LMEs) and “coordinated 
market economies” (CMEs). Rather than on political actors their explanation relies on firms being 
reluctant to dismantle well-established institutional configurations.  
More in general, the analytical paradigm of this tradition relies on what Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) define as “punctuated equilibrium model”, sharply distinguishing between long periods 
of institutional stasis periodically interrupted by exogenous shocks allowing for more or less 
radical reorganization (Streeck, 2011). This leading to the tendency to understand all the 
observed changes as minor adaptive adjustments to altered circumstances, in the function of 
continuous reproduction of existing systems.  
To empower the theorization, the two authors attempted to broaden historical-institutional 
analytical tool kit, proposing a set of five causal mechanisms that describe reoccurring patterns, 
namely displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion. These representing analytic 
tools to explain modes of incremental and transformative change (see box 1.7).  
 
Box 1.7 Causal mechanisms proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005, 31) 
 
Displacement describes a process in which change occurred through shifts in the relative salience of different 
institutional arrangement within a system.  
Layering is related to processes in which new institutions are added onto existing ones, gradually shrinking the 
domain for the old institutions. 
Drift refers to the situation in which external conditions require adaptation, but actors refrain from doing so making 
gradually obsolete the existing institutions.  
Conversion describes the situation in which institutions are redirected towards new goals and functions. 
Exhaustion refers more to gradual breakdown of institutions over time.  
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While external shocks have not to be considered condition for incremental and yet transformative 
change, the source for institutional change, triggering the causal mechanisms of displacement, 
layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion, should be found paying particular attention to the 
interplay between rational actors, the distribution of power among them and the institutions in 
which they are embedded (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
More in general we would say that the modern concept of activation emerged after the second oil 
crisis at the end of Seventies, when unemployment increased in all countries, following a major 
reorientation by national governments. Active measures previously conceived to supplement 
macroeconomic demand-management, inside the Keynesian framework, were turned to focus on 
supply-side of the labour market, as Keynesianism has been phased out, registering in parallel the 
growing influence of Monetarism. This turn has introduced the consideration of the concepts of 
workfare and benefits conditionality, toward a “job-first” strategy, increasingly relying on policies 
resembling the US-style (Handler, 2003, 2004). Work as best form of welfare becomes the essence 
of the activation turn. This argument could be easily related to the international forces of economic 
globalization and capital mobility, severely constraining the space of manoeuvre of national 
governments (Scharpf, 2000), forcing them to reduce public-expenditure for welfare and 
deregulate labour markets (Gilbert, 2002; Goldberg and Rosenthal, 2002). At the same time a new 
concern for emerging social risks had progressively to be considered by national governments, in 
relation to ageing, demographic shifts, new family structures, leading to the need to increase 
labour market participation for under-represented groups to make European welfare models still 
sustainable. However, the lack of a clear point of reference for national reforms issued different 
competing ideas about labour market policies and institutions, leading countries toward divergent 
responses, outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990) as “three worlds of welfare capitalism”, clustered 
in Anglophone, Continental and Scandinavian countries.  
With the born of European Union the refusal of a pure form of monetarism lead the communitarian 
institutions toward the search for a “European strategy”, consistent with the common European 
market and the creation of single currency, attempting to add a Social Chapter to the Maastricht 
Treaty and improve European integration in social policy fields. EMU, indeed, has imposed strict 
targets on national debts and inflation, with policy-makers loosing important grounds to manage 
economic growth, remaining with labour market policies as only means to address unemployment. 
Countries started to converge on a similar policy agenda for their national reforms, as our brief 
overview has shown. This convergence has been strong regarding ALMPs applied and requiring 
PESs capable to deliver such interventions, reorganised mainly along NPM lines. At the same 
time also benefits have progressively become more targeted, tightening entitlement criteria and 
strengthening eligibility and job-search criteria.  This trajectory of convergence is generally 
associated with institutional mix from the Scandinavian welfare regime and the Anglophone one, 
outlining a unique Anglo-Scandinavian focal point of reference, whose characteristics can be 
drawn with the emergence of the concept of flexicurity. However, as Weishaupt (2011, 33) points 
out, it should be better to talk about convergence combined with persistent national diversity, 
realizing a “process of institutional hybridisation”. The way in which labour market policies have 
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been implemented at the national level persists in differences because governments retain some 
of their original institutional characteristics, despite transforming large parts of their 
configurations.   
  Using the analytical tool kit provided by Streeck and Thelen (2005), we would say that this the 
emergence of the activation paradigm, and the related convergence across European countries in 
the way it is declined, could be interpret as an institutional change in two stages, characterized 
first by “layering” and then by “conversion”. The former refers to the process in which a new role 
played by ALMPs, related with the deregulation of labour markets and the reduction of public-
expenditure for welfare, in accordance with the emergence of Monetarism, have gradually shrunk 
the domain for previous active manpower policies conceived to supplement to macro-economic 
demand management inside the framework of Keynesianism. New programs were gradually 
added alongside well-established old institutions, increasingly acquiring political support. This is 
somehow consistent with the fact that throughout most of the seventies, representatives of pure 
monetarist remained in the minority among the political elites. Most of these prescriptions, as we 
have seen, were implemented firstly and extensively in Anglophone countries, while 
progressively influencing also other countries which, at the same time, do not completely abandon 
their firmly political established institutions.  
The result of the way in which this change has been declined by countries has registered persistent 
diversity between them, clearly evident in the “three worlds” described by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). “Conversion” is then used to describe the situation in which ALMPs of countries are 
redirected towards new principles, goals and functions, following a similar policy agenda for 
national reforms and implying also further changes in the governance of PES, prompted by the 
ground settled by the EU level. The role played by EU could be consistent with what Djelic and 
Quack (2003) say about multilevel governance systems. As a consequence of the budget 
constraints introduced by the realization of EMU, labour policies have become the only lever 
possible to manage employment levels. The multilevel European governance has become the 
framework used both by the national political elites to legitimize the choices made on labour 
market policies on the national level and the system by means of which attempting to adjust 
supranational rules that apply to them. The result of this process could be synthetized in the 
growing interest acquired by the flexicurity paradigm, seen as a mix realized from the Anglophone 
and Scandinavian systems.  
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2.  STUDYING PES GOVERNANCE  
 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen how European countries have been characterized by partial 
convergence on a similar institutional framework, reflecting the emergence of a new policy 
agenda during nineties, but still in a context of persistent diversity. Different policy reforms have 
increasingly put emphasis on activating unemployed people by implementing various governance 
changes in PES. As we have said, this kind of changes have been characterized also by a 
reorganization in line with the paradigm of NPM. Already from eighties, the concept of New 
Public Management (NPM) came up and led to a shift in the perception of the role of the state in 
public discourses. In this framework, several countries, increasingly from Nineties, have adopted 
reforms addressing the relationship between state, individual and providers of welfare services.  
 There have been changes in the governance of PES regarding both its structural and functional 
dimension. More in general, if we use the categories seen in the first chapter of the previous 
chapter, the main trajectories of PES reform have followed the direction of more locally operated 
services, increasingly involving non-public operators, following a more managerial approach in 
the relationship with users and more oriented towards economic goals. These should be 
considered as main directions of reform, not meaning that all countries have implemented the 
same changes and to the same extent, but rather combining them in many ways and with different 
degrees.   
In this chapter we will first describe the core elements defining PES governance emerging in 
support of the activation paradigm: performance management, autonomy from the government, 
decentralization, individualization and “contractualization” of services, integration between 
passive and active labour market policies and marketization. In particular, from here on, we will 
look at those processes that some scholars (Carmel and Papadopulos, 2003; Van Berkel et al., 
2011) have called reform of operational policies, distinguishing these ones from the formal 
policies, where the latter intervenes on the substantial, content-related, aspects of social policies 
and the former regulate the organization of policy delivery. More specifically, operational policies 
have the potential to affect the ways in which the provision of social policies is organized, with 
the possibility to draw conclusions about their governance (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007).  
In particular, we will look more closely on marketization, as most discussed and investigated trait 
of PES governance changes, deepening the theoretical background and the literature interested in 
the involvement of private providers in PES.    
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2.1. The core elements of PES governance emerging with the activation paradigm 
 
2.1.1. Performance management  
 
PES’ process of convergence has moved from a traditional administrative approach (‘management 
by regulation’) to an output-driven approach with agreed goals and realistic targets (‘management 
by objectives’) (Larsson, 1999). MBO approach is led by the application of quantified targets 
aiming at continuous performance improvement. Ex ante formulated operational objectives are 
followed by ex post measurement of outputs and outcomes, monitoring ongoing and final results 
and developing conclusions based on performance assessment. 
On the one hand, the specification of operational objectives and indicators needs to be centrally 
coordinated to some extent, in order to avoid policy fragmentation. On the other hand, the 
implementation of labour market policy may concede autonomy to operational units at local level 
in order to permit adaptation of labour market policy to territorial particularities (Mosley et al., 
2001).  
In order to improve both effectiveness and efficiency of labour market policies, performance 
management would help to clarify priorities in labour markets, set standards that can be fairly 
assessed, increasing also the transparency of the process.  
One of the main issues in the debate about performance management concerns the definition of 
the performance indicators and what to measure. An overview of some possible indicators in the 
context of active labour market programs can be considered that of Osborne and Gaebler (table 
2.1) (1992, 356-7).  
 
Tab. 2.1 Overview of performance indicator in active labour market programs (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 356-7) 
Indicator General definition Operational definition 
Output Volume of units produced Numbers of people assisted 
Outcome Effectiveness/Quality of production: 
degree to which it creates the desired 
outcomes 
Numbers of people placed in jobs, 
working and not in receipt of 
welfare after six months, one year 
and beyond. Further impact on their 
lives (i.e. general deprivation) 
Programme efficiency  Cost per unit of output Cost per assisted subject 
Policy efficiency Cost to achieve fundamental goals Cost to achieve desired decrease in 
unemployment, poverty rate, 
welfare caseload 
Policy effectiveness Degree to which fundamental goals 
and citizens needs are met  
Effect on larger society: poverty 
rate, welfare caseload, crime rate 
etc.. 
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2.1.2. Autonomy from government  
 
PES may assume a relatively autonomous status vis-à-vis the government. They can be under the 
direct control of the government or run in the form of autonomous public bodies, receiving 
different degree of autonomy from the government. The difference between these two forms is 
that, in the former, PES is delegated to implement policies defined by the government, while in 
the latter they can propose policies within guidelines set by government. This is often referred to 
the distinction between quasi-independent or independent executive agencies, in relation to the 
degree of centralized decision-making. Independent agencies are institutions provided with 
decision-making and financial autonomy. This means that, despite these bodies remain under 
public law, they are not run directly by the ministry, operating relatively independently from 
governmental control, with the possibility of governmental appointees sitting or chairing the 
supervisory boards.   
However, both agencies and autonomous bodies can be accountable on the basis of contractual 
obligations with the Ministry. More in general contractual agreements with the government are 
usually related with performance measurement, negotiating goals to be achieved together with 
standards of service quality and on the efficiency in the use of the resources assigned.  
 
2.1.3. Decentralization  
 
Decentralization is defined as the process in which local authorities receive more autonomy from 
the central level, devolving policy competences to regional or local governments. This means that 
policy authority shifts from national government to regional or local elected political 
representatives (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000). The extent and form of this autonomy varies across 
countries according to different degrees of political decentralization. Most of the reasons why 
national governments decide to opt for decentralization in LMPs and PESs relate to societal 
changes and policy responses to these changes requiring policy making and policy delivery 
processes in proximity to the contexts and actors interested by these changes (OECD, 2003). The 
rapid change interesting labour markets has local dynamics and specificities, with the 
consequence that PES clients are characterized by varied needs and influenced by local 
employment opportunities. Regional or local actors then receive the authority to develop services 
and policy programs adjusted to local labour market circumstances. In these respects, devolving 
autonomy to local offices would enhance local discretion, on the grounds that, in principle, they 
should be more aware and in a better position to address the needs of their labour markets. At the 
same time, traditional regulatory approaches had become increasingly obsolete, especially in areas 
with economic problems. Decentralization would make national offices generally tasked with 
coordinating Labour Ministries and/or other government departments, providing nationwide 
monitoring and setting common rules for action, organisation and staff. Regional/district offices 
would develop local objectives and priorities, support and coordinate the activities of local offices. 
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Local offices are those that at the end of the structure deliver services and deal directly with users. 
In this context, capacity building becomes one of the most important issues, requiring the regional 
or local level receiving autonomy to be able to coordinate local actors, analyse local needs, 
implement programs, monitor and evaluate performance, comply with accountability standards 
and targets (Mosley, 2009).  
Decentralized structures, however, do not necessarily imply decentralized decision-making.  
In particular, the use of new public management instruments, such as performance indicators, may 
influence local decision-making processes. Local offices gaining more flexibility with 
decentralization can often be committed to the achievement of ambitious quantitative performance 
targets established by the central level to make them accountable, with the risk of reducing ground 
for local discretion. To overcome these risks, much importance is put on negotiations between 
central and local structures, in order to agree on objectives and results to be achieved. In this way, 
targets should be formulated taking into account local particularities. The participation of local 
offices in target setting and monitoring of performance, however, tends to be more developed 
where PES is functionally independent from government (id.). At the same time, a very important 
role can be played also by PES’ source of revenue in determining their degree of autonomy in 
local decision-making processes, as it is the case with ESF for EU Member States. 
 
2.1.4. Integration between active and passive labour market policies  
 
The need to raise overall employment levels has led PESs to the expansion of the traditional 
borders for their clienteles, going beyond the most “typical” figures of jobseekers, corresponding 
to short-term unemployed receiving UBs and then including also under-represented and 
disadvantaged groups - such as women, long-term unemployed, social assistance recipients, lone 
parents, disabled and immigrants – whereas governments increasingly aim for their activation.  
In order to find new ways to deal with this increased level of diversity among clienteles of PES, 
new approaches have emerged, very often corresponding to the institutionalization of unified 
structures at the local level, the so called “one-stop-shop centres”, multifunctional organisms that 
can take on all the needs of the users, bridging PESs and welfare services. These structures have 
integrated the traditional functions of the employment offices with institutions providing benefits 
and social assistance services.  
Above all, the most significant evolution has been represented by the integration created between 
passive and active labour market policies, so that through the former it is possible to control the 
use of the latter. This is supposed to be the most efficient way to implement benefit-conditionality. 
The increasing reliance on benefit-conditionality indeed requires maximum control of the 
information regarding the ALMPs delivered and compliance of unemployed people with their 
obligations.  The same operators have the right to deliver employment assistance and manage UBs 
for the same jobseeker, applying directly sanctions in the event the jobseeker is not complying 
with his commitments. PES have the responsibility to register unemployed people and to check 
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the continued eligibility of recipients. It is through these procedures of registration and payment 
of UBs that PES come into contact with the unemployed, especially those receiving benefits, who 
traditionally form the bulk of their clientele.  
These multifunctional organisms led also to the simplification of the access to the system for the 
users with the creation of a single and more user-friendly gateway to offer a great variety of 
services for various categories of subjects. The one-stop shop centres indeed should prevent the 
requirements for users to be referred from one agency to another.  
These structures would thus become more attractive for both jobseekers and employers, with the 
potential of establishing further integration also with other relevant stakeholder, like social 
partners, vocational training centres, private providers and further welfare institutions (European 
Commission, 1998).  
At the same time, one-stop-shop model represent a more client-oriented approach, following the 
“customer service” logic of the NPM.  
Good information flows become then crucial in order to efficiently handle user by benefit. In 
cases where PES and benefit provision are not integrated in the same structure, complex systems 
for the exchange of information between PES and other social security services are usually in 
place. Related to this, ICT tools can help greatly in reducing difficulties in information flows and 
minimize the possibility of benefit abuse.  
 
2.1.5. Invidualization and contractualization of services  
 
The aim of finding new approaches in order to increase labour market participation, seeking to 
activate more “atypical” jobseekers, has been characterized in PES by the search for new forms 
of interventions. These correspond to the expansion of employment assistance far beyond the 
traditional matching function, giving more space to actions like job-counselling, tutorship, 
coaching. While jobseekers are subjected to pressure to actively seek jobs, operators are under 
pressure to be more user-oriented and fulfil the objective assigned to them according to the MBO 
framework.  
The employment assistance is now delivered in more individually tailored ways, codifying 
“individual action plans”, agreements signed both from the side of the operators and that of the 
users, committing them with mutual tasks and responsibilities. The plan codifies actions in terms 
of type of measures applied, as well as specific timing for appointments between personal advisor 
and job-seeker.  Operator and user identify goals in the job-search process and strategies to reach 
those goals. The user commits himself to the fulfilment of the steps agreed, while the advisor 
commits to assist the user and to provide the resources which may be required. This relationship 
with jobseekers is increasingly relying on their self-responsibility, but, more in general, it is often 
the case that the jobseeker is taken in charge always by the same figure, becoming his “personal 
advisor”, for the all duration of the assistance.  
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We can then define “individualization” of services the delivery process of employment assistance 
which should take specifically into account jobseekers’ features, in relation to the labour market’s 
particularities. In order to better deliver assistance in relation to personal characteristics, 
individualization is often associated with a “profiling” phase of the jobseekers. The profiling 
phase can take place either with formal, standardized, quantitative procedures or informal, non-
standardized qualitative ones. In most of the cases the result of the profiling corresponds to a 
categorization of the jobseeker in terms of “distance” from the labour market, associating to this 
measure a proportional intensity of assistance, where those deemed “job-ready” receive the lowest 
assistance and do not need detailed action plans, considering the higher probability of finding a 
job on their own. Regarding the type of instruments applied, much more variation can be found 
among countries. To the extent that it is followed a stricter workfare approach, as in English-
speaking countries, there can be more reliance on soft-skills courses, at the expenses of hard ones, 
in order to realize a quick and effective job-entry for jobseekers. While on the contrary Nordic 
countries continue to invest on traditional costly hard-skill training.  
The “contractualization” of services then might be considered a consequence of individualization 
and it is related also with the integration between passive and active measures. User and operator 
specify what should be the commitments related to the delivery of employment assistance and 
benefits. When he does not comply with them he is sanctioned by cutting his benefits. The 
agreement set between operator and user do not represent a legal contract, rather a moral one (to 
the point that we might better call them “quasi-contract”), that can be easily related, more in 
general, with the way to conceive the relationship between State and citizens arising from the 
principles of NPM (Hood, 1991).  
 
2.1.6. Marketization 
 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of markets for the provision of social services is the most salient 
and contested form of new governance that European welfare states have been confronted with.  
Traditionally, PES had a monopoly-status in most countries, being the only institution providing 
job-placement (Freedland et al., 2007). They progressively started to allow private employment 
agencies to operate only during nineties, making PES operating in a competitive market, and to 
develop partnerships with no-profit organizations (e.g. social partners, third sector 
organizations)15, as well as with other public service providers (e.g. schools and Universities)16. 
As a matter of fact, the end of the public monopoly on job placement services and the introduction 
                                                        
15 The partnership between PES and third sector organisations often concerns support for the more difficult to place 
clients (disabled people, the socially excluded, substance abusers). Collaboration is based on the skills and experience 
of non-profit organisations in dealing with vulnerable groups. 
16 includes different levels of networking from simple exchange of information to common protocols. It can rely on 
formal or informal agreements and is justified by the need for delivering multidimensional and integrated services to 
their target users. 
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of privately provided placement services marked the start of marketized services (Van Berkel et 
al., 2012).  
 Dealing with increasing diversity of labour market needs, governments often encourage 
relationship between public and private providers in order to involve more specific know-how 
and employment services which PES cannot deliver alone.  Most PES now involve external 
providers in the delivery of labour market policies, outsourcing specific services or realizing 
general collaboration. Arrangements for the involvement of private employment agencies may 
include different contracting forms, all of them generating very different market-based outcomes. 
These contracting forms often reveal the characteristics of quasi-markets (Van Berkel et al., 
2012).  
Countries, in these respects, vary with regard to the relative market shares of the labour market 
intermediaries, ranging from a strongly public to mainly private sector driven system of 
employment services. Market forces have been used to open up government organizations to the 
market. This has produced the shift from bureaucratic monopoly providers towards independent, 
competitive providers. Without meaning that the activities are completely ‘left’ to the market, 
because the government can also continue to play its own role as provider. In a broader sense, 
contracting-out means that the former public sector function is subjected to private sector 
competition, where the public provider can continue to act as one of the competing actors. 
According to the market outcome generated, we can observe here a certain trend towards what 
has been called “marketization” (Van Berkel et al. 2012). Crouch (2014, 8) defines marketization 
as «the introduction or extension of markets in any area of life», specifying that «marketization 
will normally be expected to have two consequences: gains in efficiency that flow from the 
rational cost-effectiveness of the market; and losses in the damage done by the negative 
externalities that marketization almost necessarily produces» (ibidem.). As also OECD (2005) has 
stressed some of these “negatives externalities” in the case of the involvement of private provider 
in PES needs to be avoided.  
Nevertheless, marketization should not be intended as synonymous of “privatization”. With 
privatization a former public sector function is moved permanently into the private sector, with a 
change in the owner’s structure and in the way of financing (Struyven et al., 2002). First of all, 
the providers are not necessarily private, but they could be also public actors different from PES 
core agencies (i.e. schools and universities). In addition, profit maximization is not necessarily 
the main objective of these providers, as is the case in conventional markets. More in general, the 
state remains involved in the financing of the services through budgets or vouchers for services 
(Nyssens, 2010). 
Of the various aspects of PES governance emerging in support of the activation paradigm, 
marketization has probably been discussed and investigated most (Van Berkel et al., 2011).  
Studies in this field have made clear that this phenomenon is not related exclusively to liberal 
welfare states (Considine, 2001; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2005; Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Struyven 
and Steurs, 2005; Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2005).  
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Marketization can be considered one of the main governance aspects of PES mainly because 
supported by the assumption that contestability increases the efficiency and effectiveness of 
provision. However, national reforms under this label show a variation on regulation 
characteristics, which hold the potential to crucially affect the implementation of ALMPs. In 
particular, when marketization is combined with decentralization process, the outcome of 
ALMPs, in particular, comes to be affected by the lower tiers of policy implementation. An 
important element interplaying with marketization, in this regard, could be then considered the 
level of discretion of local actors. That is, the way the activation paradigm is translated into 
practice may depend on its implementation at the local level, framed by the discretion local actors 
have with regard to the marketized services and the related involvement of private providers. As 
consequence of what we have seen dealing with decentralization, also in this context then capacity 
building becomes fundamental to enable public agencies to manage a market exposure of the 
system at the local level. These agencies, indeed, have to gain insights from users’ needs, to 
develop the procedures necessary to involve private providers and monitor and evaluate their 
performance (Van Berkel et al., 2012) 
 
 
2.2. Models of service delivery 
 
The introduction of market forces stems from the pressure to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
in the public sector, together with the expectations related with the increase in quality and 
flexibility of services and responsiveness to individual needs, offering at the same time more 
choice for users.  Providing that certain conditions are met, such as the presence of a large number 
of participants and, with it, the absence of collusion as well as the widespread knowledge of 
existing technologies, which must also be freely accessible, contracting-out mechanisms should 
be able to ensure the selection of the most efficient producer (Bosi et al 2008). In economic 
literature, the role of competition and contestability is concerned for: using competitive pressure 
to constrain activities and drive producers to keep prices down; organizing according to the best 
known techniques of production; innovating to avoid economic annihilation (Webster and 
Harding 2000). Contracting-out is therefore intended as a «device to capture some of the desirable 
features of a free market» (id., p. 10) – the assumption being that market-based delivery will 
produce these desired effects. Ideal-typically marketisation involves a clear split between 
purchasers and providers of services (Struyven et al., 2002). Inside this conceptual framework, 
the introduction of a quasi-market for public services can be considered as a specific model of 
service delivery, to be differentiated from the traditional model and a fully privatized model. In 
each model the following roles are distinguished: the resourcer, the purchaser, the provider and 
the user (Struyven and Steurs 2004). According to the traditional model, in contexts where the 
role of the public actor is still relevant, publicly funded services are provided by the public 
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provider, with some parts usually being contracted out to other non-public providers. In this case 
the government combines the role of resourcer, purchaser and provider (figure 2.1) 
 
Fig. 2.1 Traditional model of service allocation (Struyven and Steurs, 2004, 227) 
 
 In a quasi–market model, instead, there is a separation between the financing function of the 
government and the supply function. We can have also a first form of quasi-market, in which there 
is a single public purchaser contracting with non-public providers, competing with each other. In 
this case the State holds both the resourcing and the purchasing function (figure 2.2). Further 
aspects of differentiation in the quasi-market model could be find in the nature of contracts 
between purchasers and providers. On this point, Struyven et al. (2002) distinguish between 
classic contracts and trust contracts. Trust contracts are concluded for longer periods than classic 
contracts, are less detailed and require more intense cooperation between purchaser and provider. 
At the same time, the distribution of tasks between the two could be different. Purchasing agencies 
can leave the decisions about the kind of measures to deliver to the providers, or they may 
intervene more directly in this specification (Jewell, 2007). 
 
 
(Central government) 
Public provider 
Contracting-out 
   
Other non-public 
providers 
Users 
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Fig. 2.2 Quasi-market model 
 
The split between purchasers and providers implies that the core agencies identified in the above 
as purchasers of services do not at the same time provide similar services in-house. As a general 
rule, the agencies that act as purchasers on the market of activation services belong to the 
traditional core agencies responsible for providing income protection and employment services 
(benefit agencies, local welfare agencies or PES agencies). But this hardly is the case: in most 
countries, the purchasers also act as providers. This is the case for quasi-market voucher based, a 
kind of model much more recurrent. Here, funds go directly to the user, through the ownership of 
restricted funds in the form of vouchers, who can make a choice between different providers on 
the market (figure 2.3).  
 
Central government 
Central purchaser 
    
Non-public providers Public provider 
Users 
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Fig. 2.3 Quasi-market model voucher-based (Struyven and Steurs, 2004, 228) 
 
The role of the users does not provide for a fully free application, which is expressed in terms of 
willingness to pay as in a fully privatized model, nor a compulsory consumption, such as in a 
public monopoly, but passes through the ownership of this restricted funds, or vouchers, to be 
spent to a given service package offered by providers. In this case, the State has only the role of 
resourcer, while the user is acting as a purchaser of services. Since, as we have said, that of 
voucher-based represents the most recurrent model we will always refer to this when talk about 
quasi-market in the rest of the work. More in general, however, conditions for providers to enter 
the quasi-markets are crucial for the introduction of competition and these may be subject to forms 
of national state regulation. In the next paragraph we will see how the marketization and 
contracting-out forms have been studied and can be analysed.  
 
 
2.3. Neo-institutional economics 
 
In their analysis of contracting-out, researchers and scholars have made use of neo-institutional 
economics, aiming to explain structure, behaviour, efficiency and change of economic 
institutions. It represents a key point in the analysis of different institutional arrangements. This 
range of theories comprises transaction cost economics, property rights approach and principal 
agent theory (Furuboth and Richter 1998, Picot and Wolff 1994).  
 
Central government 
    
Non-public providers Public provider 
Users 
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2.3.1.  Transaction cost economics  
 
The existence of transaction costs means the possibility or not to sign “complete” contracts, that 
are those in which there is the possibility to predict and regulate all the contingencies that may 
occur in the various states of the world. They are particularly strong when there is incomplete or 
asymmetric information, specific inputs, inability to fully specify the relevant bargaining 
elements. The contracts are said incomplete whenever some relevant variable for the purpose of 
bargaining is not observable. Following the studies of Williamson (1975, 1985), the conditions in 
which most easily are generated transaction costs, and therefore incomplete contracts, are the 
following: limited rationality, opportunism and small numbers of competitors. Based on these 
factors it is possible to predict that the transaction costs related to the use of the market tend to 
grow, on the one hand, with the increase of the limits of rationality of the actors in a complex 
environment, and, on the other, with the consequent decrease in the number of competitors and 
the rise of the degree of opportunism of the negotiating parties. Each class of transactions can be 
realized either through market exchanges or through the hierarchical form. However, there is a 
different amount of transaction costs. This means that the choice between hierarchy and market 
depends on the degree to which these different mechanisms may mediate economic transactions 
to lower transaction costs. In these terms, transaction costs and incomplete contracts represent the 
two key concepts to understand the outsourcing phenomena that today take place in the public 
sector. Using the same approach, Barney and Ouchi (1984) found, next to the “pure” market 
structures and hierarchies, intermediate forms that combines different mechanisms of control. It 
is in this respect that stands the form of the “quasi-market”, as a mechanism of mixed government 
represented by the approximation of the characteristics of a market in a hierarchical structure. 
Similarly, “b-markets” and “c-markets” represent other forms of market supported by 
mechanisms similar to, respectively, those typical of bureaucracy and clan. The main point of this 
argument is that the mechanisms of government have to provide the means by which economic 
actors can get information related to the value of the incentives and contributions of an exchange 
of goods or services. Returning to Willliamson (1975), external modes generate the necessary 
information through competition in open markets, the internal ones get this purpose by law 
acceptance of a legitimate authority, in place of a competitive market. The quasi-markets, in this 
view, are based on nearly complete separability and non-uniqueness of the organizational units or 
individual tasks in defining the quasi-prices to be used in order to manage a transaction. In this 
case, each unit is treated as an investment centre of profit and the government tasks, through the 
hierarchy of the state, is limited to the monitoring of a single measurement of the results. 
Performance and compensations for economic units in a quasi-market can be measured relatively 
unambiguous. However, whereas the interpretation of the quasi-market signals is not completely 
unambiguous, the unit in question would not need to fall into a hierarchy and would be less 
expensive the recourse to the market. More often, however, the evaluation of the performance of 
the unit in question is partially ambiguous, and then a further addition to the subjective evaluation 
of the ‘quasi-price’ mechanism would be required. It is the degree of ambiguity of performance 
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evaluation, concept already introduced by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), which may lead to the 
inability to measure the performance of the parties into an exchange, assigning them a value. 
Characteristics of transactions associated with the ambiguity, in this respect, may be the 
consequence of specific resources or uniqueness of the goods or services exchanged. The greater 
the ambiguity in the evaluation of performances, the more complex (and far from the forms of 
pure market) should be the government mechanism needed. Otherwise there could be a rise of the 
conditions for the opportunistic behaviour of the parties. Which is just one of the market crises 
causes cited by Williamson (1975), meaning that we should move from pure forms of market 
towards intermediate forms. A quasi-market reflects the case in which the ambiguity of the 
performance is medium. If this was high, this would mean a return to the hierarchical control, in 
its pure form, governing more complex performance evaluations (Barney and Ouchi, 1984). 
Similarly, a decrease in ambiguity would lead performance to be dealt more efficiently through 
forms of pure market. The ambiguity is clear when we look at the fact that the quality of such 
services is difficult to be specified ex ante and to be monitored or evaluated properly ex post. The 
evaluation cannot be restricted to a measurement in terms of output, but it must be related to a 
target result and this is made even more complex by the fact that this result also depends on the 
behaviour of the service recipients.  
 
2.3.2. Property rights approach  
 
Power and control matter when contracts are incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always 
be renegotiated, the specific investments will depend crucially on the ability to control the use of 
productive assets when renegotiation takes place. In this context, asset ownership becomes the 
essential source of power and control. That is, different ownership structure will affect the 
production of goods or the delivery of services. This means that, in absence of constraints, a party 
is more likely to own an asset if it has an important investment decision to take (Hart, 1995). A 
property right can be defined as a set of rules specifying the use of scarce resources and goods 
(De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). Rules that may be codified by law or contract or 
even institutionalized by social norms together with pattern of more or less formal sanctions. 
According to property rights approach, the efficiency of organizations depends on the direct 
assignment of property rights to an individual. In other words, property rights may be defined 
with respect to the right to use resource directly. The allocation of this rights, so, becomes 
fundamental. There is a substantial difference if they come to be private or public. Following this 
line of reasoning, firms in private ownership are expected to work more efficiently because 
efficiency gains are directly attributable to an individual. The key question is: how have property 
rights to be defined so that the economic system generates optimal outcomes? According to 
Grossman and Hart (1986), it is possible to identify a firm with precise assets and confer residual 
rights of control over the firm’s assets: the right to decide how these assets have to be used, except 
to the extent that particular usages have been specified in an initial contract. The difference 
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between public or private modes of production does not rely on the existence of competition. We 
may have competition also in a public system, for instance, as in the case of quasi-market. The 
difference relies in the allocation of the residual rights of control (Hart and Moore, 1990). In the 
case of contracting-out, in these terms, we can find a situation in which the ownership of the assets 
remains public, but the residual rights of control are in the hands of private providers (Bosi et al., 
2008). Hence, the government does not prescribe what private providers have to do, but rather 
pays them a defined amount for outcomes, and there is a high degree of flexibility for providers 
in the way they can organize services.  
 
2.3.3.  Principal-agent theory  
 
Principal-agent theory does not concern whether to deliver a service with a public or a private 
organization. The key point is always the question of how to make an agent (an employee or a 
contractor) acting in the interest of the principal (an employer or a purchaser) (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Gibbons, 1998; Sappington, 1991). Conflict arises when there is asymmetric information between 
the two parties. That is, risk aversion on the side of the agent, uncertainty, and divergence of the 
agent’s goals, from that of the principal. In the situation of contracting-out, the consequence will 
be that the public authority, in the position of the principal, could be unable to observe the actions 
that a contracted private provider, acting as agent, may undertake, and at the same time the public 
authority must assume that the provider may maximize its own utility rather than work for the 
goals of its principal. Following these assumptions, the main risk of contracting is moral hazard 
(Picot and Wolff, 1994). Moral hazard occurs after the contract has been signed and can be defined 
as that condition in which the agents maximize their own utility to the detriment of that of the 
principal, in the context of a situation in which their actions cannot be fully observed. In both 
cases, the agents have divergent interests from those of the principal. At the same time, however, 
the principals are only able to observe results, which may be influenced by factors other than 
effort, making rewards based on results difficult. In the case of employment services, the 
government is unable to observe the effort of private providers to place participants into jobs, 
since a successful job-matching might be the consequence of many variables, not necessarily due 
to employment services. The only variable that usually is available is the number of placements 
achieved, though this outcome does not necessarily include any information on the contribution 
of the provider to this placement. At the core of the principal-agent relationship is the difference 
between the objective function of private providers and that of the government. The private 
providers’ goal is to maximize their profits, whereas the government tries to manage cost and 
benefits in a difficult trade-off between unemployment benefits and reintegration costs. Thus, the 
government needs to design mechanisms that simultaneously maximize both objective functions. 
Agency theory aims at developing governance structures that allow for a solution or at least an 
attenuation of this trade- off. The basic idea is that, «under certain circumstances, it may be 
possible for a principal to induce agents to behave exactly as the principal would if the principal 
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shared the agents' skills and knowledge» (Sappington 1991, 46). Bruttel (2005), describes three 
sets of governance mechanisms that aim at solving or mitigating the principal-agent problem of 
moral hazard (Ebers and Gotsch 1999): incentive mechanisms, information mechanisms, and 
control mechanisms. The intent behind incentive mechanisms is to find a design through which 
to align the interests of the agent to those of the principal. This can be achieved by designing 
payment structures in which the agent’s maximization of its own profits also maximizes the utility 
of the government, for example. A very common strategy is to differentiate payments according 
to target groups. Ideally, profiling instruments are used to classify jobseekers according to their 
needs with respect to the services that would be most useful in helping them to find a new job 
(Hasluck, 2004; Konle-Seidl, 2011). Within these groups the net impact on outcomes is assumed 
to be identical, which still creates problems. Information mechanisms aim directly at the 
overcoming of information asymmetry by increasing the government’s information about the 
providers’ efforts. A widely used tool is performance benchmarking (Behn and Kant, 1999; 
Courty and Marschke, 2004). An increased transparency can be achieved also by direct 
monitoring. For both, benchmarking and monitoring, an accurate IT platform could be essential. 
Finally, control mechanisms use extensive rules and regulations that state in great detail how 
providers have to deliver their services. Most research focuses on only one of these mechanisms 
at a time. In particular, the design of performance-based payment structures and performance 
evaluating benchmarking systems have attracted considerable interest. The design of these 
mechanisms, above all, appears to be decisive when contracting-out, and particularly quasi-
market model, have to face the two main problems that may occur with the involvement of private 
providers, that are the problems known as “creaming” and “parking”(Donahue, 1989; Le Grand 
and Bartlett, 1993; Smith and Lipsky, 1993, Courty and Marschke, 2003; Dockery and Stromback, 
2001; Struyven and Steurs, 2005). Both the two are related to the concept of “adverse selection” 
(Akerlof 1970). Since contracting-out is built around incentive-induced behaviour, there are 
suboptimal consequences if incentives are not designed well. An optimal contract would reward 
providers on the basis of their net impact on the condition of a jobseeker. As we have already said, 
the greater their contribution to the placement of a jobseeker, the higher their payment should be. 
However, it is very difficult to evaluate the net impact of treatment on an individual client. It is 
often the case that measuring usually take only the gross results (total placements) as a proxy for 
the provider’s impact. Nevertheless, by only taking into account the gross results, the government 
implicitly assumes that the impact is constant for all the job-seekers. Because providers are paid 
on the basis of crude placement results, they are encouraged to assist those who are easiest to 
place regardless of whether the provider’s service actually makes any difference. This behaviour 
corresponds to the phenomenon of “creaming”. On the other end, “parking” describes the situation 
in which providers take the short way to gain the paid outcome, choosing the easiest program to 
treat the jobseekers, without helping them at all. Very often, this is the case for an extensive use 
of job-search training activities, more difficult to evaluate in terms of contribution to a successful 
result, instead of effective job-matching, of which the results are directly observable. It is clear, 
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therefore, that in these cases of sub-optimal design public-private contracting arrangements there 
are very important social implications in terms of the equitability of performances.  
 
 
2.4. Quasi-markets in social policies 
 
In this framework the introduction of the concept of quasi markets in the context of social policy 
has been marked by Le Grand (1991), showing how markets for providing social services are 
similar to and differ from conventional markets.  Together with Bartlett (1993) they have used the 
criteria to study public management, such as the comparison between the concept of user and that 
of “customer”.  
The quasi-market model, as already said, gives particular emphasis to the separation of financing 
function (which is public) and supply (which should consider public and private providers 
compete with each other). In particular, welfare-quasi-markets differ from conventional markets 
in several ways: non-profit organizations competing for public contracts, sometimes in 
competition with for-profit organizations, consumer purchasing power either centralised in a 
single purchasing agency in opposition to the system of the vouchers and, in some cases, 
consumers represented in the markets by agents instead of operating by themselves. Whereas in 
the model of contracting-out the service provider has to be accountable towards the public body 
with which it has a contractual relationship, one of the principal features of quasi markets 
approach is, instead, to give greater voice and ability to control and choice to the recipient of the 
service. The service provider then becomes accountable directly to the citizen, in addition to be 
also responsible respect to the public authority and public goals. However, the possible 
information asymmetries which can arise from these new quasi-markets may make too weak this 
kind of accountability. In order to strengthen that accountability, the public body establishes and 
verifies some requirements and the behaviours that providers need to take, to protect the interests 
of citizens, being subject to correct incentives. Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) introduce the 
question of the application of quasi-markets specifying a number of conditions they have to meet 
if they want to succeed in delivering social policies. These concern market structure, information, 
transaction costs and uncertainty, motivation and cream-skimming. According to these 
conditions, quasi-market have to be judged on the basis of criteria such as efficiency, 
responsiveness, choice and equity. Concerning market structure, a first observation regards the 
aspect that prices established on the quasi-market are different from purely free market prices 
because they are not formed directly by the interplay of demand and supply but are either 
administered or negotiated prices with the intervention of a state authority. As in an ordinary 
market, competition exists between various providers, but these are not necessarily driven by 
profit maximization. That is, on the supply side there are a variety of forms of ownership, not only 
private for profit organizations, but also public ownerships, trust and collectively owned non-
 69 
profit making organizations. While, on the demand side, price formation does not reflect user 
preferences, since it is regulated by the government agency. In this situation. government funding 
is justified on the grounds that purely private provision will result in sub-optimal consumption 
levels where positive social externalities are present and economic justice principles are relevant. 
If these organisations do not face hard budget constraints, the consequences of loss-making 
decisions are not necessarily bankruptcies. In this context price-setting behaviour may not reflect 
cost-constraints and may lead to the weaknesses in the ability of the quasi-market to achieve 
efficiency. Moreover, if they should be more efficient than the system they replace, any extra 
transaction cost they create must not be higher than any cost savings that may be generated by the 
forces of competition or by other aspects of the quasi-market. At the same time, an important 
condition for markets to operate efficiently is that both sides of the market concerned have access 
to accurate information. The reference is to the monitoring of service quality as an essential part 
of any quasi-market system. Otherwise, providers may engage in opportunistic behaviour, 
exploiting their informational advantage to reduce cost at the expense of quality. The third 
condition concerns motivation related to the side of providers, which ought to be motivated at 
least in part by financial considerations. If they are not, they won’t respond appropriately to 
market signals introduced. However, on the provider side, there are no-profit providers, with 
unclear motivation. Finally, cream-skimming, as we have already anticipated, as synonymous of 
creaming, deals with issues concerning equity, since providers should not discriminate among 
users in favour of those who are less expensive. If inequity is completely to be avoided in quasi-
markets, there must be restricted opportunities for cream-skimming.  
 
 
2.5. Comparative international approach 
 
Empirical basis of research to study contracting-out of employment services could be described 
by comparative international approach, coming from the analyses of those countries which have 
proceeded furthest with such models in a large scale. They use, for the large part, qualitative 
means exploring patterns of the new trends of the contracting-out logic and the implementation 
of quasi-market models in employment services. 
Struyven and Steurs (2004) try to show some evaluation results for the first two countries 
experiencing quasi-market reforms in employment and training services, those of Australia and 
the Netherlands. They distinguish between formative and summative evaluation. Formative 
evaluation aims at providing information for further programme improvement; summative 
evaluation aims to determine the effects and impact of a particular programme, especially for 
those decisions concerning funding. The lesson from the reforms appear to be positive respect to 
the previous experiences, in particular for Australia, finding that market system leads to more 
cost-effective performance. However, this was only a rough view, since there was no strong 
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empirical evidence. In addition, both the two system still suffered a lack of transparency of 
information and strong interference by the bureaucratic sphere. More in general, Considine (2001) 
and Sol and Westerveld (2005) show the first comparative in-depth studies of these reforms, 
looking at United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, the former, and adding 
to the same cases also Belgium, France, Germany, and Finland, the latter. Especially in the first 
one, they are countries which have been among the boldest reformers within the OECD, yet each 
adopting different models. Considine uses the employment assistance as most important service 
of the modern welfare state to explore two shifts in the paradigms of governance in Western 
bureaucracies: the shift towards the increasing use of privatization, private firms and market 
methods to run core public services and the conscious attempt to transform the role of citizenship 
from ideals of entitlement and security to notions of mutual obligation, selectivity and risk.   
Among the issues explored the most remarkable has been represented by the condition of the 
unemployed individual as a contract partner. The case of Australia, in particular, is one of the 
more interesting experiences, both for researchers and scholars. This because Australia undertook 
a radical step in 1998 in contracting-out most of its public employment services to private 
providers and non-governmental agencies, on a competitive tender basis, almost abolishing any 
form of public provision. The new system has been called “Job Network” (subsequently changed 
in “Job Services Australia” in 2009) and soon it placed Australia amongst world leaders in the 
outsourcing of such services and it becomes the subject of much interest from international bodies 
like the OECD (2001). Eardley (2003), on the basis of the evidence available on the outcomes of 
this radical shift, finds too that the Australian way of outsourcing has been successful in efficiency 
gains, reducing costs to government while making only modest improvements, if at all, in macro 
employment outcomes. But he finds also some limitations of this model due to consideration of 
equity and social justice, referring to continuing problems of access to services by particular 
groups and the acknowledged problems of “parking” of harder to assist job seekers, including also 
the possibility that the quality of service for some users has declined. The case of the Job Network 
is used also by Finn (2011a) to show to what extent also the UK, further country case receiving 
much attention for its reforms in this field, has been influenced by comparisons with developments 
in the contracted out Australian employment assistance system. Reviewing the Australian 
experience, he finds that the evidence from this country suggests that marketization and outcome-
based incentives have the potential to induce innovation, flexibility and efficiency savings, as 
already said. More critical evaluations suggest, however, that providers may receive less costly 
job-search assistance or “park” harder to place job seekers.  
In the evolution of this system there has been much “learning by doing” and constant adaptation. 
Successive reforms have sought to establish a market and payment structure able to reduce 
parking and improve service quality. However, as the author points out, in this process of market 
shaping, policy makers introduced greater specification of service requirements and regulation of 
processes, then reducing the scope for flexibility and innovation. Finn have enlarged his focus 
including in the comparison also the cases of Germany, United States, Canada and the Netherlands 
(2011b ,2015), finding in each of these countries that private providers can, under certain 
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contractual arrangements, improve outcomes for particular groups and bring innovation to service 
delivery and that the competitive pressure they bring may also prompt improved PES 
performance. However, these experiences stress the important need of extended systems of 
monitoring and evaluations. The way in which tendering procedures are built may be also the 
cause for lowest price bids, resulting in poor service quality. To face the problem of “parking”, 
instead, several countries undertook subsequent reforms moving away from simply paying grants 
or awarding cost-reimbursement or fixed-price contracts towards the introduction of “payment by 
results” and outcome-based contracting. In these new contracts public authorities placed greater 
emphasis on measuring and paying for the “outputs” delivered, with a growing trend towards 
making a more or less significant proportion of provider income dependent on the employment 
outcomes secured. In consideration of this, the British approach to what has been known as “black 
box contracting” has developed on the basis of the core principle that providers have flexibility to 
use their skills to design and deliver services for jobseekers, but their income is largely dependent 
on securing long term employment outcomes. This is meant to ensure that the provider focuses 
on delivering job outcomes and that the public purchaser pays less for activities unlikely to 
produce a job outcome (Finn, 2012). International organisations such as the OECD (2014) assess 
the British system as highly effective in reducing benefit caseloads and in promoting high levels 
of employment. Despite success, there are significant weaknesses, highlighting that the system 
performs less well in disadvantaged areas and for the most disadvantaged groups. Something that 
has been intensified by welfare reform, expenditure cuts and by changing welfare to work 
caseloads (Finn, 2015).  
With even different results, for what concerns the Dutch government’s approach to the 
“reintegration market”, one of the more detailed study is that of Koning and Heinreich (2010). 
The authors analysed the impact of the contract changes using panel data that enabled them to 
control for the varying characteristics of different cohorts of claimants and to develop explicit 
measures of selection into the programmes. They found evidence that the transition towards 
stricter outcome-based systems of payment for providers (passing from the principle “no cure, 
less pay” to “no cure, no pay”) were associated with evidence of “creaming‟, where providers 
selected or refused more employable participants, but found that these effects had little impact on 
job placement rates. Bredgaard and Larsen (2006, 2008) compare models adopted by the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Australia. The logic of quasi-market, in each of these countries, goes 
beyond the fact that they represent three very different labour markets and welfare models. A very 
interesting finding is that the item of the free user choice can hardly be applied as a driver to 
improve the service quality. They highlight that often choice is exercised on the basis of 
idiosyncratic factors and not the quality of the provider. It is also uncertain whether the individual 
jobseeker can be expected to possess the knowledge and capacity necessary to make an informed 
choice, leading to rejection of the least qualified and selection of the provider with the best 
outcomes. Furthermore, there seems to be a trade-off: the more freedom of choice the individual 
jobseeker is given, the higher the transaction costs. It is shown as a common experience in all 
three countries that quasi-markets have difficulties in catering to the needs of the most 
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disadvantaged jobseekers, which has major barriers to (re)enter the labour market. Creaming and 
parking of jobseekers is almost unavoidable within a framework of market-economic logic, as 
outcomes of activities are uncertain and these jobseekers have a host of complex problems 
requiring long-term and cost-heavy initiatives. Avoiding creaming and parking calls for extensive 
public monitoring and regulation. So, according to the authors, public regulation is nevertheless 
vital: on the one hand to actually create real market conditions, and on the other to prevent socially 
undesirable consequences inherent in the market model. The fact that the market could not operate 
without new forms of regulation is also one of the main findings of the comparison between 
Denmark and United Kingdom by Larsen and Wright (2014). By comparing the starting positions 
and divergent trajectories of marketization in these two very different welfare systems, they find 
some common traits in how it so far has been difficult to make marketization deliver on its 
promises. They see in both cases difficulties for the contracted-employment services to reduce 
bureaucracy, save money through innovation, realize user choice, prevent poor quality services 
or increase efficiency/effectiveness through better job outcomes.  
Data from a Dutch study of frontline workers in purchaser and provider agencies is presented by 
Van Berkel (2014) which analyses frontline practices of risk selection and monitoring. 
Interpreting provider behaviour in terms of risk selection may not be as straightforward. The 
widespread occurrence of risk selection processes throughout service provision chains makes 
rather difficult to attribute risk selection unequivocally to rational provider behaviour. The 
monitoring process, in this context, is experienced as an administrative burden, especially by staff 
in provider agencies, but it also has elements which operators consider as making a positive 
contribution to service provision processes in circumstances where actions of purchasers and 
providers need to be coordinated. This could be partly related to the double function of monitoring 
in the context of contracting-out: monitoring provider behaviour as well as monitoring user 
behaviour.  
Van Berkel et al. (2012) analyse and compare governance reforms in the policy areas of activation 
and income protection for unemployed people in nine European countries – UK, Germany, 
France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, Netherlands and Switzerland – attempting to 
represent Europe’s diversity in various ways.  
This analysis showed that all countries abandoned monopolistic state provision, most of them by 
introducing privately provided services. Each country involved in the analysis has its specific mix, 
but the involvement of the state in financing the services is given in all countries.   
Although marketization is clearly the common trend, a considerable degree of diversity of quasi-
markets in Europe can be observed, in particular concerning the roles of various purchasers and 
providers and their relationships. Anyway, a full split between purchasers and providers hardly 
exists in any country. 
Zimmermann et al. (2014) use the comparison between three most different countries regarding 
worlds of welfare - Germany, Italy and the UK -.  to show a link between the regulation of market-
based interventions and the level of discretion for local actors with regard to these measures and 
their local policy histories. Local contexts of policy-making and their suitability and willingness 
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to become marketized affect the usage of local discretion. Even though local discretion is 
relatively high both in Italy and Germany, we observe much lower degrees of marketization in 
Germany than in Italy. In the UK, local discretion is weak and the national level has secured the 
implementation of marketization via a centralized system. Thus, notwithstanding a common 
marketization trend, its scope and its national adaptation varies in function of the embedded 
relationships among levels of governments and stakeholders and not necessary in function of the 
national welfare regime type. Our analysis could be considered the answer provided to the 
questions left open from this kind of studies, calling for a more in-depth analysis of market-based 
governance at the local level, referring to the particular context of Italian regions.   
 
 
2.6. The contribution of policy evaluation 
 
In the continuing effort to improve service programs policy-makers are increasingly recognizing 
the importance of rigorous policy evaluations. They want to know what the labour market 
programs are able to accomplish and, in particular, how they should operate to achieve maximum 
effectiveness. They need information about which programs work for which groups, and they 
want conclusions based on evidence. The perspective of learning by monitoring, described by 
Sabel (1993), put in place rules «designed to oblige the actors to take notice of the unintended 
burdens created by their transactions and to arrive at a common view to reshape their activities so 
as to avoid them» (id., 52). Monitoring policies, then, refer to a comprehensive set of activities 
based on the collection and elaboration of information of socio-economic phenomena and the 
delivery of policy initiatives, used in the decision-making process for adjusting the course of 
policy actions. Monitoring tools, in this sense, become necessary elements in order to create 
sustainable policy cycles and to guarantee to produce more appropriate responses to challenges 
than any yet existing. The “signals” of policy actions obtained in this way can thus increase the 
transparency and accountability of the decision-making process (Gianelle and Kleibrink, 2017). 
Anyway, these are not so clear mechanisms in the reality and monitoring can constitute a 
significant challenge for policy makers and operators of the system. 
Evaluations should be designed to maximize the use of available data, as long as these are valid 
indicators of important concepts and are reliable. Available data may, for example, include 
government statistics, individual administrative records and information collected by researchers.  
We can consider some basic principles of program evaluation design and the way they are applied 
in the field of our interest, focusing in particular on the techniques that will be used later on in 
this work. These basic features will be accompanied with examples coming from the literature 
about ALMPs and employment services evaluations. Harrel et al. (1996) distinguishes four 
activities for a comprehensive evaluation (despite very often either the target audience or the 
available resources limit the focus to one or two of these activities): impact evaluation, 
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performance monitoring, process evaluation, cost evaluation. Impact evaluation is related to 
questions of causality, estimating whether the program has achieved its intended effects or, on the 
contrary, any unintended consequences, positive or negative. Performance monitoring provides 
information on key aspects of how a system or program is operating and the extent to which 
specified targets are being attained. Policymakers work with this activity in order to assess the 
program's performance and accomplishments. Process evaluations focus on the reporting of the 
procedures and activities with which a program works. Such evaluations are precious in particular 
to identify problems faced in delivering phases, but also to replicate a program or to adapt program 
strategies. Cost evaluations address the expenses related with a program or program components, 
preferably in relation to alternative uses of the same resources and to the benefits being produced 
by the program, assessing the achievement of a maximum cost-effectiveness.  
Considering that impact evaluation will be the main activity in our analysis, a specific focus on 
this design will follow.   
 
Impact evaluations 
 
The choice of an impact evaluation design begins by identifying the design that offers the 
strongest capacity for isolating the independent causal effects of the program. In our analysis, to 
examine the post-assistance outcomes we have to estimate the effectiveness of employments 
services, finding the real contribution of them. It may be that some jobseekers who obtained a job 
after participating to a specific measure would have done so anyway.  
The employment impact of a labour market program then can be measured by comparing the work 
situation of the beneficiaries with respect to their relative "counterfactual situation", that is, the 
one that would have been observed for the same subjects in the absence of this kind of program. 
A net impact study is necessary, therefore, to determine the extent to which outcomes after 
assistance are a function of referral to and participation to PES initiatives. What we are looking 
for, in other words, is a measure of the “employment net impact”. Net impact is obtained by 
comparing the outcomes of a group of jobseekers who are referred to a program (treatment group) 
with the outcomes for a similar group who are not involved in the assistance, despite having 
eligible characteristics for the intervention (control group). This means that estimates of net 
impact indicate the difference between intervention and no intervention, since it is a measure of 
the treatment effectiveness which takes into account outcomes that would have occurred also in 
the absence of assistance. 
Two possible designs are possible for impact evaluations: experimental and quasi-experimental. 
They all share the strategy of comparing program outcomes with some measure of what would 
have happened without the program.  
The construction of a valid control group is crucial to accurately measuring net impact. Some 
evaluations have used an experimental approach, which involves randomly assigning job seekers 
to a treatment group and a control group, comparing outcomes between these groups. Provided 
that the sample sizes are large enough, this approach can be expected to control for factors that 
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are likely to have a substantial impact on outcomes, including traditionally unobservable 
characteristics such as level of motivation, attitudes and behaviour. If careful design and 
implementation are achieved, random assignment potentially provides the most rigorous method 
of measuring net impact.  
Experimental designs are the most powerful and produce the strongest evidence. They require that 
individuals or groups, such as unemployed people, must be assigned by randomizing procedure 
to one or more groups prior to the start of services. The "treatment" group or groups will be 
designated to receive particular services designed to achieve clearly specified outcomes. A 
"control " group receives no services. The treatment group outcomes are compared to control 
group outcomes to estimate impact. Because chance alone determines who receives the treatment, 
the groups can be assumed to be similar on all characteristics that might affect the outcome 
measures except the program. Any differences between treatment and control groups, therefore, 
can be attributed with confidence to the impacts of the program. 
Although experiments are the preferred design for an impact evaluation on scientific grounds, 
random assignment evaluations are not always the ideal choice in real-life settings.  
Random assignment raises questions related to ethical concerns. Public opinion may resist treating 
similar jobseekers differently on the basis of a randomizing procedure or may view random 
assignment as exploiting vulnerable populations and powerless people. Carefully designed 
procedures for randomization may be able to overcome such resistance. One strategy is random 
selection of these to receive services from a list of those who meet eligibility requirements when 
resources are not available to serve everyone who is eligible. Providing services for some clients 
at a later time may satisfy community concerns about fairness and be consistent with available 
staff and resources. Great care needs to be taken to ensure that the control group is not denied 
essential services they would otherwise have, that the benefits to participants and the community 
are carefully explained, and that program staff and participants understand and support the 
research.  
Experiments typically require high levels of resources: money, time, expertise, and support from 
program staff, government agencies, funders and the community. This aspect makes important 
the consideration whether the results that are likely to be obtained justify the investment (id.).   
Considering that the adoption of a random assignment methodology is far from easy in practice, 
the alternative is represented by quasi-experimental approaches. Like experiments, quasi-
experimental evaluations compare outcomes from program participants to outcomes for 
comparison groups that do not receive program services. The critical difference is that the decision 
on who receives the program is not random and the treatment and control groups are selected after 
intervention. Comparison groups are made up of members of the target population as similar as 
possible to program participants on factors that could affect the selected outcomes to be observed. 
Multivariate statistical techniques are then used to control for remaining differences between the 
groups. 
Usually, evaluators use existing population groups for comparison those who live in a similar 
area, or are registered at the same employment centres, or undertake the same kind of initiative, 
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observing their records for the same time interval.  
Use of non-equivalent control group designs requires careful attention to procedures that rule out 
competing hypotheses regarding what caused any observed differences on the outcomes of 
interest.  
A threat to validity is the process of "selection " the factors that determine who receives services. 
Some of these factors are readily identified and can be used as control variables in statistical 
models, such as meeting program eligibility criteria. However, it is often not easy to consider all 
these factors. 
For example, program participants may receive services because they are more motivated, skilful, 
or socially well connected than non-participants. Such differences are not easy to measure during 
a program evaluation, needing to find variables able to approximate these unobservable. 
In these contexts, recent labour market history could be an interesting variable to be used in order 
to approximate for unobservable characteristics. In particular, people with the same labour market 
history will probably be very similar, and therefore comparable, even by skills, qualification level 
and other unobservable features that affect the probability to find a job (Heckman et al., 1999).  
 
2.6.1. Experimental and quasi-experimental approaches  
 
The international literature is not always unambiguous in assessing the impact of ALMPs. The 
meta-analysis realized by Card et al. (2010) focused on 97 studies implemented from 1995 to 
2007, finding that training programs show negative or insignificant results in the short run (up to 
one year from the completion of interventions), but more positive impacts than other ALMPs in 
the long run. Kluve (2010) performed a meta-analysis too, based on 137 impact evaluations of 
ALMPs programs, carried out in 19 countries. The results showed clearly that the impact depends 
most on the type of tool applied. In these respects, public works seem to produce negative effects 
and, on the contrary, wage subsidies are more effective in increasing employment rates. Modest 
positive effects, instead, for training programs.  
Benmarker et al. (2012) use a randomized experiment to empirically assess the effectiveness of 
contracting-out employment services to private placement agencies in Sweden, planning the 
experimental procedure together with the central administration. Unemployed people were 
randomized into an experimental group and a control group, distinguishing three target groups: 
Those assigned to the experimental group were then given an opportunity to switch from the PES 
to a private placement agency during the trial period, while those in the control group remained 
at the PES. There is no overall difference in the chances of finding employment between private 
providers and PES, but there are some changes according to different categories of unemployed. 
In particular, private providers perform better at providing employment services to immigrants, 
whereas they may be worse for adolescents. Hägglund (2009) presents experimental evidence on 
the effects of intensified placement efforts compared to standard services on subsequent 
employment and earnings of participants for Sweden. Due to small caseloads, he finds mainly 
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insignificant effects. Nevertheless, intensified services seem to reduce unemployment among the 
treated compared to standard services. Krug and Stephan (2013) implement a randomized field 
experiment, within three local labour agencies, to investigate if such services might be more 
effectively be provided in-house by public authorities. They show that half a year after random 
assignment, in- house provision resulted in significantly lower days in unemployment. The 
positive effect arises from exits into employment as well as from withdrawals from the labour 
market. Behaghel et al. (2013) perform a large-scale randomized controlled experiment which 
compares two ways of delivering intensive counselling programs for job-seekers at risk of long-
term unemployment. In the public version, the program is implemented by government 
caseworkers who are given more resources and more time to work with the beneficiaries. In the 
private version, private firms bid to offer a similar service, and are paid part at enrolment and part 
at delivery. The authors have found that private agencies exercised less effort on those who had 
the best chance to find a job in the absence of the program, highlighting the incentive problem in 
designing contracts for the services.  
Despite many advantages, field experiments are quite complex in this field of study, considering 
possible ethical problem in the assignment of jobseekers to particular treatments and the fact they 
are costly. Very often, as we have seen, these are possible with the contribution of governments 
and the joint work of public administrations. Many researchers have tried to adopt different quasi- 
experimental approach for their evaluations, in order to overcome these limits. One of the 
techniques most applied for non-experimental approach is propensity score matching, by means 
of a control group for the non-intervention, comparing those receiving the treatment of 
employment- services with those non-subjected to the same measures, while having comparable 
characteristics of eligibility (for example those refusing to apply). Several researches try to 
evaluate programs using this kind of techniques. Sianesi (2004) investigated the effects of 
Swedish ALMPs’ system finding mixed impact: participating in ALMPs increases employment 
opportunities, but at the same time it allowed participants to rely on the UBs system, with 
jobseekers entering into a program just at the time of their benefits’ exhaustion.   
Winterhager (2006) proposes an evaluation of the contracting-out reforms in this country, using 
propensity score matching. He finds that the effects on the employment probabilities of the 
unemployed remain small and negative, suggesting that this might be explained by deficits in the 
contract management. In another insight (Winterhager et al. 2006) it has been analysed the 
introduction of job placement vouchers scheme in Germany, exploiting administrative data. They 
have found positive treatment effects on the integration into employment in both West Germany 
and East Germany and higher deadweight effects in East Germany than in West Germany. Also 
Bernhard and Wolff (2008) make take advantage of administrative data to construct a control 
group. They analyse the effectiveness of the temporary assignment of needy job seekers to private 
placement services by comparing their outcomes with respect to employment, unemployment and 
benefit receipt with those of the control group. In some cases, the assignment to private providers 
appears to be relatively more effective for groups of job seekers who are rather hard to place. 
Despite positive employment effects for some subgroups, however their results imply that the 
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assignment to private providers is generally ineffective and, in some subgroups, 
counterproductive regarding the goal of avoiding unemployment and benefit receipt. Interesting 
studies making use of propensity score matching are also represented by the application in South-
American countries, in order to evaluate the role of PES as opposed to the large phenomenon of 
informal job. Here, we propose two examples. The results of Pignatti Morano (2016), regarding 
the case of Colombia, show that participating in the PES increases the probability of having a 
formal (rather than informal) job. By contrast, participation in the PES has a negative effect on 
hourly wages. Vera (2013) examines whether, in Perù, jobseekers who use PES find a job quicker 
than those who use alternative job search methods, revealing that, on average, jobseekers who use 
the PES have longer unemployment spell. 
Some of these studies concern also the case of Italian PES reforms. Naticchioni and Loriga (2011), 
for example, exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the Labour Force Survey data, design an 
evaluation structure that allows observing outcomes in both the short (at most 3 months) and the 
long run (at most 12 and 15 months). In this framework, PES users show a lower probability of 
finding a job in the short term, because of a lock-in effect, while in the long term this probability 
turns out to be positive. They also show that PES effects in the long term are much less 
pronounced when considering as outcome variable the probability of finding a permanent job, a 
proxy for the quality of the job, suggesting that PES impacts are to a large extent driven by the 
use of temporary contracts. Barbieri et al. (2001), instead, use a quite similar approach to explore 
the determinants of the probability of enrolling to PES and the effect of such decision upon the 
probability of finding a job. The most relevant factors appear to be those related to age and 
educational level. As for age there appears to be an inverted U-shaped pattern, with a maximum 
of the enrolment probability for individuals in the 25-34 years bracket and a minimum for the 
most aged ones (55 and over). A similarly inverted U shaped pattern appears for the educational 
levels, with a maximum probability for high school graduates and a minimum for people with 
tertiary level of education males, households’ heads, middle aged, more educated individuals, and 
the fact of having previous work experiences appear to find more easily a job, Factors resulting 
negatively correlated with job-finding opportunities, in that context, turn out to be the condition 
of student and the duration of unemployment. 
The present work aims at representing an important addition to the Italian literature on the 
evaluation of regional PES. These kind of studies in Italy are still at an early stage. To our 
knowledge the present work may represent one of the few studies focusing on contractual 
arrangements of Italian regional PES. In these respects, we can present some previous findings 
from what Pastore and Pompili (2019, 4) call “grey literature”, referring to both published articles 
and further contributions mainly based on evaluations carried out for the ESF, but never published 
as journal articles. Several analyses in this context focus on the impact of vocational training 
programs, both on-the-job and off-the-job. 
Some studies may be interesting because related to the case of Lombardy.   
Formez (2015) collects very rich of information about Dote Unica Lavoro program, but limited 
to the probability of completing the program by the jobseekers and the main determinants of the 
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completion of it. It showed that women and older people, have less chances to complete DUL 
than men. As for the educational title, graduated jobseekers have higher probability to complete 
the program. Some specific measures, such as job-search assistance and skill certifications, are 
associated with higher probability as well. Hard-training tools are associated with negative 
probabilities, with women particularly penalized.   
First results about the DUL program in Lombardy could be found in Regione Lombardia (2017), 
in the final report of the Regional Operational Program for the ESF. However, this work does not 
show details of the evaluation, but it just presents that the impact evaluation revealed that, already 
at the first month after the program, the probability of being employed for the participants was 
40% higher than for the non-participants. There are no elements to say how the estimation was 
performed. Previous evaluation concerning Lombardy and its first quasi-market schemes was 
performed by Ismeri Europa (2011). The policy evaluated concerned both training and job-
matching in the two years 2009 and 2010.  The impact was positive on the long run, registering a 
probability of becoming active job-seekers 8 percentage points higher for the participants. Duranti 
and Sciclone (2017) focused on the case of Tuscany region over the years 2007-13, finding 
substantial impact on the short run for on-the-job training courses, in particular for the eldest 
jobseekers. Similar kind of positive impact for on-the-job training courses was found by Pastore 
and Pompili (2019), with net impact of 5% on average. This kind of hard-skill training caused 
also positive impact of 3% on average on the probability to find permanent work.  
Ghirelli et al (2019), evaluated regional program from Umbria, finding different impact according 
to the type of contract considered as outcome, with higher effect for the apprenticeship contract. 
At the same time substantial gender variation in the effect was found too, explained by different 
choices in terms of field of study.  
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3.  THE ITALIAN CONTEXT 
 
In this chapter we will provide an overview of the main features of Italian PES system, attempting 
to outline its role inside the framework of LMPs of this country. We will begin from the historical 
background of Italian PES. The public monopoly was created in the post-war period and 
characterized to be complete ineffective and totally inefficient. It was considered part of the Italian 
“original model” of LMPs, which created for long times the conditions to reproduce the huge gap 
between outsiders and insiders on the labour market. Reform processes occurred during nineties 
have radically changed this perspective but creating new problems. The combination between 
decentralization and marketization of PES has led the system towards a situation of high level of 
regional differentiation concerning market exposure of local PESs. We will depart from this 
context to present our research design, aiming at studying this regional variability in terms of 
different and alternative designs of public-private contracting arrangements. The analysis will be 
anticipated by an overview of the last important labour market reform in Italy, the so-called Jobs 
Act. Inspired by the flexicurity approach, this reform aimed at revitalizing the context of Italian 
PES and ALMPs, introducing many interesting changes, which are implemented very painfully 
still today. Anyway, we will concentrate our efforts on the features of the new active labour market 
scheme supposed to be promoted on the whole country and changes in the PES governance it 
requires.  This will constitute the starting point for our empirical analysis.  
 
 
3.1. The born of the “original model” 
 
From the post-war period, the key legislative reference in the field has been represented by law 
264/1949, the so-called “Fanfani Reform”17. This reform was conceived as application of the ILO 
Convention 88/1948.  
Every ILO Member State had to implement PES free for everyone, 
organised in such a way as to be able to adapt to changes in the economic context 
and characteristics of the population. The design formulated by the government aimed at the 
edification of a public monopoly of PES. It was not anymore accepted any form of management 
by trade unions, as it was previously. It was believed that the monopolistic form should respect 
equality principles, on the basis of which all people could be able to find a job starting from equal 
basis, avoiding the possibility that different non-public operators could be responsible for the 
matching function. This was, however, a strict interpretation of the ILO convention, where ILO 
did not forbid the activity of private no-profit organization, such as membership-based 
                                                        
17 From the name of its Amintore Fanfani, the Minister of Labour of that period.   
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organizations, like trade unions. It was very probable, on the contrary, that the Italian government 
used the opportunity of an international legitimacy in order to replace the role achieved by trade 
unions in the placement activities in the post-war period, fearing the excessive power in their 
hands.  
Despite PES was designed to be absolutely central in the context of a new LMP framework 
emerging in the post-war period, the implementation revealed a system completely ineffective 
and inefficient, resulting to be hyper-bureaucratic and over-centralized (Gualmini, 1998).  
The “Provincial offices of labour and maximum employment” (Ufficio provincial per la massima 
occupazione – UPMO) were created, as local branches of the Ministry of Labour, with the only 
task to registrate the unemployed inhabitants of the province under their legal competence. 
Anyway, the relationship between operators and users followed exclusively an administrative 
approach. Jobseekers were obliged to be registered into “placement lists”, differentiated according 
to economic sector, qualifications and social conditions. These lists followed a strict chronological 
order and were managed by tripartite commissions at the provincial level. The “unemployment 
seniority” became the main mechanism to scroll the lists. In this context, an employer wishing to 
hire someone had to refer exclusively to his UPMO, making a numerical request by category and 
qualification. The stipulation a contract, then, should therefore have been made between the 
employer and those workers, necessarily registered in the placement list of that province, 
according to needs, qualification and economic sector of the firm and respecting the chronological 
order of registration. This designation bound legally the employer. He could only avoid the 
designation, but could not, in any case, participate to the “selection” of his future employees. On 
the contrary he could select particular workers from other firms without any restrictions.  
That system soon became more respondent to the need of those already employed, shifting from 
a job to another, rather than for those looking for a job for the first time. In other words, 
monopolistic PES favoured the dualism between “outsiders” and “insiders”, that would become 
typical of the Italian original LMPs model, together with the absence of universal schemes 
concerning PLMPs and the rigidity of work contracts, exclusively designed on permanent basis 
as unique form. PLMPs were characterized by different schemes and progressively became over-
reliant on wage-supplement schemes (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni). At the same time, at the 
beginning of seventies, law 300/1970, well-known as “Workers Statute” (Statuto dei Lavoratori), 
introduced the legal reinstatement in the event of unfair dismissals, obliging the employer by 
decision of a labour court. In this context, active manpower policies remained an unknown 
concept.  
It’s quite obvious that the mechanism of the numerical request came to be a relevant obstacle, 
limiting the autonomous negotiation between labour demand and supply. The matching then 
tended to be increasingly realized on informal, and even illegal basis, trying to bypass the rigidity 
of the system. The possibility to shift directly from a job to another created the incentive for 
employment relationships of convenience.  
As consequence of the economic crisis which interested Italy as well as other western countries, 
between the end of seventies and early eighties, policy-makers started to design some new 
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instruments attempting to change Italian PES and open for the first time to the concept of ALMPs. 
More precisely, from eighties till mid-nineties we can identify a process of exhaustion of the of 
Italian PES, gradually leading towards its breakdown, until the point in which “Fanfani Law” still 
will remain in law but completely emptied of all the elements introduced in the post-war period. 
This process of exhaustion can be synthetized in three main changes: the new prerogatives 
acquired by regions, the abolition of the numerical request mechanisms, and the definitive end of 
the State monopoly with the liberalization of the system.    
Starting to conceive supply-side measures, one of the most important innovations of this period 
can be considered national reform of vocational training, occurred with law 845/1978. This 
represented the first policy decentralized at the regional level. As we have seen from chapter one, 
training, especially vocational, could be considered a “cornerstone” of ALMPs. The recently 
created regions, then, should be considered as actors involved in the process of delivery of active 
labour market initiatives since this period. Ten years after, the prerogatives of regions on labour 
market regulation were further slightly strengthened, with law 56/1987, introducing the possibility 
to create new institutions, the regional agencies, as technical entities for planning and monitoring 
of PES’s activities, as well as implementing new (soft and experimental) active labour market 
initiatives. In the same period, it was law 223/1991 which finally eliminated the numerical request 
mechanism. It was replaced by the free possibility left to the employer to hire the jobseekers on 
the basis of his own choice18.   
 
 
3.2. The end of the “original model” 
 
The beginning of nineties coincided with the restructuration of the Italian political system, 
following a crisis that was, at the same time, economic and political. New Italian governments, 
since 1994, regardless of their political colour, have succeeded each other attempting to realize 
new seasons of intense reformism. Even Italy was receiving the influence from the international 
context, in particular from the EU level, in order to converge towards a similar policy agenda.  
This season was introduced by two important social pacts: the “Ciampi agreement” on 1993 and 
the “Pact for Work” on 1996. The first one putting as new goal the introduction of the temporary 
work contract (lavoro interinale/lavoro in somministrazione), the second one aiming at opening 
to the market the system by means of the liberalization of the operators (Marocco, 2011). It has 
been the “Treu Package” to reach, in 1997 (law no. 196), both the objectives. This reform was 
able to put an end to the State monopoly, breaking the last pillar of the previous system. This 
objective was achieved, first of all, through the introduction of temporary work, and, 
subsequently, supplemented by law 469/1997 with the regulation of the intermediation between 
                                                        
18 Anyway, this provision maintained some restrictions for firms with more than ten employees: 12% of the hires had 
to be reserved for weaker targets, according to categories defined by the regional commission. 
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labour demand and supply by private employment agencies. New temporary employment 
agencies became known as agenize interinali. Similarly to the Personal Service Agenturen of the 
German experience, they became a point of reference for temporary work, job-brokering, as well 
as supporting work reintegration. The “Treu Package” was a relevant reform also from the point 
of view of the renewal of ALMPs.  It was outlined, in particular, an organic discipline for 
vocational training, emphasizing above all the dimension of school-to-work transition, relying 
both on existing tools (apprenticeship and training-work contracts) and on new ones, such as the 
internship, which aimed at making easier the first contact of young jobseekers with the labour 
market.  
Among the government programs of the new centre-left coalition of this period there was also a 
renewed orientation towards federalism, aiming at redesigning country's institutional structure. 
The “Bassanini reforms”, in this context, were a complex of delegated laws and legislative decrees 
with the objective of reorganizing the relationship between national and subnational levels. In the 
context of these, the decree 469/1997 remained one of the most important achievements of this 
process of decentralization, assigning to regions the competence for PES and ALMPs. Regions 
acquired these new responsibilities, then taking on the task of further conferring, through their 
secondary legislation, these powers to the provinces, following a design in which the initiatives 
would have been better delivered in relation to the characteristics of the local labour markets. In 
particular, from the point of view of the new structure of the system, the old UPMO were 
transformed into new structures dependent on the provinces: the "employment centres" (Centri 
per l’Impiego – CPI), designed according to local basins of 100.000 inhabitants. The provinces 
were now responsible for the management and delivery of ALMPs through these new public 
operators. Whereas, only the coordination and monitoring of the system remained in the hands of 
the State, in addition to the competence for UBs.  
Regions went to attribute to the provincial institutions the ability to contract additional services 
with external private operators, collaborating, by means of agreements, with the CPIs. At the same 
time, all the administrative functions remained exclusive competence of the public operator. Only 
in some cases it was specified that the agreements could have been conditioned to prior tendering 
procedures for the identification of the provider to involve.  
From our perspective these processes could be considered as what we have defined as “operational 
policy reforms”. Anyway, beyond the organizational transformations, there was also the attempt 
to change the functions of PES, insisting above all on the relationship between operator and user.  
On this point it was revised the legal status of “unemployed” as starting change. In this sense, the 
decree 181/2000 specified the conditions creating the eligibility to get a certification of 
unemployment status released by CPIs, the “declaration of immediate availability” 
(Dichiarazione di immediate disponibilità – DID), further necessary to be eligible for UBs. This 
legal status then corresponded to the condition of whom is «without work and immediately 
available to be hired or to look for a job»19, according to the strategies defined together with PES. 
                                                        
19 Art. 1, lecter c, as modified by the subsequent decree 297/2002.  
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Both the user's profile and that of the operator came out completely redesigned. In particular, the 
action of the latter was no longer limited to mere administrative obligations. The priority became 
the prevention of long-term unemployment, preparing a series of interventions that constituted a 
nucleus of minimum services to be standardized throughout the whole country. Interventions 
focused on the form of the orientation interview, proposal of placement, training or retraining, 
and modulated on different timescales depending on different targets. Therefore, a new 
relationship between operators and users was outlined, which would then be progressively 
translated into a real "agreement" between them, on the basis of which to agree on the active 
labour market initiatives to join, consistent with the subject's skills and needs (Liso 2006). At the 
same time, mechanisms of benefit-conditionality were put in place in case of non-compliance 
with what was agreed with the operator, in order to depart from the traditional administrative 
approach. Despite, as we will see later on, the benefit-conditionality will remain largely unapplied, 
even today.  
The new applied for these purposes was the "service pact", representing the adaptation of the 
Italian system to a new form of "contractualization" of the relationships between operators and 
the users, with a new stipulation of rights and duties between operators and jobseekers replacing 
old administrative procedures.  
With the change of coalition and the rise of new Berlusconi government in the period 2001-2006, 
however, there was a new impetus on the on the policy making in this field. The Biagi Reform 
represented the main labour market reform of this period, becoming impressive above all for the 
massive flexibilization introduced for work contracts. In the design of this reform there was also 
the wish to achieve a better definition of the possible public-private contracting arrangements that, 
until then, had remained uncomplete. The involvement of private providers, indeed, found an 
organic discipline within this new labour market reform, aiming at increasing the market share of 
services. The activities of private employment agencies went then beyond the temporary 
contracts. The new objective was to create multi-purpose operators, which were delegated to one 
or more of the activities of intermediation, research and selection of personnel and support for 
professional reintegration. Anyway, for each of these activities, the need to meet certain criteria 
was required. The public actor should have remained in a position of control, establishing these 
criteria by means of the tool of accreditation. This tool represents a prerequisite for the delivery 
of services using public funds, establishing the requirements for the access to the system.  
Biagi Reform stated that there should have been regions to set the criteria, implementing their 
own accreditation regimes on local basis. Regions should have decided to recognize to accredited 
providers the possibility to deliver active labour market initiatives financed with public resources, 
following the service standards defined in their accreditation regimes. More in general, 
accreditation represented the tool with which regions could manage their public-private 
contracting arrangements. Therefore, the key issue became how to regulate the contracting-out of 
services, that is to what extent expose the regional PES to the market.   
According to requirements, contents and goal of the accreditation regimes there has been different 
arrangements, either more cooperative or complementary or competitive oriented. Differently 
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implemented by regions and defining their governance concerning the involvement of private 
providers.  
 
 
3.3. From hyper-centralism to hyper-fragmentation 
 
The period from the “Treu Package” to the Biagi Reform can be considered a season of innovation 
in the context of Italian LMPs. We can synthetize saying that these reform processes, over the 
past twenty years, have been characterized by two trajectories: the decentralization of competent 
institutions and the marketization of services. The main effect of the entire reorganization process 
was evident both in terms of new tasks and powers in the hands of regions, and in the involvement 
of a number of new private providers (both for-profit and non-profit) in the delivery of ALMPs. 
In this sense, reforms aimed at improving the quality, accessibility and universality of PES have 
gone along with changes in the governance of the same services, with an increasing importance 
of the vertical and horizontal dimension of governance (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007). 
Nevertheless, these two trajectories have been implemented without promoting any coordination, 
neither between institutions at different levels of government nor in relation to the relationship 
between public and private operators.  
More in general, we have to observe that the implementation of regional accreditation regimes 
has proceeded very painfully (Tiraboschi, 2015). For many regions it has been implemented just 
in very recent years, more often due to the "boost" received from the need to implement the "Youth 
Guarantee" program. Today in all regions, with the exception of the autonomous province of 
Bolzano, the accreditation regime has been implemented. A particularity which reveals also how 
it has been relevant also the difference among regions in terms of their capacity building (Ascoli, 
2011).   
Table 3.1 shows this different timing among regions for the implementation of an accreditation 
regime, expressed in terms of the year in which it has been introduced the accreditation regime.  
 
Tab.3.1 Timing of implementation of regional accreditation regimes for PES 
Regions Introduction of the accreditation regime 
Tuscany  2005 
Lombardy  2007 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2009  
Abruzzo  2010  
Campania  2010 
Veneto  2011  
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Piedmont 2012 
Puglia 2012 
Sardinia  2012  
Molise 2012 
Marche 2013 
Lazio 2014  
Calabria 2014 
Autonomous Province of Trento 2014 
Sicily 2015 
Emilia-Romagna 2016 
Umbria 2016 
Aosta Valley  2016 
Liguria 2017 
Basilicata 2018 
Autonomous Province of Bolzano - 
 
The increased autonomy of regions has allowed them to freely realize their own models realize 
(albeit not all, as we will see, have succeeded), following different public-private contracting 
arrangements and consequently affecting space and resources allocated to the operators involved. 
The choice for a particular model often reflected the experiences of public-private relationships 
already established in each territory. In particular, local governments received the opportunity to 
exploit the competences acquired to differentiate their policies in order to obtain legitimacy and 
consent. It is important, indeed, to consider that for each social policy of local competence there 
are different implementation paths, related to the role played by the political-institutional actor in 
the respective regulatory choices, as consequence of certain dynamics of political consensus 
(Trigilia, 2016). This means that the implementation process could be influenced by political and 
ideological factors. In particular, here we are referring to the possibility that a more liberal culture 
might be more favourable to market-based resource allocation mechanisms (Lopez de Silanes et 
al., 1997). 
In consideration of this, the lack of implementation of an accreditation regime in some regions 
could not be due solely to inefficiencies, but it has been the expression of specific political choices 
of the regions that within their autonomy have expressed their opposition to the involvement of 
private providers, choosing to continue to give centrality to the public actor with a limited market 
exposure of their local PES (Lella, 2016). An example can be represented by the cases of Marche, 
Tuscany, and Emilia-Romagna, which have also attempted to promote appeals, then rejected, to 
the Constitutional Court20. These aspects make the idea of the extent by which the decentralization 
process has strengthened regions, both from the institutional and political perspective, making 
                                                        
20 The reference here is to the sentence 50/2005, related to a set of disputes in terms of LMPs concerning the 
delegations of Biagi Reform.   
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them able been able to activate a role of "veto-player" in cases of contrast with the central level. 
Indeed, in the situation in which a region would have not implemented the accreditation regime, 
this would have continued to rely on the configuration defined by the “Bassanini Reform”, acting 
by means of public agreements. At the same time the possibility to get the resources 
autonomously, from the ESF, left for regions an exit strategy, with the possibility to not comply 
with the decisions taken at the central level (Ferrera, 2008).  
The characteristics of the political-institutional contexts can be then a relevant aspect to describe 
the formation of different, and even divergent trajectories, in PES governance, concerning the 
regulation of the relationship between public and private operators.  
We might say that the possibility given to regions to develop their own models, as a consequence 
of the processes of decentralization and marketization described, has been then conditioned both 
from the capacity building of local governments to adequately support the implementation of these 
reforms, resulting in a very delayed process over time, and, above all, from political choices of 
the same governments concerning spaces and resources allocated to the operators involved, in 
particular respect to non-public operators.   
This aspect, in addition to the different characteristics of local labour markets, can be easily linked 
to the level of territorial differentiation which is typical of the Italian social policies (Ambra et 
al., 2013). Italy, in fact, more than other European countries, shows such a variability at regional 
level that would allow to talk of both "local labour markets" and "regional welfare systems" (Calza 
Bini, 2001; Kazepov, 2009).  
We will try later on to go deeper in this regional differentiation, attempting to explain it looking 
at the particular aspect of market exposure of local PESs.  
Anyway, we will have a look before to the Youth Guarantee Program, introduced in 2014, which 
can be considered an important step in the development of the regional accreditation regimes, 
inducing regions to regulate their own contracting arrangements.  
 
 
3.4. Youth Guarantee Program in Italy 
 
The implementation of the Youth Gurantee program in Italy has represented one of the greatest 
challenges faced by regional PESs. Respect to the communitarian Recommendation, where the 
target was identified in young jobseekers with age between 15 and 24 years, the Italian 
government decided to extend the coverage until 29 years old.  
Italy can be considered seriously affected by youth unemployment, posing risks to social cohesion 
and constraining potential output growth, as well as by mismatch which favours low-profile jobs 
due to growing problems of overeducation (ISTAT 2016). This problem has been even more 
relevant during the years of the economic crisis (Figure 3.1).  
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Fig.3.1  Rate of unemployment by age 15-24 
 
Source: Eurostat 
  
The “Youth Guarantee implementation plan”, presented by the government on December 2013, 
has set out the need of an ambitious and comprehensive strategy. Launched on May 2014, this 
program so far has acted as a driver of reform and innovation in PES governance, intervening 
both on the side of functional governance, concerning the relationship between users and 
operators, and on the side of the structural governance, regarding the relationship between State 
and regions and the involvement of private providers.  
For the first aspect, YG has contributed, in particular, to the establishment of a profiling 
methodology, in order to better deliver personalized measures and individual pathways. 
Participation in the Youth Guarantee consists of different steps. First, young people must register 
online to show their interest in the program. A dedicated website for the YG in Italy allows young 
people not already registered with the PES to sign up to the YG scheme. The site also has an 
internal section for YG providers, and facilities for companies to post job opportunities that are 
published in the portal and to sign up to employment incentive schemes. Secondly, young people 
registered receive an appointment at the CPI where they are interviewed and can formally sign up 
for the program, effectively becoming participants. Finally, a number of participants are given 
access to ALMPs, e.g. internships, vocational training, employment support programs, return to 
education, self-entrepreneurship and community service. The national level is responsible for the 
national YG database, which brings together data collected by local levels.  
Regarding the involvement of private providers, each region had to define its own local 
implementation plan (with the possibility of foreseeing further interventions) discussing it with 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. The aim of the government, more precisely, has been 
to set a multilevel governance between State and regions, where the latter have the responsibility 
of implementing active labour market initiatives addressed to the beneficiaries and defining on 
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which initiatives and how to involve private providers. This process, as we have already 
anticipated in the previous paragraph, has induced many regions to accelerate the definition of 
their accreditation regimes. Anyway, YG has introduced a first national accreditation regime, 
favoured by the possibility left to the young jobseeker to register in any place at the national level, 
regardless his administrative residence. Clearly the regional implementation plans, concerning the 
definition of the involvement of private providers for the YG program, has very often ended up 
reflecting the kind of relationship between public and private operators, especially for those 
models of service delivery already well consolidated21.  
From the YG monitoring data collected until 2016, we know that the 60,6% of those leaving the 
Italian YG scheme in 2016 took up an offer within 4 months of registration. At the same time, on 
average, more than three quarters (75.2%) of those in the scheme at any time during the year had 
been waiting for an offer for more than 4 months, suggesting a progressive accumulation of young 
people that are not being treated on time. Anyway, it should be underlined that the provision of 
different kind of ALMPs for Italy is far below the EU average for all the categories, except that 
of internships which, on the contrary, register a massive recourse, superior to the EU average 
(figure 3.2). It can be considered certainly the main tool applied in the context of Italian YG 
program, despite further analysis would be needed in order to find out if there could be some form 
of opportunistic behaviour in these cases.  
 
Fig.3.2 Proportion of young people leaving the YG in 2016 and known to be in a positive situation 6 months after 
exit by type of offer (% exits, excluding not applicable situations) 
 
Source: YG Database 
 
                                                        
21 An example could be provided by the continuity between YG program and DUL program in Lombardy: 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/la-garanzia-giovani-lombardia-tu-per-tu-con-lassessore-valentina-aprea/ 
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Coverage of the NEET population has improved compared to 2014, but still remains low 
(14.1%). Registration is voluntary through an online portal. Young people registered with the 
PES but not in the YG may still receive an offer or benefit from national or regional measures 
but are not covered by the data. However, the proportion of young people still in the programme 
who have not received any offer for more than 4 months remains very high (75.2 %). The share 
of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) covered by the Youth 
Guarantee scheme, while increasing, is ill low (14.1 %). The NEET rates have been declining in 
Italy the last two years, falling from above 26 % in 2013, one year before the implementation, to 
24 % in 2017 (figure 3.3) . However, these levels are still high and the situation remains 
challenging.   
 
Fig.3.3  Neet rates in European countries comparing 2013 and 2017 
 
Source: Eurostat   
 
However, if we look at young people unemployed (between 15 and 24 years) for the same time 
interval we can find still relevant disparities among Italian regions, marking once again the huge 
gap between North and South on youth unemployment during these years, despite some 
improvements (Figure 3.4).  
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Fig.3.4 Rate of unemployment by age  15-24 and region of residence 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
3.5. The Jobs Act22 
 
The outbreak of the world economic crisis found Italian LMPs still far from the European policy 
trends, mainly for the delays related both to social benefits, PES and ALMPs. After the emergency 
in which took place the “Fornero Reform”, in 2014 and 2015, the Italian government set a goal to 
modernize labour market institutions by implementing the Jobs Act (law 183/2014) as major 
reform of the labour market. In March 2014, with the so called “Poletti decree” some preliminary 
new measures were introduced to foster employment and simplify bureaucratic procedures for 
temporary contracts. Subsequently, in December 2014, a wide-ranging law was passed enabling 
eight legislative decrees in the following months, all adopted by September 2015. The Jobs Act 
has represented a very ambitious reform, creating a new comprehensive regulatory framework for 
Italian LMPs. Law 183/2014, precisely, has intervened on five fields: rationalization of 
unemployment benefits; revitalization of PES and ALMPs; simplification of bureaucratic 
procedures related to the employment relationship; reorganization of the existing work contract 
typologies and new incentives related to work-life balance.  
Our interest is concentrated on the second point, that of PES and ALMPs, of which a deep reform 
came with the decree 150 on September 2015.  
                                                        
22 A version of this paragraph will be published for the OECD research “Connecting people with Jobs: Italy”, of 
which the author has been part of the team.    
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
Lo
mb
ard
y
 Bo
lza
no
/Bo
zen
 Tr
en
to
Ve
ne
to
Fri
uli
-Ve
ne
zia
 Gi
uli
a
Em
ilia
-Ro
ma
gn
a
Tu
sca
ny
Um
bri
a
Ma
rch
e
Laz
io
Ab
ruz
zo
Mo
lise
Ca
mp
an
ia
Pu
glia
Ba
sili
cat
a
Ca
lab
ria Sic
ily
Sar
din
ia
2013 2017
 92 
This reform has represented the attempt of the Italian government to move towards the flexicurity 
approach. The strengthening of ALMPs introduced by the “Jobs Acts”, in this sense, represents 
the third major pillar such approach, in addition to the changes in employment protection 
legislation (flexibility) and changes in the benefit system (security), similarly affected by the same 
reform process. While there have been many attempts to advance labour market flexibility and 
passive labour market policies during the past thirty years, so far the provision of active labour 
market policies has been always lagging behind.  
The changes introduced by the decree 150/2015 aspire to make Italian PES more effective and 
efficient. However, the implementation of such changes remains currently jeopardized due to the 
problems of territorial differentiation we have seen: different models of service delivery at the 
local level, with a different degree of market exposure.  
The next paragraphs will provide the overview of recent changes in the institutions involved in 
Italian LMPs and the state of play. We will start from the other two “vertices” of the “golden 
triangle” of flexicurity, flexibility of contracts and solid UBs, before to consider the main changes 
occurred to the last one, that of ALMPs and PES, at the centre of our analysis.   
 
3.5.1. Changes in the employment protection legislation and exemptions on social security 
contributions  
 
Historically, firing costs have been high for permanent contracts in Italy which has hindered job 
creation and increased labour-market duality with respect to permanent and fixed-term workers. 
Increasing labour market flexibility has been the aim of different reforms since the nineties when 
different types of fixed-term contracts were introduced. This, however, did not increase flexibility, 
but rather fostered the dualism as the fixed-term contracts were used for not only facing demand 
uncertainty, but also as a screening device before hiring on a permanent contract (Sestito and 
Viviano, 2016). We know that dualism registers worrisome economic and employment 
implications. On the one hand, the so-called “two-tier reforms” expose temporary workers, in 
comparison with workers with more stable contracts, to occupational experiences marked by 
significant pay gaps (even with equal duties performed), by recognition of lower protections and 
by critical social security perspectives, due to lower contribution rates and contributory 
discontinuity. On the other hand, from the point of view of employment trends, the development 
of margin flexibility would be subject to the "honeymoon" effect: in the short term, fixed-term 
contracts - mainly due to reduced or zero costs from layoffs - they would incentivize employment 
growth in the phases of economic growth, whereas during the negative economic phases there are 
considerable employment losses, mainly due to the non-renewal of contracts expiring. Therefore, 
marginal flexibility leads to employment volatility in relation to economic cycles but has no 
obvious effect on general labour demand. This is because the decrease in employment protection 
influences both the incentives to hire and lay off workers, and there is no reason to expect a priori 
that one effect will dominate the other (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).  
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If we look at the EPL (“Employment Protection Legislation”) index, elaborated from OECD to 
express the degree of protection in employment in each country, Italy still presents a significant 
strictness in the protection of workers from layoffs. However, we must always consider that, in 
last twenty years, this rigidity has been attenuating with stronger acceleration than in other 
countries. EPL index from 1998 - the year of the “Treu Package”, the reform that first has 
introduced massive flexibility in Italian labour market – to 2013, before the Jobs Act, has 
registered for Italy a reduction about three times higher than the EU15 average.  
Anyway, it has been remarked that this fall has never shown any statistically significant 
correlation with occupational dynamics and a reduction in unemployment, as demonstrated by 
robust literature of empirical studies (Baker et al., 2005; Blanchard, 2005; Howell et al. 2007).  
To cope with this problem, in 2008, the economists Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi (2008) 
proposed a new single employment contract (contratto unico di inserimento23)  that should have 
gradually replaced temporary contracts. The original design of this proposal involved an initial 
phase of high flexibility on exit, characterized by a period of three years during which the 
employer was not committed to re-employ the employee in the event of unfair dismissal, but just 
to monetarily compensate him (higher compensation in case of higher tenure). After this phase 
the worker should have received the right of reinstatement24. By this proposal, the initial phase 
should make the permanent employment relationship cheaper and firms would then tend to 
substitute this contract for the plethora of temporary contracts25. 
The “Fornero reform” in 2012 (law no. 92/2012) and the recent Jobs Act in 2015 (law no. 183/ 
2014 with several legislative decrees until September 2015 for implementation) were attempts to 
actually decrease the firing costs and the uncertainty of these costs for open-ended contracts. The 
uncertainty of firing costs was cut even further by the Jobs Act by restricting the grounds for 
reinstatement in cases of dismissal without just cause. It was only applied to newly signed 
permanent contracts (after the 7th of March 2015) of firms with more than 15 employees. 
Additionally, the Jobs Act replaced the multitude of forms of open-ended contracts with one 
permanent contract type (contratto a tutele crescenti) with severance payments increasing with 
the job tenure. By OECD estimates the strictness of employment protection legislation for 
permanent workers against individual dismissals has fallen from 2.74 to 2.54 in 2015 (preliminary 
estimations by Garda (2017), decreasing somewhat the gap in protection to temporary contracts. 
 The Jobs Act involves partially similar ideas as the proposal by Boeri and Garibaldi. Firms 
received effectively more flexibility on exit as the reinstatement in the event of unfair dismissal 
                                                        
23 The proposal was even presented in parliament for discussion. It was the bill 2000/2010, the so called “Nerozzi 
bill”, never approved. 
24 This consideration should be related to the importance that has always received the article 18 of law 300/1970 
(known as “Statute of Workers” Statuto dei Lavoratori) stating that the worker with a permanent contract has the 
right of being reinstated back into his job position by the employer in the event of unfair dismissal, ascertained by a 
labour court. The article 18 of law 300/1970 has been reduced in his legal provision already by the Fornero Reform 
and then definitively abolished by the Jobs Act.  
25 To reconstruct the debate over the single employment contract in the Italian context: 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/il-dibattito-sul-contratto-unico-di-lavoro-tra-mito-e-realta/ 
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was abolished. This provision was introduced in the conviction that by doing so firms would be 
less reluctant to hire on permanent basis. Instead of reinstatement, a financial indemnity which 
increases with seniority was introduced, as envisaged by the original idea of the single 
employment contract. Nevertheless, the modification regarding the event of unfair dismissals is 
not limited to the first three years of the new contract. The increase in protection for the new open-
ended contract no longer concerns “rigid” protection of reintegration in the event of unfair 
dismissals, but regards only the monetary aspect, because the compensation that is due to the 
worker becomes explicitly and formally linked to the years worked in the firm. In the intention of 
the government this should have make the employers more able to calculate preventively “firing 
costs” in cases of lawsuits. Nevertheless, considered that the new rule applies from March 2015, 
this may result, at the same time, in much more inequality on the labour market, whereas at the 
same time there could be workers hired on permanent basis, but divided in two groups, some of 
them with the right of reinstatement in the event of unfair dismissals and some others not26.  
Additionally, the new permanent contracts were exempted from the social security contributions 
in 2015 (capped at 8.060 EUR annually for the first 3 years). In 2016, the social security 
exemptions were reduced (up to 3.250 EUR in 2 years). The budget for 2017 extended the social 
security exemptions for two more years but limited them only to students newly hired to firms 
where they completed their internship or traineeship (up to 3.250 EUR) or young workers hired 
in the southern regions with permanent or internship contracts (up to 8.060 EUR, (OECD, 2017). 
According to the Italian National Institute for Social Assistance (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza 
Sociale, INPS), the number of new open-ended contracts increased indeed as expected in 2015 
but fell again in 2016 when the social security exemptions were cut. The number of fixed-term 
contracts increased as well in 2015 (though marginally) but continued to increase in 2016. The 
rise of new permanent contracts rose in 2015 both in terms of new hirings with permanent 
contracts as well of conversions of fixed-term contracts to permanent contracts (INPS, 2016). 
Additionally, the survival rates of employment relationships started by permanent contracts in 
2015 using the social security exemptions have been higher in 12 and 18 months after the start of 
the relationship than the survival rates of those permanent contracts that did not use the social 
security exemption (signed in 2014 or 2015; INPS, 2017). In 2019 it will be possible to estimate 
if these employment relationships have higher survival rates also beyond 36 months, the 
maximum period of social security exemptions for permanent contracts signed in 2015. 
Despite the higher number of permanent contracts and their longer actual duration in 2015, the 
statistics for the share of employees with permanent contracts has not visibly changed, yet (figure 
3.5). The share of employees with permanent contracts has slightly decreased over the years and 
remained stable during the past few years in Italy, whereas this share has slightly increased on 
average in the OECD countries (particularly in Spain and Japan). The use of fixed-term contracts 
                                                        
26 The Fornero reform reduced the scope of art. 18 of law 300/700 stating that the labour court must decide to apply 
or not the reinstatement, on case-by-case basis. Differently from the Jobs Act, this change was applied for all the 
workers with a permanent contract.  
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has been particularly common practice in Italy for young employees. During the past years, more 
than half of the young employees were working on short-term contracts. In 2016, the share of 
permanent contracts for young employees saw a slight increase, though it is questionable if this 
change will remain during the coming years. 
 
Figure 3.5 The share of permanent contracts among all employees in Italy and in comparison with other OECD 
countries27 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Labour Force Database.  
 
                                                        
27 In the first picture data for Australia are from 2015, not 2016. 
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Sestito and Viviano (2016) have estimated that the exemptions on social security contributions 
and changes in the employment protection legislation did manage to reduce duality on the Italian 
labour market and encouraged labour demand. However, the larger part of the effect can be 
attributed to the social security exemptions. They show that the probability of finding a permanent 
job increased for non-employed, temporary workers in other firms as well as for temporary 
workers in the same firms (conversion of contract to permanent). Fana et al. (2017) have shown 
similarly that the effect of new permanent contracts has emerged mainly through monetary 
incentives, but also that the new permanent contracts were mostly transformed from fixed-term 
contracts, that a remarkable share of new permanent contracts were part-time jobs, that the 
increase in employment concerned mostly older employees and that the new permanent jobs 
emerged more in low-skilled and low-tech service sectors. 
However, more time is needed to estimate the longer term effects of the exemptions on the social 
security contributions and the changes in the employment protection legislation. Besides 
increasing employment, in the aim of the policy-makers, the reduction in employment protection 
would have the potential to increase productivity through improved labour allocation and skill 
match as the firms can more easily adapt their workforce according to changing demand 
conditions and technology and as the workers have better opportunities to find better matching 
jobs (OECD, 2013).  
The exemptions form the social security contributions and the changes in the employment 
protection legislation together with concentrating all the inspection activity related to undeclared 
work in a single new body (National Inspection Agency) would have also the potential to decrease 
the extent of undeclared work in the Italian labour market.  A recent estimate by Schneider and 
Boockmann (2017) puts the share of the shadow economy to close to 20% of GDP in 2017 (figure 
3.6). Although the share has recently decreased, it is still higher than in many other OECD 
countries. A study by the Study Foundation (Fondazione Studi) of Labour Consultants 
(Consulenti del Lavoro) claimed that in 2015 the number of informal employments decreased to 
1.9 million people i.e. by 200.000 people from the year before due to the Jobs Act and three-year 
social security contributions exemptions (Consulenti del Lavoro, 2016). If the conversion of 
informal employment to formal employment indeed has taken place, the statistics for the 
additional employment contracts might overestimate the impact of the Jobs Act and the 
exemptions on the social security contributions. 
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Figure 3.6 Share of shadow economy among OECD countries 
 
Source: Schneider and Boockmann (2017) 
 
 
3.5.2. Changes in the benefit system: harmonization and universalization of benefits  
 
A wide part of the Jobs Act has been concentrated on changes concerning PLMPs. The Italian 
benefit system has been characterized by long-lasting problems of fragmentation, limited and 
unequal coverage, generosity and absence of any link with ALMPs. The new measures have 
attempted to address these issues looking at three main objectives: reducing grounds for wage 
supplementation schemes, rationalizing the previous system into a main universal insurance 
scheme, supported by a social assistance benefit; strengthening the link between active and 
passive measures.  
 
Wage supplementation schemes 
 
Italy’s passive policies have historically been over-reliant on wage supplementation schemes 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni - CIG and Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria-CIGS). 
Even though these used to be very generous schemes, they limited the potential for mobility across 
firms and reallocation to more productive jobs, they left room for opportunistic behaviour due to 
the lack of conditionality and they covered only some workers while many others lacked effective 
protection (Calligaris et al., 2016). There was no single scheme, but many segmented ones limited 
primarily by company size and by age of the worker.  
Wage supplementation schemes (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni – CIG) have always represented 
a substantial share of all the Italian PLMPs. These schemes – “ordinary supplementation fund” 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria – CIGO) and “extraordinary supplementation fund” 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria – CIGS) – were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s 
to help firms cope with temporary difficulties or lengthier processes of restructuring. 
Nevertheless, over time these schemes are used increasingly to cover permanent redundancies. 
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Since they are not universal, one of the consequences of the massive reliance on these schemes 
have been the high level of differentiation in the coverage of workers, mainly by contract type 
and seniority, firm size and sector of activity as well as by the discretion by public authority, who 
can decide upon the access to the funds28. The generosity of wage supplement schemes has made 
them preferable compared to the unemployment benefit schemes for both employers and 
employees, replacing up to 80% of the wage and with a contribution up to the employers never 
higher than 8% of the benefit.  
These schemes became functional substitute for a defective UB system, though only for the 
workers in specific sectors. On the firm side, at the same time, they have represented an instrument 
of internal flexibility in response to the strict EPL (Sacchi et al., 2011). Table 3.2 compares CIGO 
and CIGS with the two general UB schemes29 – full requirements unemployment benefit 
(Indennità di disoccupazione a requisiti pieni) and reduced requirements unemployment benefit 
(Indennità di disoccupazione a requisiti ridotti) existing before the Fornero reform, showing how 
CIG was preferable.  
 
Table 3.2 Comparison between general UB schemes before Fornero reform and wage supplementation schemes 
 Full Requirements 
Unemployment benefit 
Reduced Requirements 
unemployment benefit 
Ordinary 
supplementation fund 
Emergency 
supplementation fund  
Entitlement criteria  52 weeks of contribution 
in the last 2 years 
78 worked days in the 
year the benefit is 
claimed for  
Dependent workers of 
firms authorized to access 
the fund (non-standard 
workers excluded) 
Dependent workers of 
firms authorized to access 
the fund (non-standard 
workers excluded) with at 
least 90 days of 
contributions 
Duration 
 
8 months (12 for over 50) Number of days in the 
reference year, with a 
maximum of 180  
3 months in a row, 
extendable up to 12 
months in 2 years  
Up to 48 months for 
restructuring (24 + 12 + 
12)  
Amount: 
 
60% of gross wage up to 
6 months; 40% for the 
following 2 months; 30% 
for further months 
 
35% of previous wage up 
to 120 days; 40% 
afterwards; ceilings as for 
CIG  
 
80% of hourly gross wage per non-worked hour; 
ceilings: 892 € gross per month for gross monthly wage 
up to 1,931 €; 1,073 €/month above  
 
 
This reliance on wage supplementation schemes has become even much stronger when, in 
response to the economic crisis, the government introduced the so called ‘social shock absorbers 
in derogation’ (ammortizzatori sociali in deroga - AD) with decree 185/2008, relaxing the 
entitlement criteria for both wage supplementation (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Deroga – 
CIGD) and mobility allowance30 (Mobilità in deroga). These new criteria allowed regional 
                                                        
28 A provincial tripartite committee chaired by representatives of the Ministry ultimately decides over the granting of 
CIG following negotiations with unions, and negotiates also possible extensions, on a case- by-case basis.  
29 The system of unemployment insurance included at the same time a variety of ad-hoc schemes (e.g. unemployment 
benefits for agricultural or construction workers) 
30 This scheme was introduced in early 1990s by law 223/1991. It was a very generous scheme too, particularly in 
terms of length. It could be considered as a scheme integrating CIGS, thus it was paid either at the end of CIGS 
provisions or when the firm was not able to grant the inclusion in CIGS for part of workers, putting them, once 
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authorities to include firms that were previously not covered due to their sector or size as well as 
employees on non-standard contracts. New admitted firms accessed without contributing to the 
insurance, being on charge of the State budget. At the same time the maximum potential period 
for wage supplementation was extended virtually indefinitely31. For this purpose, the government 
earmarked almost 12 billion euros between 2009 and 2015 (8.1 billion for CIGD and 3.5 billion 
for Mobilità in deroga) partially co-financed by regions and  ESF. In addition to this, wage 
supplementation schemes continue to lack conditionality, since there has never been any link with 
active labour market measures. 
The share of wage supplementation schemes and mobility allowance forms around 40% of the 
total expenditure of PLMPs in Italy (Figure 3.7). This share increased to that level during the 
crisis due to the introduction of AD.  
 
Figure 3.7 Share of wage supplementation schemes and mobility allowance on the total expenditure for PLMPs 
(percentage of the GDP) 
  Note:  
Source: Eurostat 
 
The coverage of PLMPs in Italy has always been under the average of the OECD countries despite 
the high level of expenditure (figure 3.8), as the coverage of workers has been unequal and 
fragmented. The increase in the number of recipients after 2011 is due to the relaxed criteria of 
AD, showing again a decrease after 2013.  
                                                        
authorized, in these “mobility lists”. Like CIG, it was subject to the same procedures of authorization by public 
authorities.  
31 The extension was regulated by regional tripartite agreements, conditionally on the availability of resources in the 
regional budgets, where resources were assigned to regions after rounds of negotiations with the Treasury Ministry. 
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Other passive measures (out-of-work income maintenance and support)
Early retirement
Mobility allowance
Wage supplementation schemes
 100 
 
Figure 3.8 Share of recipients of PLMPs comparing Italy with OECD average (participant stocks as a percentage of 
the labour force) 
 
Source: OECD/Eurostat  
 
The government decided for a progressive reduction of AD32 in 2012 (the Fornero reform). At the 
same, two new general unemployment schemes were introduced – “Social Insurance for 
Employment” (Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego – ASPI) and “Mini- Social Insurance for 
Employment” (mini-ASPI). These were to replace all the other schemes existing until that point 
(with the exemption of unemployment benefits for agricultural workers).  
Later on, in 2015, the harmonization of CIGO and CIGS occurred with the Jobs Act, by means of 
the decree 148/2015. The new norms have reduced ground for redundancies, extending their usage 
and better linking with ALMPs. 
The coverage of contract types has been extended to all employees, the length reduced considering 
CIGO and CIGS cumulated up to a maximum of 24 months over a moving five-year period. The 
cost for firms is made more responsive to the actual use of the schemes, by making their 
contribution proportional to the extent of the CIG used33.  
Bureaucratic procedures are simplified too by smoothing the access procedure to the funds: the 
authorization is now granted directly by INPS and local committees have been abolished34.  
                                                        
32 Fornero reform abolished CIGS in the events of bankruptcy or insolvency and mobility allowance (from the 1st of 
January of 2017). In order to extend coverage to sectors not covered by CIGO and CIGS, “bilateral solidarity funds” 
were introduced, to be established by social partner as part of collective agreements and entirely relying on insurance 
contributions of both employers and employees.  
33 For the first 12 months, there will be an increase equal to 9% of the wage lost by the worker, which will rise to 12-
15% once the 12-month threshold of use is exceeded. 
34 For CIGS it has been also abolished commitments towards unions in terms of preventive communications   
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Concerning the link with ALMPs, workers whose working hours are reduced by more than 50% 
are required to sign the "personalised service pact" with employment services, as well as other 
recipients of UBs, following the same principles of conditionality later introduced by the decree 
150/2015.   
 
Unemployment benefits 
 
The substantial change provided by the Jobs Act in the system of unemployment benefits (UBs) 
has intervened following two main lines. First, it extended the previous system of UBs by creating 
a single main insurance scheme called “New Social Insurance for Employment” (Nuova 
Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego, NASPI, see Table 2) and a smaller specific one for 
dependent self-employed workers (Disoccupazione collaborator,  DIS-COLL). Secondly, it 
introduced a means-tested scheme to address poverty risks (Reddito di Inclusione, REI).  
 
Table 3.3  Comparison between the old system (ASPI and Mini-ASPI) and the new one 
 Social Insurance for 
Employment (ASpI) 
 
MiniASpI 
 
New Social Insurance for 
Employment (NASpI) 
 
Entitlement criteria 
 
13 weeks of contributions in the 
four years before the beginning 
of the period of unemployment, 
and at least 30 working days in 
the 12 months preceding the 
same period. 
 
first contribution payment at 
least two years before the 
beginning of the period of 
unemployment. 
12 months of contributions in the 
two years preceding the same 
period 
 
13 weeks of contributions during 
the 12 months preceding the 
beginning of the period of 
unemployment. 
 
Duration 
 
Half the number of weeks for 
which contributions were paid in 
the four years before the start of 
unemployment.  
Maximum duration is 24 months 
in 2015 and 2016  
 
from 10 to 16 months depending 
on age  
 
Half of the number of weeks for 
which contributions were paid 
over the 12 months preceding the 
beginning of unemployment. 
 
Amount: 
 
75% of the first €1,195 of wages 
25% of wages over €1,195 
The maximum allowance is 
€1,300. The benefit decreases by 
3% each month starting from the 
fourth month. 
 
75% of the first €1,195 of wages 
25% of wages over €1,195 
The maximum allowance in 2015 
is €1,167. The benefit decreases 
by 15% after the first six months 
and by a further 15% after 12 
months. 
75% of the first €1,195 of wages 
25% of wages over €1,195 
The maximum allowance in 2015 
is €1,167. 
 
 
The Jobs Act reform of PLMPs started on March 2015 with the introduction of NASPI. This 
instrument has replaced previous two schemes that were created by Fornero reform in 2012 (ASPI 
and Mini-ASPI), harmonizing entitlement and eligibility criteria and extending both coverage and 
duration of the benefit (Table 3.3). With the exemption of the unemployment insurance for 
agricultural workers, NASPI represents now the single unemployment insurance scheme in Italy, 
being fully implemented from the 1st of May 2015. 
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The integration of the previous schemes has resulted in more relaxed entitlement criteria. First of 
all, contrary to the previous system, NASPI applies also to workers whose contract has been 
terminated consensually or by resignation. At the same time, an increase in the coverage rate of 
unemployment benefits has been achieved by loosening the entitlement criteria. 
Table 3.4 shows the number of unemployed people entitled to NASPI in 2015 and 2016 and 
compares this with the situation in which they would have filled requirements to access the 
previous ASPI/Mini-ASPI system. In both years, the number of benefit recipients would have 
been almost 6% lower. The new system appears to benefit particularly the workers on temporary 
contracts. This effect could be due to the more relaxed entitlement criteria. It would mean that the 
new scheme might enable an easier accumulation of working records, as career breaks have 
probably smaller impact on the benefit entitlement.  
 
Table 3.4 Extension in coverage of NASPI compared to previous ASPI/Mini-ASPI system (years 2015-2016) 
 2015 2016 
Total number of 
recipients 
Number of 
recipients who 
would have not 
been entitled to 
ASPI/Mini-ASPI 
% of persons not 
entitled under 
the old system 
Total number of 
recipients 
Number of 
recipients who 
would have not 
been entitled to 
ASPI/Mini-ASPI 
% of persons not 
entitled under 
the old system 
Total 1.300.385 73.616 5,7% 1.579.311 91.800 5,8% 
Open-ended 
contracts 
429.650 15.007 3,5% 581.998 19.339 3,3% 
Fixed-terms 
contracts 
625.486 38.061 6,1% 726.631 50.553 7,0% 
Source: INPS (2017) 
 
The new scheme has not changed the criteria establishing the amount of the benefit compared to 
ASPI, granting 75% of the monthly “standardized” wage35 for those who earn up to a threshold 
of 1.195 euros per month36. For wages above the threshold, the benefit is equal to 75% of it plus 
25% of the difference between the monthly wage and the threshold itself, limiting the maximum 
benefit at 1 300 euros37. However, the main effect of NASPI occurs due to its duration. This 
benefit is granted for a number of weeks equal to half the weeks of insurance contribution38 in 
last 4 years, while this window of time to find weeks of insurance contribution for ASPI was 
restricted to only one year.  
The maximum potential period of NASPI is now in total a few months longer than ASPI used to 
have(table 3.5). The increase is particularly high for open-ended contracts due to the higher 
                                                        
35 The amount of the benefit is related to the taxable wage of the last four years divided by the number of contribution 
weeks and multiplied by the number 4,33. 
36 For ASPI, this threshold was established at 1.180 euros.  
37 This threshold is revalued annually on the basis of the variation in the index of the consumer goods for the workers' 
and employees' families in the year before. 
38 Contributions are paid by employers in the share of 1.61% of the wage for permanent contracts, 3% for fixed-term 
contracts.  
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number of recognized weeks of contributions in the period before unemployment that are used to 
establish the duration of benefit. This means that people working more continuously (with less 
career breaks) might benefit more from the new system.     
 
Table 3.5 Extension in duration of NASPI compared to previous ASPI/Mini-ASPI system (years 2015-2016) 
 2015 2016 
 Total number of 
benefits granted 
Average duration 
of NASPI 
(months) 
Average duration 
of ASPI 
(months) 
Total number of 
benefits granted  
Average duration 
of NASPI 
(months) 
Average duration 
of ASPI 
(months) 
Total 816.574 13,8 10,9 966.716 13,8 12,8 
Open-ended 
contracts 
 
319.410 
 
17,7 
 
11,3 
 
433.603 
 
17,5 
 
13,1 
Fixed-terms 
contracts 
 
383.480 
 
11,8 
 
10,7 
 
405.398 
 
11,4 
 
12,5 
Source: INPS (2017) 
 
With the same decree that regulates NASPI, also two other new schemes have been introduced, 
complementing the main one. The first one is an unemployment benefit for dependent self-
employed workers (Disoccupazione collaboratore - DIS-COLL)39. Its access requires a minimum 
of three months of contributions, from the beginning of the year preceding unemployment. The 
duration and amount of the benefit are the same as for the NASPI, with the only difference that 
the maximum duration cannot exceed six months. It represents the first protection introduced for 
an emblematic category in the Italian dual labour market: the dependent self-employed workers, 
mainly referring to collaborators (collaborazione a progetto), whose share in Italian labour market 
has dramatically increased after the liberalization of this kind of contracts by the Biagi Reform in 
2003.  
Another important novelty in the chapter of passive labour market policies is the introduction of 
an unemployment assistance scheme, the Assegno Sociale di Disoccupazione (ASDI) that relies 
on general taxation. This benefit is targeted to those unemployed who have not fulfilled the 
minimum entitlement criteria of NASPI or who have exhausted its maximum period, but who 
continue to be unemployed and also in poverty40.  
                                                        
39 This scheme originally corresponded to an experimental and temporary measure in the intentions of the 
government, since most of this kind of contracts (“project collaborations” – collaborazioni a progetto) have been 
abolished with the Jobs Act, being transformed in the new permanent contract type from the 1st of January 2016. 
There remain, instead “continuative coordinated collaborations” (collaborazioni coordinate e continuative) contract 
form used in cases of some particular categories. The government decided to confirm DISCOLL as stable measure 
after the decree 81/2017, addressing the benefit to those workers paying the threshold of 34% of unemployment 
benefit contribution at the “separated insurance” of INPS (“gestione separata INPS), a fund for specific and residual 
categories of self-employed workers.  
40 The amount of this unemployment benefit was equal to 75% of the NASpI, and it was due for a maximum duration 
of six months after the period of the unemployment insurance if the worker remained in a situation of particularly 
difficult conditions: yearly household income not higher than 5.000 euros, being close to the retirement age (at least 
55 years old) or having children. In addition to this, the recipient had to fulfil a specific “personalized project” 
conditioning the benefit to the active job search 
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However, with the decree 147/2017, ASDI has been replaced by “Inclusion Income” Reddito di 
Inclusione (REI)41, extending both benefit coverage and duration. REI was originally designed 
with entitlement criteria related both to the family composition42 and the household’s income43 
and then changed with budgetary law 2018 removing family requirements from the 1st of June 
2018.  . All the components of the household have to agree to a “personalized project”, involving 
not only employment services but also social assistance services. The benefit is then conditioned 
not only to active job search, but also to other commitments, such as health care and prevention 
or attendance to school for minors, in order to help families to overcome poverty and address 
social exclusion.  
REI represents an institution that exists in almost all OECD countries. It is usually expensive for 
public budgets since it is paid with general taxation, and this is the reason why, where it exists, it 
is strongly conditioned to the obligation of the unemployed to actively seek work and to accept 
job offers by employment services. In the intentions of policy-makers, the introduction of this 
new means-tested unemployment benefit would bring Italy in the best conditions to complete its 
own income support system conforming to the most widespread model in Western Europe, with 
the protection against unemployment organized on two pillars, social insurance and social 
assistance (Sacchi, 2014).  
 
The link between passive and active labour market policies 
 
The intention of the government has been to change the traditional characteristics of UBs in Italy: 
high benefit level, but low and highly fragmented coverage and poor link with ALMPs. The main 
goal of the Jobs Act has been to reduce the reliance on wage supplementation schemes, to 
introduce more “harmonization” and “universalization” of UBs and linking their duration to the 
previous labour market history, to introduce means-tested measures complementing insurance 
ones, and to strengthen the principle of conditionality.  
To this purpose, the link between passive and active labour market policies has been improved by 
the decree 150 of September 2015 which strengthened the principle of conditionality by 
introducing three changes: more gradual application of sanctions in case jobseekers are not 
                                                        
41 This scheme has resulted from the combination between ASDI and “Sustainment for the Active Inclusion” 
(Sostegno all’Inclusione Attiva – SIA), introduced in 2016, a social assistance scheme to address poverty based on 
households’ income and managed by municipalities. 
42 To obtain the benefit there should have been in the household at least one of these conditions: an older unemployed 
(over 55), a child, a pregnant woman, a disabled. 
43 Household’s income not superior than 6.000. This threshold is accompanied by the provision of ISRE (income 
indicator in relation to the composition of the family nucleus) up to 3.000 euros, real estate not exceeding 20.000 
euros and movable up to 10.000 euros (6.000 euros for singles, 8.000 euros for couples). The amount of the benefit 
is not more related to the previous wage, but it is on fixed rates depending on family composition, until a maximum 
of about 500 euros in case of five people in the household. REI, therefore, assigns an allowance lower than ASDI on 
monthly basis, but for a longer duration, up to 18 months. 
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complying with commitments agreed, the creation of the state agency for active policies and the 
design of a connection with INPS (the institution responsible for the delivery of the benefits). This 
decree introduced for the first time a principle of gradual sanctions for jobseekers not respecting 
commitments agreed with operators in their personal service pacts (patto di servizio 
personalizzato), proceeding according to different steps of curtailments of benefits depending on 
the kind of obligation not fulfilled.  
This represents an important change since until the Jobs Act the application of conditionality was 
expressed with more rigidity, establishing a complete loss of the benefit in any lack of 
commitments for the obligations with employment services. Despite this definition, conditionality 
was never applied in practice. Nevertheless, it is not sure that more flexibility will improve the 
application of conditionality (see the next section). In these respects, one of the objectives of the 
new state agency should be also to define a structure aiming at managing the integration between 
passive and active policies, despite that the competence over subsidies remains in the hands of 
INPS. The Italian system is indeed not a one-stop-shop for the clients due to this fragmentation 
in the administration of labour market policies. To this point the decree 150/2015 has introduced 
specific provisions concerning the relationship between public employment offices and INPS, 
establishing that the former have to communicate to the latter the sanctions to be applied. The 
decree, to this point, explains that they should interact by means of an integrated single IT system, 
aiming at sharing information about both PLMP and ALMP users. The finances saved by applying 
sanctions on benefits are used to finance the system of ALMPs. So far, the implementation of 
such infrastructure has not been completed. 
Nevertheless, the main challenge seems to remain in the lack of sufficient resources for 
employment services in order to better address their matching function and enabling well-
functioning mechanisms of conditionality. Comparing Italy with other OECD countries, the share 
of public spending on active measures remains still quite low respect to that on passive measures 
(figure 3.9). This feature could be related to the substantial growth in expenditure for passive 
labour market policies during the years of the economic crisis, due to the massive reliance on 
wage supplementation schemes as policy response adopted in that period, while the expenditure 
for ALMPs remained the same as ten years before. This resulted in an increase in the difference 
between the expenditure on active and passive measures. 
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Figure.3.9 Public spending on active and passive measures, percentage of GDP, 2010-2015 averagec 44 
 
Source: OECD/Eurostat and Grubb and Puymoyen (2008)  
 
Despite that there is now a single and universal scheme with NASPI, the Italian LMPs continue 
to reveal a very unbalanced relationship regarding the expenditure on active and passive measures, 
being in favour of the latter. A similar situation can be seen in other Mediterranean countries such 
as Portugal and Spain.  
Figure 3.10 shows how these levels have changed during recent years, until the Jobs Act. PLMPs’ 
expenditure has been always above the OECD average, even growing between years 2011 and 
2014, while ALMPs’ expenditure has been always below the OECD average, even decreasing 
during the same period. So far, the Jobs Act seems to not change this feature, despite putting more 
efforts on active measures. Some inversion, showing an increase in expenditure for active 
measures and a decrease in expenditure for passive measure can be seen after the 2014. However, 
if the conditionality mechanisms will not work, as it is so far the case, the picture will continue to 
be very difficult to reverse.  
  
                                                        
44 Countries are ranked in increasing order of active measures in 2015. For more details about the categories, see Grubb and 
Puymoyen (2008).       
Data refer to FY 2004/05 for the United Kingdom and New Zealand (instead of 2005); they refer to FY 2011/12 for the United 
Kingdom, to 2014 for Estonia and to FY 2014/15 for New Zealand (instead of 2015).      
Unweighted averages of 31 OECD countries where both active and passive measures are shown for all years referring to the 
respective panel, i.e. except Chile, Greece, Iceland and Turkey.    
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Figure 3.10 Public spending on active and passive measures over time, comparing Italy with OECD average, 
percentage of GDP 
 
 Source:  OECD/Eurostat  
 
 
3.5.3. Changes in PES and ALMPs 
 
The National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies  
 
The starting point of the decree 150/2015 can be certainly considered the creation of the ANPAL, 
as new organisation on national level.   
Originally, ANPAL was conceived with the idea to return to a centralized State-led operated 
model, in which the agency would have had the responsibilities of managing directly the whole 
PES system. The reasons for this choice had to be found in the awareness of policy-makers about 
the failure of the decentralization introduced by previous reforms at the end of nineties, resulting 
in high levels of fragmentation, and thus to increase the effectiveness of ALMPs centralizing the 
competencies for employment services. The context become even complex after law 78/2015 with 
which provinces were abolished and responsibilities for employment services have been 
transferred from provinces to the regions, without transferring the corresponding budget. This has 
added severe repercussions on the already problematic implementation process, because it 
represents a crucial enabling mechanism. On July 2015, an agreement between State and regions 
established the costs for the local offices to be shared (2/3 and 1/3 accordingly), although the 
negative outcome of the referendum in the end of 2016 put this agreement in jeopardy. As of now, 
a solution has still not been reached (Pinelli et al., 2017).  However, this shift of competencies 
required a constitutional reform to be approved with a referendum, held on the 4th of December 
2016, which resulted in the rejection of the reform and thus in the failure of the original project. 
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Due to the negative outcome of the referendum, its role was redefined as the coordinator of the 
network of employment services. The network of employment services is established with the 
decree 150/2015 giving it the task to introduce actions and services aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the labour market for both employers in terms of satisfying skill needs and for 
jobseekers by providing support for labour market integration. The network consists of many 
different actors: 
- ANPAL as coordinator of the network, monitored and steered by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policies;  
- regional structures for active labour market policies. The regions have the competencies to provide the 
employment services thorough their local employment centres (CPI), which previously, were in charge of 
provinces;  
- INPS (the National Institute for Social Protection) being in charge of UBs, a national centralised 
organisation;  
- INAIL (the Institute for Insurance against Accidents at Work) cooperating with PES regarding job 
integration of people with work-related disabilities;  
- private (accredited) providers of employment services providing active measures alongside PES; 
- inter-professional funds for lifelong training and bilateral funds (i.e. funds for training measures for which 
the task of supervision is given by the reform to ANPAL); 
- ISFOL (the Institute for the Development of Workers' Professional Training) changed by the same decree 
in INAPP (National Institute for Public Policy Analysis). Some staff of ISFOL was transferred to ANPAL 
as part of the reform. The main task of INAPP is to study, monitor and evaluate public policies, including 
labour market policies; 
- “Italia Lavoro S.p.A.” changed to “ANPAL Servizi S.p.A.” and transformed into an in-house entity of 
ANPAL. While Italia Lavoro used to be a joint-stock company owned by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance mainly to manage locally the provision of employment services from ESF funding, the 
transformed “ANPAL Servizi” (now a joint-stock company owned by ANPAL) should assist and support 
ANPAL in its activities. As ANPAL Servizi contrary to ANPAL has employees also at the regional level, 
it assists also regions and CPIs locally (though considering the guidelines from ANPAL); 
- the Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Crafts and Agriculture (called Unioncamere) regarding 
an input for trainings (anticipating skill needs), universities and upper secondary schools regarding training 
provision. 
All these organisations existed in some form also before the reform. Thus, the creation of this 
network was a slight rearrangement of responsibilities between the organisations rather than 
creating a new set-up of employment services. Even ANPAL is not an independent agency, being 
still steered and monitored by the Ministry (similarly to several other organisations in the network 
of employment services).  
Though ANPAL coordinates the network, it is not responsible for ALMPs. The Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policies together with the regions identify the relevant strategies, objectives 
and priorities. Specifically, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies acting together with the 
State-Regions Conference is responsible for fixing three-year strategies and yearly objectives 
regarding active labour market policies and for defining minimum service levels throughout the 
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country. The Ministry and the Regions sign yearly framework agreements regulating the relations 
and obligations concerning the management of employment services and active labour market 
policies, the activities that are outsourced from the private accredited operators and the duties 
entrusted to ANPAL. Consequently, the governance of PES in Italy involves the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policies and ANPAL on the national level and 21 regions steering the CPIs. 
The agency is hence not tasked with setting the objectives and strategies for PES in Italy but has 
the power to coordinate the activities between the relevant stakeholders to develop these 
strategies.  
ANPAL coordination of the network of employment services should go through common tools 
offered to regions, aiming at improving the ability of the local government level to deliver the 
services, as well as monitoring and evaluating territorial performance.  
In this respect, the decree introduces a new form of accreditation, now based on the national level. 
As well as foreseeing, as defined by the previous Biagi Reform, that regions define their own 
accreditation schemes, the reform recognizes that private providers can now make their request 
of accreditation directly to the ANPAL, becoming accredited on the entire national territory. To 
this purpose, ANPAL has set up a specific national registry for these operators. This provision 
has been specifically conceived also to overcome the problem of providers wanting to operate in 
regions without an accreditation scheme (or with a stricter one). More in general, in the intention 
of the policy makers, this kind of provision is intended also for the majority of regions without a 
consolidated system, due to the recent introduction in time we have seen in the previous 
paragraph.  
Among the tools in the hands of ANPAL we find also the goal to realize an integrated single IT 
system of active labour market policies (Sistema Informativo Unitario- SIU). A well-functioning 
and supportive IT infrastructure is an integral part of a modern PES, the backbone for the tasks 
that it performs. A well-developed IT infrastructure and digitalisation, in particular, should have 
the potential not only to increase the efficiency (doing more with less) and effectiveness (targeted 
measures, better matching of vacancies and jobs, data supported decision making) of the public 
employment services, but also customer satisfaction and transparency can be enhanced (Pietersen, 
2016). The highly fragmented division of responsibilities for employment services in Italy over 
the past decades has led to an abundance of IT systems and databases on provincial and regional 
levels. Due to this fragmentation it has never before been possible to have an overview of the 
number of clients registered with PES, monitor the activities of local employment offices or 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of employment services provided across Italy. Before 
the reform there were no unique online platforms available for the jobseekers or employers 
facilitating the communication with the system of employment services and supporting the 
matching of jobseekers and vacancies across Regions. 
Therefore, the Jobs Act and the related strategic documents assign ANPAL several tasks related 
to digitalisation, the IT infrastructure and data exchange. The new SIU should serve as the basis 
for monitoring the activities and effectiveness of the Regions and the CPIs allowing introducing 
performance management in the system. SIU has an application that allows integrating data from 
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the existing Regional IT systems. It will have also functionalities to exchange data with other 
organisations such as providing data on activation conditionality on benefit recipients to INPS 
and receive data about the jobseekers from the databases concerning education information, 
income and income tax returns data, land and real estate data. Data exchange is envisaged also 
with INAPP to enable it to evaluate training activities and active labour market policies. SIU 
should also benefit the jobseeker clients and citizens to integrate data from the online registration 
platform (data about jobseekers declaring their availability to work, DID) and proving them a 
“worker’s dossier” i.e. generating a file containing the information about them available in the 
system.  In the context of this goal, ANPAL has implemented in November 2016 the first SIU 
version. Subsequently, from December 2017 the agency has introduced the provision that the 
certifications of unemployment status should be released only by the online channel. The release 
of this certificate has always represented the first step at the entrance in a local employment centre, 
and its telematic form is conceived to reduce the workload of the public operator. To strengthen 
conditionality the online DID has been connected also to the procedure to apply for UBs. In this 
respect, the decree 150/2015 established that the request for NASPI should be intended as an 
equivalent of the declaration of unemployment. Once the request for the benefit is released INPS 
should send it to the local employment centre in charge. For the purposes of conditionality, then, 
in the reverse direction, employment centres should send to INPS communications related to the 
sanctions that should be applied in terms of benefits reductions for non-respected commitments 
by the jobseekers. Anyway, the interoperability of INPS data on UBs recipients is still proceeding 
following a very slow and laborious implementation.  
The first steps building this infrastructure have not gone however very smoothly for ANPAL. To 
date, the data quality is not high enough yet to serve as a reliable input in the decision-making 
process and performance management system.   
 
Strenghtening benefit-conditionality 
 
Besides restructuring the PES system, the Jobs Act also targets the content and above all the 
quality of ALMPs.  
The Jobs Act aims at harmonizing the concept of ALMPs and setting minimum quality standards 
in the otherwise diverse regionalised system. The decree 150/2015 defines the basic concepts such 
as the status of unemployment and it identifies general principles of ALMPs. As the 
responsibilities to design and provide active measures have been decentralised over the past years, 
the set of measures provided in different parts of Italy are varied. The Jobs Act outlines the set of 
active labour market policies that has to be available for the jobseekers across Italy. However, 
regions can (and they do) deliver additional measures to this minimum set of measures. The Jobs 
Act calls also for the establishment of minimum quality standards for the outlined active measures 
with the help of ANPAL. The agreement for these minimum standards was reached with the 
Regions the first time in the end of 2017 and these are fixed in the “Triannual Strategy for the 
Action on Active Policies”. However, monitoring of the implementation of these minimum 
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quality levels has remained yet problematic. The preliminary performance management system 
has to be developed further to accommodate monitoring of the quality of services45. 
The other major change in the concept of labour market policies is the shift from passive towards 
active labour market policies. As the aim is to increase the activity of jobseekers and make benefit 
receipt conditional on activity, on the one hand, and, on the other, to increase the personalised 
support for the jobseekers, a new “individual service pact” is introduced by law. After registration 
through an online system as unemployed, a jobseeker has to contact a local employment office 
within 30 days to confirm the status as unemployed and the local employment office has to 
propose an individual service pact within 60 days after registration. The service pact is in essence 
an individual action plan (or job integration agreement) used in some form by all of the public 
employment services in the European Union (Tubb, 2012; Wittenberg et al. 2016)46. 
The service pact lays down mutual obligations of the jobseeker and the employment office. The 
operator commits to deliver measures according to the individual needs of the jobseeker (e.g. job 
search counselling, training, reintegration voucher, UBs) and the jobseeker agrees to participate 
in these activities, take steps to find employment and accept suitable job offers. A failure to 
comply with these activities (no-show to an appointment in the employment office, failure to 
participate in an active measure or refusal of a suitable job offer) incurs sanctions on benefits 
ranging from the reduction to the termination of unemployment benefits (NASpI and DIS-COLL, 
REI), as well as the reduction or loss of income support measures (CIGO, CIGS, Solidarity 
Contract and Solidarity Funds). Although the conditionality on benefits existed in the legislation 
already before the introduction of the Jobs Act, these principles have never been implemented 
(Pinelli et al., 2017). At the same time, provisions related to conditionality already introduced in 
the past, did not take into account any graduality of the sanctions, implying the full loss of the 
benefit for the recipient regardless the kind of violation.  
The decree 150/2015 has aimed at enforcing the implementation by foreseeing disciplinary and 
financial sanctions for the staff in employment offices failing to apply the sanctions on benefit 
recipients and rewards them in case of compliance. The employment offices have to communicate 
the events of jobseekers violating their activities to ANPAL and INPS which executes the 
resulting benefit adjustments. The regions receive 50% of the benefits saved due to applying 
sanctions to be used for incentive tools for staff in local employment offices and the remaining 
50% of benefit savings goes to the national fund for ALMPs.  
                                                        
45 The set of indicators agreed in the Triannual Strategy for the Action on Active Policies in December 2017 contain 
some indicators related to this area (e.g. number of active measures provided and the share of participants in 
employment after 3, 6 and 12 months). However, no target for these indicators has been set yet nor are there any data 
available yet as of summer 2018. 
46 Besides the concept of the service pact, also the individual action plans have been used by the Italian Regions. 
Even though the decree 150/2015 provides only the concept of the service pact, some Regions/CPIs sign two different 
agreements with the jobseeker, the service pact targeting more the services to be provided and the individual action 
plan targeting more the pathways to work. However, the provision of services and the pathways to work should be 
complementary and integrated into one administrative activity to decrease administrative burden in the offices. 
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Regardless of the mechanism provided in the Jobs Act for conditionality, this concept is still not 
implemented in Italy. The biggest obstacle at the moment is that the concept of a suitable job offer 
is not yet furnished. The law obliges the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies to define it based 
on a proposal by ANPAL. As this is not done, the CPIs and operators are afraid to apply the 
activation conditionality due to the possible lawsuits as it would not be possible for them to prove 
that the job offer was suitable. Nevertheless, even if the term of suitable job offer will be defined, 
there would be difficulties for the operators to prove that the jobseeker refused it. Thus, also the 
processes and IT systems have to be amended to support the application of benefit-conditionality. 
The staff in the CPIs have to be trained to implement such measures, making them aware of its 
objectives and build the know-how to use the appropriate tools. The monitoring and performance 
management system have to be developed further to accommodate ALMPs47. Nevertheless, it will 
be unavoidable that the application of conditionality will incur some lawsuits from jobseekers and 
the regional authorities have to devote some additional budget for legal costs. Yet, the additional 
legal costs will be marginal compared to the additional benefits that the application of activation 
conditionality brings if implemented properly. 
Additionally, the online tools for communicating violations of the activities by jobseekers and the 
following sanctions to the INPS, as we have seen in the previous sub-paragraph, have not become 
fully functional yet, meaning that the data exchange is not properly facilitated and any 
communication attempt is at the moment rather burdensome. Furthermore, we have to remember 
that the number of vacancies mediated by PES is very low, which also makes it harder for the 
operators in the CPIs to apply the benefit-conditionality (refer jobseekers to suitable jobs). More 
in general, conditionality has been proven to be the most difficult to implement and several further 
changes have to be made in the system before conditionality could take effect successfully, taking 
a few years despite of the additional new mechanisms provided by the Jobs Act. 
 
The “reintegration voucher”: developing a quasi-market model of service delivery  
 
Among the task assigned to the ANPAL we can find also the promotion of the assegno di 
ricollocazione (AdR), a scheme conceived, in the intentions of the policy maker, as one of the 
major innovations for the renewal of ALMPs in Italy and consistent with the goal of overcoming 
regional fragmentation. According to this scheme, the jobseeker, after an accurate profiling phase, 
carried out by employment centres, may receive a voucher quantified in terms of his employability 
(the harder to place jobseekers needing more intensive support). The same jobseeker, at that point, 
can freely choose how to spend those resources, among the provision of services delivered by 
public and private operators, in competition to “gain” the public resources directly assigned to the 
user through the voucher. As we will see more specifically later on, this provision aims at 
increasing the role of private providers, in order to compensate the limited resources of the public 
                                                        
47 In the set of indicators agreed in the “Triannual Strategy for the Action on Active Policies” on December 2017, 
also indicators for the sanctions applied on benefit recipients and for the number of service pacts signed are included. 
However, no target has been set for these indicators yet nor is it clear how to gather the data for them. 
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providers as well as stimulating competition between the public and private providers, thus aiming 
at a major market exposure of the system. In this respect, we could say that the AdR should be 
related also with the national accreditation regime, which aims at favouring the involvement of 
private providers and therefore might be considered as a precondition for the implementation of 
the AdR.  
This scheme should not be completely considered as novelty, since it had been however 
anticipated already in the previous two years. The first time it appeared the mention to a contratto 
di ricollocazione was with the budgetary law of 2014, leaving to regions the task to promote the 
measure in an experimental way. Subsequently, the experimentation has found only few policy 
translations in regional schemes –Lazio and Sicilia, with Sardinia and Veneto applying the scheme 
only limited for workers receiving benefits for the outplacement – due to limited resources 
assigned from the government for its implementation48. One year after, in the context of the 
decrees implementing the Jobs Act, the decree 22/2015 re-introduced a new discipline for this 
scheme, merging it with the reorganization of the UBs. In this case the measure was not more 
linked to regional experimentations and presented as national scheme, addressed to all the 
jobseekers. However, the subsequent decree 150/2015 has again rewritten the entire discipline.  
The scheme has been presented always as a national scheme, but the area of the recipients has not 
more coincided, in the design of the decree 150/2015, to all the jobseekers, since the access to the 
measure has been restricted only to UBs recipients, receiving NASPI from at least 4 months, 
probably due to the persistence in funding problems. We might then say that with this change the 
scheme has lost its original universal address, despite this restriction in the area of the recipients 
has put in evidence one of the first goal of the policy makers with the introduction of the AdR: to 
build a strong link between passive and active policies. Nevertheless, the AdR has been conceived 
as a measure activated on voluntary basis. In the design of the decree 150/2015, the unemployment 
benefit recipient from at least 4 months at the moment of the definition of the individual service 
pact in an employment centre, may ask to the operator for the AdR. So far as the employment 
centre does not call the jobseeker within 60 days, this can make a request for the ADR directly to 
the ANPAL. Once the jobseeker has been profiled he can choose from which operator to spend 
the voucher, with a duration of 6 months for the delivery of the assistance, with the possibility to 
extend for another 6 months if the placement has not been achieved. As we have already 
anticipated, two important aspects of the scheme are the characteristics of the payments for the 
operators, since they are targeted to the features of the beneficiary, growing in relation to his 
employability, and they are outcome-based, granting the reimbursement of the voucher obtained 
only in case of positive successful placement. In relation to this last aspect, the norm of the decree 
150/2015 does not specify what should be considered a positive successful outcome in terms of 
placement and this, as we will see, may have significant consequences. We can only suppose that 
a valid duration of an employment contract for a successful outcome might be computed in a 
minimum of 6 months. This reference is obtained indirectly, since the decree specifies that the 
                                                        
48 The Labour Ministry assigned 55 millions for the Active labour market policies fund” (Fondo Politiche Attive) 
divided in 15 millions for the 2014, 20 millions both for 2015 and 2016.  
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assistance is suspended whether the user obtain a contract of this duration (Valente 2017). The 
AdR represents one the innovations introduced by the Jobs Act that most symbolize the change 
in the paradigm in Italian labour policies, from the previous “job-protection” – responsible for the 
dualization of the labour market - towards the search for the modern concept of “flexicurity” 
(Caruso and Cuttone, 2015). More precisely, this instrument should provide the element of 
“security”, to compensate the massive flexibilization of employment relationship introduced with 
the elimination of the reinstatement in case of unjustified dismissal. The new scheme becomes 
the result of the attempt to shift the protection from the employment contract - and then the 
employer – to the labour market, whence the importance of ALMPs. In these terms the ADR 
should have become a scheme with the potential to catalyse all the other activation schemes 
already existing.  
However, the first implementation of the AdR has not been very encouraging. Starting from 
March 2017, ANPAL has begun a first experimentation with the AdR, sending an invitation letter, 
for the participation to the measure, to 30 thousand potential beneficiaries. The response has gone 
far below the expectations of the policy maker, with only 3 thousand potential beneficiaries 
agreeing to participate at the experimentation. Yet, the provision of reintegration voucher during 
its piloting year in 2017 has not been viewed as a success as the take-up has been lower than 
expected, the employment outcomes have been weak. The initial evaluation results by ANPAL 
show no statistically significant increase in employment rates due to the vouchers (ANPAL, 
2017a) and the information on job quality has been missing. In order to re-enhancing the AdR, 
the government, in the budgetary law 2018 has chosen to extend this scheme among the measures 
to support outplacement processes for workers of companies in crisis. The AdR, in these terms, 
remains an instrument on which the policy-makers seem to continue to invest.  
Nevertheless, we remain still very far from the goal to create a universal scheme of ALMP, able 
to collect all the activation initiatives already delivered and addressed them to all the jobseekers.  
 
 
3.6. Finding the optimal design of public-private contracting arrangement 
 
3.6.1. Selection of the cases and guiding hypotheses 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the last labour market reform. We have seen how Italian 
PES system has been historically characterized by many limitations. The activation of Italian 
unemployed people remains an issue at the top of the labour policies agenda, where its success is 
still uncertain. 
Last ALMPs’ reform have aimed to increase the quality of ALMPs and to restructure the system 
of PES. We can approximate these two fields of reform to the distinction made by Carmel and 
Papadopulos (2003) between “operational” and “formal” policy reforms, where the latter define 
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the content-related aspects of ALMPs – referring to the renewed set of policy tools and the link 
between active and PLMPs strengthened -, the former defines the organization of policy delivery, 
then affecting the governance of PES.  
Relying on the governance dimensions defined in the first chapter, we can find that the main 
attempt concerning PES governance has been to intervene on the “forms” or “structural 
governance”, both at the vertical level, concerning the relationship between different levels of 
government and at the horizontal level, concerning the involvement of non-public operators. The 
first aspect has been interested by the born of the new state agency and its role of coordination of 
the national network of the employment services, as well as a sort of “substitutive power”, whether 
regions do not fulfil the essential levels of ALMPs. This has represented, more precisely, the 
attempt to change the distribution of powers between national government and regions, following 
a new neo-centralistic design. The shift of the system back towards a state-led operated model, in 
the intentions of the policy-makers, would have overcome the limits due to the current high levels 
of regional differentiation. However, as we have largely said so far, the rejection of the 
constitutional referendum, necessary to realize this shift of competence, has quite compromise the 
implementation of that design.  
We can therefore focus on changes occurred at the horizontal level, where there seems to be the 
attempt to increase the market exposure of PES. The awareness of the policy-makers about the 
limited effectiveness of the public operators represents the motivation that probably has induce 
them to opt for a larger involvement of private providers. This has resulted in the promotion of 
the AdR, as new national active labour market scheme introducing a quasi-market in employment 
services. An option that could be also related to the functional governance for what concerns the 
enhancement of the economic goals of Italian PES, by means of the efficiency gain that should be 
associated to the competition between providers. At the same time, the introduction of the AdR 
could be easily related also to the introduction of a new central accreditation regime, alongside 
regional accreditation regimes. The implementation of a competitive framework indeed requires 
a substantial participation of non-public operators, favoured by means of a new channel, in which 
“gateway” for the access of private operators is represented directly by ANPAL (Marocco, 2016).  
After the rejection of the constitutional reform the central level recognizes the regional 
competence but now requires to regions to make their accreditation criteria consistent with the 
functioning of the AdR. The implementation of this tool, together with the national accreditation 
regime, in the aims of the ANPAL, should create the ground for the homogenization of the 
regional public-private contracting arrangements.  
We have seen how, after labour market reforms between Nineties and early Two-thousands started 
in the middle Nineties, the involvement of private provider has been regulated in different ways 
from Italian regions. Every region has been confronted with the implementation of different 
public-private contracting arrangements, generating even divergent trajectories in their models.  
The Lombard model, in particular, arouses much attention because it has developed practices that 
seem to have inspired the design of the AdR. Here, since 2013, ALMPs have been managed with 
the program Dote Unica Lavoro (DUL), a quasi-market in employment services as well (Giubileo, 
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2013; Pastore, 2015). Following the prescriptions of the Biagi Reform, the Lombard policy-
makers have pushed towards a system mainly built on competition between public and private 
actors, putting in place a complete equality of status among them, and leaving to the region the 
main tasks to plan and evaluate the implementation of the policies. The design of this system was 
inspired by the principle of “horizontal subsidiarity”, as incorporated in the Italian Constitution 
in 2001, together with increased regional autonomy, stating that public administrations should 
favour initiatives by individuals and civil society organizations aimed at addressing public needs. 
These are the basic traits of a so called “Lombardy model” that we can find, more generally, in 
other policy areas, such as health care and social policies. DUL corresponds to a voucher and 
consists of an economic entitlement that the eligible user can spend in order to “purchase” (a 
package of) strictly defined active labour market measures, provided by accredited operators, 
either employment centres or private for profit (mainly) or no profit providers. The jobseekers 
who fulfil given requirements for the eligibility may choose among these providers the one they 
will submit the application with and spend the resources attached to the voucher. The similarity 
with the AdR appears very evident. Taking into account the risk of moral hazard from private 
providers, DUL and AdR are very similar also from the point of view of the incentives used to 
align the interests of the agent to those of the principal. In both the programs, the classical solution 
has been to design payment structures in which the agent’s maximization of its own profits also 
maximizes the utility of the government. This means, from one hand, that the payment structure 
should indicate different payments for the providers, according to different target groups placed, 
putting a strong emphasis on the profiling phase. From the other, payments are outcome-based, 
that is, recognized only on the basis of the placement results achieved. Nevertheless, some 
differences are still in place between the two programs, considering the recipients and the role of 
CPIs. For the first, the AdR is restricted to those unemployed receiving NASPI from at least four 
months, whereas the DUL program is also addressed to those not receiving UBs. For the second, 
in the case of DUL CPIs are fully equalized to private operators. They too need to be accredited 
and to compete at the same floor of the privates, whereas in the AdR the public employment 
centres are still conceived as gateway for the users, they are responsible for the access to the 
program, have to perform the profiling phase to jobseekers, remaining out of the competition, 
which is reserved exclusively to private providers.  
As we have seen, at the opposite of the Lombard system, there could be some regions, like Emilia-
Romagna, Marche and Tuscany, which took an openly hostile attitude towards the system 
designed since the Biagi Reform, refusing a larger involvement of private for-profit providers in 
employment services. In fact, they have realized policies that have sought to defend more strongly 
the position and the role of the public actor. This does not mean that these regions still rely on 
public monopolies. Indeed, there could be a different way to concern the involvement of private 
providers. Emilia-Romagna, in particular, has never regulated any accreditation regime until the 
2016, not for delays in the implementation but as a consequence of a precise choice of contrariety. 
Here a full centrality of the public actor has remained in place for long time. Private providers are 
involved only in a “complementary” framework, they enter in support and never replacing the 
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public operators. The regional government holds a strong role of coordination, planning and 
evaluation, while the CPIs remain at the core management of the delivery function. The form in 
which privates have been involved, until the implementation of the regional accreditation regime, 
has been that of public open tendering processes, with public open calls or even agreements with 
public authorities, usually on project basis, above all for the delivery of specific tools of which 
public operators are not equipped. Jobseekers are assigned to specific providers, as emerged from 
the tendering processes, directly by the public operator, without any choice for them. Payments 
are for the major part process-related, also because there are no structured forms of evaluation.  
Considering the situation of high level of regional differentiation, the new challenges putting in 
place by the aim of implementing a national scheme based on a quasi-market in employment 
services now raise the question whether this model is better than others. 
We have discussed in chapter 2 about the implication of marketization and involvement of private 
providers in employment services. As we have already said, quasi-market in employment services 
are often confronted with problems of opportunistic behaviour from the side of the private 
providers, due to asymmetric information between the two parties. These problems are usually 
known as “creaming”, the situation in which providers are paid on the basis of crude placement 
results and then encouraged to assist those users who are easiest to place, and “parking”, the 
situation in which providers take the short way to gain the paid outcomes, choosing the easiest 
program to treat the users, without helping them at all (usually by recurring to soft-skill training 
activities instead of effective job-matching).  
In this work our aim will be to understand what could be an optimal design of public-private 
contracting arrangement. Defining an “optimal design” the one able to take into account both 
economic (efficiency and effectiveness of the performance) and social goals (equity of the 
performance, avoiding opportunistic behaviour of private providers involved). We are interested 
to know what the consequences of a greater market exposure of Italian regional PESs could be. 
In particular, whether a particular model of service delivery, such as the quasi-market model 
(voucher-based), might configure an optimal design of public-private contracting arrangement for 
Italian regional PES.  
To answer this question, we will present a comparison between two regions, Lombardy and 
Emilia-Romagna, that we consider as most dissimilar cases in the context of Italian high levels of 
differentiation of regional PESs. Relying on the horizontal dimension of the structural governance 
of PES, we should say that we are comparing respectively “private oriented services” versus 
“public oriented services”.  
Lombardy as the case with a maximum exposure to the market, where its governance is 
characterized by a large participation of private providers involved on competitive basis, as in the 
quasi-market model of service delivery. 
Emilia-Romagna as the case with a minimum exposure to the market, where its governance is 
characterized by a limited participation of private providers involved on complementary basis, as 
in a traditional model of service delivery.  
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Further aspects related to the political and institutional characteristics of the two territories allow 
this selection of cases. In both cases the traits of each PES governance model can be correlated to 
the strength of actors’ coalitions in the local contexts of policy-making. Coalitions across societal 
groups around large political parties (such as Left Democrats before and Democratic Party after 
2007 in Emilia-Romagna) or confessional movements (as in the case of Comunione e Liberazione 
in Lombardy) have characterized these regional political systems during the period of 
decentralization process, in which the governance of their PES has emerged and consolidated.  
 The two regions then can be described by a common process of layering defining two 
symmetrical, despite divergent, trajectories of formation of their respective PES governance 
models, along high level of stability of their respective regional political majorities, with a quite 
identical time extension of a single president chairing the government during the years of the 
decentralization49. We will describe this evolution along three main stages over time: the period 
before the decentralization, characterized by “proto-models”; the decentralization phase with the 
emergence first and then the consolidation of the models and finally the period following the Jobs 
Act, with the attempt to preserve and adapt the models.  
The substantial traits of difference between the two cases have emerged after the decentralization 
occurred in late nineties. Both the two regions have realized reforms implementing the 
reorganization of competencies between national and sub-national levels and main regulation of 
the involvement of non-public providers, soon after the two turning points represented by 
Bassanini reform in 1997 and Biagi Reform in 2003. After the latter, in particular, we can find in 
each case an organic and comprehensive labour-market regulation (regional law 22/2006 in the 
case of Lombardy and regional law 17/2005 in the case of Emilia-Romagna). Each one of these 
contains the main traits of the respective governance. Main traits of governance have then 
progressively settled until what we have identified as an ideal consolidation phase of each model: 
the stipulation of a local pact, on the basis of the political initiative of the regional government. 
Despite the two initiatives have been quite different, these can be likewise useful for our analysis. 
The consolidation of the two systems comes to be achieved just before the Jobs Act and its reform 
of ALMPs and PES. Soon after this, both the two models have made efforts in order to defend 
their features and prevent from new changes required by the national level, signing special 
agreements with the Labour Ministry. Table 3.6 synthetizes the common steps of development 
followed by the two PES models.  
 
Tab.3.6  Common steps of development followed by the two cases  
Before the decentralization 
(1978-1997) 
 
“Proto-models” common adhesion to a national 
model, distinguishing only for very 
                                                        
49 This is represented by the length of presidency of two of their main political figures: Roberto Formigoni, from 
1995 to 2013, in the case of Lombardy, leader of centre-right coalitions; Vasco Errani, from 1999 to 2014, in the case 
of Emilia-Romagna, leader of centre-left coalitions. 
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few differences concerning tools 
adopted50  
After the decentralization 
(1998-2015) 
emergence of the models comprehensive regulation over local 
labour markets soon after Biagi 
Reform, defining clearly the kind of 
relationship between public and 
private providers 
consolidation of the models local pacts starting from the political 
initiatives of the regional 
governments  
After the Jobs Act  
(after 2015) 
preservation and adaptations 
of the models   
agreements with the national ministry 
to preserve own peculiarities   
 
 
This comparison, then, should make us able to understand what both the advantages and limits of 
a larger share of market services and its social implications could be. Something that we can 
consider of social interest, considering the current public debate and reform process of Italian 
PES. We can imagine testing the new national scheme, not yet fully implemented, using those 
territorial experiences already well established which resembles it, as for the case of Lombardy.  
We have formulated two main general hypotheses to guide our analysis:  
 
H1: The larger the market exposure of PES the larger will be the effectiveness of the system  
According to the literature on contracting-out of employment services, marketization is 
considered as a vehicle for more efficiency and effectiveness. We are not able to evaluate the 
efficiency because we have knowledge just about the overall amount of resources applied in our 
cases, but not about the extent with which these have been specifically used for particular 
interventions. Indeed, we will focus on the effectiveness of the systems.  
That is, the reasons for marketization should be found in the possibility that they can boost the 
performance of the system in terms of placements. If this hypothesis is true we should then expect 
a superior level of effectiveness in the case of Lombardy respect to the case of Emilia-Romagna. 
We have already said above that the DUL program has developed some incentives which are 
present also in the AdR design. Regarding this point this hypothesis will take also into account 
the incentive of outcome-based payments, that should overcome uncertainty by intervening on 
the structure of payments, supposed to be able to enhance the effectiveness of the operators 
recognizing the remuneration only in case of effective placement achieved.  
 
H2: The larger the market exposure of PES the lesser will be the equity of outcomes, showing 
more penalization in terms of employment opportunities for the most disadvantaged jobseekers, 
as a consequence of a higher risk of opportunistic behaviour from the side of private providers.  
                                                        
50 The competencies on vocational training are considered the first attribution in terms of possibility of intervention 
on the labour market for regions, moving from law 845/1978 at the national level. They represent the core of the first 
local initiatives on labour market 
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If this hypothesis is confirmed, we should expect more penalization for the most disadvantaged 
jobseekers in the case of Lombardy respect to that of Emilia-Romagna.   
Relying on principal-agent theory, we could say that the two cases represent two different options 
to overcome the uncertainty from the side of the principal, respect to the risk aversion from the 
side of the agent. That is, the way in which the principal gets information related to the 
contributions of the providers is different. In the case of Emilia-Romagna uncertainty should be 
overcome by the option for a strong position of the public actor, able to gain high level of control 
over the behaviour of the private providers involved.  
The application of the “targeting” incentive, present both in AdR and in DUL, should overcome 
uncertainty by intervening on the structure of payments, supposed to be able to induce providers 
to place those most disadvantaged paying more for them. The second hypothesis will consider 
also this aspect, respect to the extent of which this incentive is effectively able to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour. 
To test our hypotheses, we decide to observe the area of the two metropolitan cities of these 
regions, Milan for Lombardy and Bologna for Emilia-Romagna. These two areas present both a 
high level of economic development. If we observe the period of the economic crisis the territories 
reacted with similar trend. The dynamic of the economic recovery after the crisis is very similar 
with a GDP increase superior respect to the Italian trend (fig. 3.11).  
 
Fig. 3.11 GDP variation in the two cities during the period of the economic crisis (2008=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Despite the overall level of economic competitiveness, the two economic contexts still present 
some substantial differences. When we look at the business demography, we can find that after 
the 2009 the two areas show an opposite trajectory concerning the population of active firms, 
quite positive in the case of Lombardy, definitely negative that of Emilia-Romgna (figure 3.12a). 
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We can understand more in detail the difference between the two contexts when we restrict the 
observation just to the industry sector. In particular with the crisis the number of active enterprises 
in the industry sector has constantly fallen in both the cases (figure 3.12b). The trend 
characterizing the industry sector for Bologna appears to be very similar to the overall one. In all 
the region, from the 2011 the number of total firms has constantly diminished (Unioncamere, 
2016). We can guess that probably the economic context of Milan has been characterized by firms 
from other sectors replacing those from industry. This could be consistent with the huge expansion 
of the tertiary sector as typical features of the economic context of Milan respect to that of 
Bologna, and more in general also of the rest of Italy (Camera di Commercio di Milano, 2017; 
Assolombarda, 2017).  
 
Fig. 3.12 Population of active enterprises during the period of the economic crisis (2008=100) 
 
 
 Source: Eurostat 
 
More in general we can consider these two cities as the heads of metropolitan and urban areas in 
a particular context able to perform on the global economic competition, as the North of Italy. In 
such a context we can imagine the role LPMs subjected to local regulation should be that of public 
policies aiming at the sustaining the economic competitiveness of the firms’ networks, as well 
other areas of public policies, such as economic, industrial and infrastructure (Perulli, 2012).  
We will find how, in their evolution, one of the common aspects between the two models has 
been the role of LMPs aiming at supporting the adaptability workers and unemployed people to 
the economic changes and to firms’ need, in particular when we consider the role of vocational 
training.  
In order to establish the criteria to compare the measures implemented ALMPs in the two cities 
we have to consider a substantial difference in the operational characteristics of the two systems. 
In the case of Lombardy, the DUL represents a universal scheme. In Emlia-Romagna there is not 
a universal equivalent, since the delivery of ALMPs is fragmented according to many programs. 
In consideration of this, we have to choose a criterion to discriminate which measures we should 
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observe. Since the whole DUL program is financed by the European Social Fund (ESF), we decide 
to look at all the initiatives which are correspondingly financed with the ESF also for the case of 
Emilia-Romagna. For what concerns the period of observation, we have to consider that DUL has 
been introduced on the October of the 2013 and then a reasonable focus could be on all the DUL 
participations completed in the first two years of implementation, 2014 and 2015, starting from 
the 1st of January 2014. In the case of Bologna, we should restrict on the single 2015, in 
consideration of some data limitations we will consider later on. In both cases we will stop on the 
September of 2015, considering the introduction of the new discipline from the decree 150/2015. 
The table 3.7 summarizes the structure of the comparison.  
 
Tab. 3.7 The comparison  
Model of service delivery Quasi-market model Traditional model (tendering 
procedures and agreements) 
Design of the public-private 
contracting arrangement 
Competitive, equalization between 
public and private 
Complementary, prevailing role of 
the public over the private 
Cases of observation Milan MC Bologna MC 
Criteria to select the objects of 
observation in each system 
Active labour market initiatives financed by ESF – all the treatments 
completed in the period of interest 
Period of observation January 2014 – September 2015 January 2015 – September 2015  
 
We have to remember that different types of ALMP may have different effects. Thus, it will be 
fundamental to specify carefully the kind of tools delivered in each case. Starting from the 
classification presented in table 1.1, the present study will be focused on employment assistance 
and training, because these represent the ALMPs that could be contracted out by regional PESs. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to be more accurate in the further distinction among the tools included 
in these two categories. The set of tools used within each can be further classified according to 
their degree of “labour market proximity”. This means that we classify each tool on the basis of 
its capacity to minimize the distance of the jobseeker from the labour market. Job-matching in the 
successful case corresponds to the start-up of an employment relationship. The labour market 
proximity will be maximum because the delivery of this measure would end up with an 
employment relationship, thus fully eliminating the distance from the labour market. Hard-skill 
training most often corresponds to advanced course to achieve particular job-related skills. It 
massively reduces the distance from the labour market multiplying the chances for the jobseeker 
to find a job correspondent to the new skills acquired. Soft-skill training, job-search assistance 
and job-counselling only partially reduce the distance of the jobseeker from the labour market, 
since they should deliver just general knowledge about the labour market and how to improve 
job-search activities and/or soft-skills.  
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The jobseeker is neither directly placed, nor enabled for a job by means of specific skills, but he 
is just tutored to find a job by himself.  
This classification will become useful to distinguish the approach followed by each model, 
referring to the main distinction presented in chapter one between workfare or work-first approach 
and human-capital or enabling approach. High levels of labour market proximity require provider 
to put more efforts in taking charge of jobseekers. Figure 3.13 shows a continuum which goes 
from the extreme of minimum degree of labour market proximity/soft tools, to the extreme of 
maximum degree of labour market proximity corresponding to job-matching/placement. The 
more it grows this degree the more it increases the extent to which the policy should be oriented 
towards direct placement. The activation plan for jobseekers may include and cumulate different 
among these tools. For our purposes, for each individual we will focus on the maximum tool 
applied on the basis of this classification. However, each of the cases will show the way in which 
the specific tools combine.  
 
Fig. 3.13 Tools classified according to the degree of placement orientation 
 
3.6.2. Data and methodology applied 
 
The analysis of the cases will be presented in the following two chapters. Each one will show, 
first, the trajectory characterizing the historical-institutional perspective of its model. This part 
will rely on the analysis of official sources from the administrative archives of each region. We 
will be then able to understand the historical background, the main features and aims of the 
systems subsequently to be analysed. The analysis will proceed performing an evaluation of each 
system, relying on a quantitative methodology.  
In order to answer to the first hypothesis, we need to examine the effectiveness of PES regional 
systems assessing the real contribution of them. It may be that some jobseekers who obtained a 
job after participating to a specific measure would have done so anyway. A net impact study is 
necessary, therefore, to determine the extent to which post-assistance outcomes are a function of 
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referral to and participation to the initiatives evaluated.  What we need is to compare the work 
situation of the beneficiaries with respect to their relative "counterfactual situation", that is, the 
one that would have been observed for the same subjects in the absence of this kind of program. 
Reconstructing a counterfactual situation, in our case, means to exploit the possibility of observing 
the work situation of those subjects not-subscribing the program, defined as "controls" or "control 
groups", which are comparable to the group of the treaties, in terms of observable characteristics 
relevant for the selection process (Martini and Sisti, 2009). Far from being practicable a random 
assignment of jobseekers to a treatment and a control group, which we know could be crucial to 
accurately measuring a net impact, we will adopt the quasi-experimental technique of propensity 
score matching, based on the analysis of administrative data. This represents one of the most used 
techniques, with regard to studies in this field (Bryson et al, 2002). For the purpose of the 
identification strategy, the greatest limit to be faced when choosing similar techniques is given by 
the consideration of the non-observable characteristics relevant for the selection process. This is 
the case, for example, of motivational influences that can play an important role in the choices of 
participation in a program, especially in cases of voluntary participation. In such cases, it is crucial 
to have a careful selection of the variables to be taken into account, in order to exploit all the 
observable features available and to ensure that they are as close as possible to the non-observable 
ones, as we have already said. Unfortunately, the data at our disposal are not fully able to ensure 
that we can reconstruct with sufficient richness of information the characteristics of the subjects 
we are examining. The use of administrative data, in fact, gives us, on the one hand, the 
opportunity to obtain almost the total coverage of the population of interest, on the other, we have 
always to remember that this information is not collected for research purposes.  
Starting from the consideration of the enrolment procedures we may have a general pool of 
jobseekers registered as unemployed at a certain point in time, but only one part of them joins 
active labour market initiatives. Many jobseekers then register without following any program, 
despite having characteristics of eligibility, just because they have to register in order to be eligible 
for UBs. In this work the control group will then include all those jobseekers who have certified 
their unemployment status at a particular point in time the period observed, without participating 
to any active labour market initiative in the subsequent period. On the contrary the treatment group 
will include those jobseekers who have joined active labour market initiatives after certificating 
their unemployment status.  
This makes us able to obtain a situation in which we can distinguish two different groups, 
participants and non-participants, whose features can be comparable. Participants and non-
participants are then matched on the basis of their estimated probability to belong to the treatment 
group. This “propensity score” is estimated by maximizing a likelihood function based on a 
standard equation, where all the variables which can influence both the probability of becoming 
treated and the outcome in case of non-participation are included. In the literature are often 
distinguished sets of variables such as socio-demographic attributes, qualification, recent labour 
market history and regional indicators (Winterhager et al 2006; Naticchioni and Loriga 2011; 
Bernhard and Wolff 2008). Once we control for a vector of observable characteristics, it is thus 
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not necessary to match on all the covariates, but it is sufficient to match on the propensity score. 
In our case we will rely on information related to socio-demographic attributes, educational and 
professional qualifications and recent labour market history. The administrative data at our 
disposal have made us able to find almost the same observable characteristics in both cases. 
Indeed, we can distinguish our subjects for age, gender, education, citizenship, month of 
registration and duration of unemployment. Age is grouped in: 15-29 years, 30-44 years and over-
45 years. The education variable distinguishes between compulsory, secondary and tertiary 
education. The month of registration will be helpful, instead, in order to control for seasonality of 
employment. The unemployment spell variable distinguishes those who at the time of registration 
are in a more or less long-term unemployed condition: less than 1 year, more than 1 year and less 
than 2, more than 2 years (at least two years in the case of Bologna). In the case of Milan, we are 
able to observe the previous labour market history for the three years period before our window 
of observation (2011-2012-2013), while in the case Bologna the previous labour market history 
has limited to the two years before the window of observation (2013-2014). The information on 
the labor market histories is crucial because it should also capture unobservable variables 
(Caliendo et al., 2017). 
Information on the outcome variables and the labour market histories is derived from “compulsory 
communications” (COs – Comunicazioni Obbligatorie). These represent administrative 
communications that employers have to send to employment centres whenever an employment 
relationship is started, modified, renewed or terminated. The outcome will be observed after the 
beginning of the treatment, while active labour market initiatives are ongoing.  
We know from the CIA that the results could be biased when the outcome is partly dependent on 
selection of individuals to be treated. Selection bias should be present then if the assignment to 
the treatment correlates with outcome. At the same time, as we have already said, the limitations 
due to administrative data can make this assumption hard to respect. In our case the consideration 
of information related to the previous labour market history for a large period should assume that 
this condition is satisfied in both cases.  
Anyway, in the case of Bologna, it has been possible to use as control variable also the maximum 
level of qualification achieved in the period before the observation, distinguishing for: no 
experience, non-qualified professions, qualified professions, executives and managers.  
For the purpose of the estimation strategy, once the individual propensity to be part of the program 
is estimated, the strategy of identifying the effect of the program is based on combining each 
“unity of treatment” to that “untreated” with the most similar propensity score, in order to obtain 
a measure of the employment impact of the policy through the difference between the participants 
to the program (treaties) and their matched controls. In this work it has been decided to use the 
radius matching method (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). The matching in this case is restricted to 
untreated units which fall into a propensity score difference of 0.01 in absolute value. The impact 
is presented as the average treatment effect of the treatments, known as the “Average Treatment 
effect on the Treated” (ATT), that with the radius method used by us it is calculated through the 
following formula: 
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Where:  
 𝑁#$ represents the number of units treated finding at least a matching inside the range (𝑁#$ ≤𝑁#); 𝑌)#			represents the value of the outcome variable of the i unit treaties;  𝑌+())-  represents the average value of the outcome variable for the control unit matched to the i 
treated unit.  
 
Since the standard errors of the ATT will not take into account that the propensity score has been 
estimated we will replace them with the technique of bootstrap, performed with 100 re-samplings. 
As robustness check we will implement also the matching methodology of Mahalanobis approach, 
where the selection of the control group is more rigorous as it selects only observations in the 
control group which are identical to those in the treatment group, from the viewpoint of the 
observable characteristics (Sianesi, 2004; Pompili and Pastore, 2019). At a first stage, we will 
consider all the work contracts that are obtained by the participants after the treatment, focusing 
our attention on the employment status of the observed subject at a certain point in time after the 
beginning of the program. In this way, it will be possible to evaluate what could be the attachment 
of the subject to the local employment circuit after the participation to the active labour market 
initiatives.   
In a second phase, we will consider as dependent variable the probability of being employed or 
not, considering only the first regular employment obtained after participating in active labour 
market initiatives, in order to evaluate the characteristics of the kind of job provided by the 
operators, referring to the duration of the contracts obtained. In these respects, the stability of the 
employment will be considered to be information about the employment quality provided 
(Dengler, 2019). 
In order to answer to the second hypothesis, it will be analyzed the correlation between post-
assistance outcomes and the personal observable characteristics of the jobseekers. We will use as 
outcome variable the same used for the second step of evaluation, referring to the first employment 
contract got by the jobseekers after the programs. We will use the tool of multinomial logistic 
regressions, focusing, in turn, on the interaction between the participation to the program and the 
observable characteristics of the subjects (Scarano and Guetto, 2017).  
The dependent variable used distinguishes three categories: get no employment, get a short-term 
contract and get a long-term contract. At the coefficients given by multinomial logistic regressions 
we will able to compare the probability of a given outcome with the base outcome. This tool 
allows us to compare, for each observable characteristic, the main effect, reflecting the trend of 
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the local labour market for those non-participating to active labour market initiatives, with the 
interaction effect found for those participating, being interested only in sign and significance of 
the effects. The interaction term will be used then to test whether treatment changes the 
relationship between one observable characteristic and the dependent variable.   
 Nevertheless, application and interpretation of logistic regression require to be very careful 
(Mood, 2010) as well as interactions in non-linear models (Norton, 2004; Mandic et al., 2012).   
Logistic regression estimates do not behave like linear regression estimates because of the risk of 
being affected by unobserved heterogeneity. In these respects, the computation of marginal effects 
in some cases will help us to interpret the model.  
On the basis of the observable variables, it was possible to specify five models for the case of 
Lombardy and six for Emilia-Romagna: 
 
Lombardy 
 
Equation 1: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Treatment + b3 Age ´ Treatment + b4 Gender + b5 Education + b6 Citizenship + b7  Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 2: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Gender + b3 Treatment + b4 Gender ´ Treatment + b5 Education + b6 Citizenship + b7  Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 3: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Gender + b 3Education + b 4Treatment + b 5Education ´ Treatment + b 6Citizenship + b 7 Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 4: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b 2Gender + b 3Education + b 4Citizenship + b 5Treatment + b 6Citizenship ´ Treatment + b 7 Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 5: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b 2Gender + b 3Education + b 4Citizenship + b 5 Unemployment Spell + b 6Treatment +  
+ b 7 Unemployment Spell ´ Treatment 
 
Emilia Romagna  
 
Equation 1: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Treatment + b3 Age ´ Treatment + b4 Gender + b5 Education + b6 Citizenship + b 7 Previous Qualification +  
 + b8  Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 2: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Gender + b3 Treatment + b4 Gender ´ Treatment + b5 Education + b6 Citizenship + b 7 Previous Qualification +  
 + b8 Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 3: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b2 Gender + b 3Education + b 4Treatment + b 5Education ´ Treatment + b 6Citizenship + b 7 Previous Qualification + 
+ b 8 Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 4: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b 2Gender + b 3Education + b 4Citizenship + b 5Treatment + b 6Citizenship ´ Treatment + b 7 Previous Qualification + 
+ b 8 Unemployment Spell 
 
Equation 5: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b 2Gender + b 3Education + b 4Citizenship + b 5 Previous Qualification + b 6Treatment +  
+ b 7 Previous Qualification ´ Treatment +  b 8 Unemployment Spell  
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Equation 6: No employment /Employed with short-term contract/ Employed with long-term contract =  
b0 + b1Age + b 2Gender + b 3Education + b 4Citizenship + b 5 Previous Qualification +  b 6 Unemployment Spell + b 7Treatment + 
+ b 8 Unemployment Spell ´ Treatment 
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4.  THE CASE OF LOMBARDY 
 
 
4.1. The development of the model 
 
4.1.1. Before the decentralization  
 
First interventions by Lombardy on vocational training have preceded the national reform of 1978. 
With the regional law 93/1975 regional government decided to follow up the need to govern this 
field on the territory. It is probably for this reason that after 1978, regional administration decided 
to realign its already designed policy with that emerged at the central level in 1980 (with r.l. 95). 
Already in that period, Lombardy claimed explicitly at the concept of “active labour market 
policy” and the role of the region on the realization of a policy design consistent with the needs 
and features of the territory. As we can read among the first objectives of law 95/1980:  
 
“Vocational training is a public service and it represents a tool of active labour policy. Its purpose is to contribute to 
the growth of workers' personality through the acquisition of a professional culture and to make effective the right to 
work, favouring employment, production and the evolution of work, in harmony with scientific and technological 
progress, within the objectives of economic planning and the regional development plan.” 
Source: Art. 2, regional 95/1980.  
 
The priorities of the Lombard vocational training system were set in relation to the development 
and updating of professional skills required by firms belonging to the industrial fields and, 
especially, by artisanship and small and medium-sized firms. The logic of interventions did not 
seem to neglect special care to the most vulnerable categories on the labour market. One of the 
first innovations introduced by this reform was the “Chapter 908” of regional budget, in which 
were included resources connected to training and re-training of both unemployed and workers 
exposed to unemployment, with particular reference to workers belonging to firms in difficult 
economic conditions. 
The most important measure introduced during these years to support the weakest targets on the 
labour market, however, has been represented by regional law 9/1991 promoting subsidized 
employment initiatives addressed to the most disadvantaged jobseekers, giving resources for four 
particular kinds of interventions: local projects associated to particular areas characterized by 
industrial decline and to those zones with a rate of registration to unemployment lists superior to 
the average; incentives for hiring particular targets; support to the creation of new businesses by 
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particular targets; support of the female labour force taking into account equal gender opportunity 
on the labour market.  
More generally, self-entrepreneurship represented one of the main forms of intervention. An 
important regulation, in this regard, can be traced back to the mid-Eighties, with incentives aimed 
at creating new start-ups, especially by young unemployed. Among the first regional interventions 
in the area of support for businesses, regional law 32/1986 was oriented to the sector of 
cooperatives supported by economic contributions. The promotion of youth employment through 
the creation of new business initiatives was then the main objective of law 68 of the same year, 
with financial contributions covering costs related to the start-up phase, up to half of the expenses 
incurred during the first year of activity. Most of the funds delivered with this provision, in 
particular, were used to finance purchasing of capital goods at reduced rates. Ten years later, it 
was regional law 35/1996 to intervene to support the development of smaller companies, by means 
of subsidized loans to small and medium-sized firms in order to make investments that would 
entail new hiring. In particular, this policy was oriented to the coverage of expenses related to 
investments reserved for the innovation of plants and technologies used by companies. 
The evidence about the distribution of resources of the ESF (IRS, 1999) confirmed that most of 
those connected to “activation measures” were related to enterprise development projects, 
especially for youth, in a superior proportion respect to those addressed towards most 
disadvantaged jobseekers.  
The relationship developed by local policy-makers with social partners during the eighties 
revealed a proficient  cooperation with social partners concerning planning and evaluation of each 
intervention, especially regarding the reintegration of workers involved in outplacement and 
dismissal processes (Gualmini and Alti, 2000). Progressively this kind of dialogue would have 
been extended also to other social private non-profit actors, that will subsequently represent an 
influent subject for the development of this model. With great attention for the role of families 
and Third sector.  
 
4.1.2. After the decentralization 
 
Lombardy’s features, some of them already sketched in the previous paragraph, started to emerge 
after the decentralization, coming to be collected in the first regional law concerning local 
regulation of LMPs, regional law 1/1999. Not by chance, this reform can be considered as the 
prosecution of schemes introduced by previous norms 68/1986 and 9/1991.  
Concerning the new local structure of PES, about 60 new CPIs were established. This first reform 
process is characterized also by the attempt to improve the information function through the 
creation of a new technical regional agency (Agenzia regionale per l’impiego), in order to monitor 
labour market and to provide technical support to the new provincial CPIs. The regional reform 
implemented also subsidized employment measures addressed to youth jobseekers, combined 
with internship programs, as new tool introduced by Treu Reform. Starting from this phase, 
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indeed, internship would have become one of the most considered active labour market initiative 
to address youth unemployment.    
The definitive emergence of a Lombard PES governance concerning the relationship between 
public and private operators, should be identified with the approval of the regional law 22/2006. 
It replaced law 1/1999 and represents the most comprehensive local labour market legislation 
currently in law, following the implementation of the provisions introduced by the Biagi Reform. 
This regional reform has been articulated into four main parts, related to both operational and 
formal policies: role of the regional government, structure and network of the operators, 
evaluation of services, objectives and targets for the interventions. It seems to be in continuity 
with the main priorities already followed with the previous local regulations: incentives for 
enterprise development and self-entrepreneurship, focus on the weakest targets on the labour 
market, the importance of internships, emphasis on processes of training and re-training, 
integration between work, training and education. At the same time, we can find some new 
objectives concerning the development of changes and new needs on the labour market, such as: 
a clearer relevance of gender equal-opportunity; a better work-life balance; the orientation 
towards a model of life-long learning; the necessity to govern new trends regarding geographical 
mobility of workers and the immigration flux of non-EU citizens; a new emphasis on 
internalization of the local labour market and related employment services.  
These are all objectives that should be addressed by the regional government, assuming functions 
of planning, coordination, control and evaluation. In particular, through the "Regional Action 
Plan", the regional government establishes the criteria for the allocation of public resources to be 
assigned for the implementation of each type of measure. One of the main results of this reform, 
from the point of view of the new structure designed, has been the reduction of the role of 
provinces, now mere candidates for the assignment of services, with a correspondent 
strengthening of the regional government (Varesi, 2007). On the basis of the new criteria for the 
accreditation introduced by regional law 22/2006, provincial CPIs, despite being indicated by 
national reforms as main operators responsible for the delivery of services, have been equalized 
to the other non-public actors involved, starting from the introduction of the requirement to be 
accredited as well as all the other non-public providers.    
The accreditation in the regional law 22/2006 then represents the “gateway” for all the operators 
and, in particular, it is required both for private and for public operators, even CPIs.  
At the same time, there is neither exclusive competence for public operators concerning 
bureaucratic functions. In other words, it is admitted the possibility of a full substitution of public 
operators by private providers. Following the reform occurred with the decree 181/2000, it has 
been specified that non-public operators involved may receive public funds assigned by the region 
to deliver ALMPs and including also the possibility to release certificates of the employment 
status (DID) . Every accredited operator, in particular, should be able to provide: the certificate 
of the unemployment status, an interview of the jobseeker, proposal for initiatives and 
personalized measures of job-matching or training and then also verify that these commitments 
have been respected by the jobseeker.  
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Following the criteria defined by r.l. 22/2006, the subsequent year has been then implemented the 
accreditation regime, with the regional decree 6273/2007.  
It can be considered a “soft” regulation, concerning two main aspects: it is released for an 
indefinite period and, above all, it specifies only economic and organizational requirements. This 
means that in this regulation it was not introduced any particular requirement concerning 
performance and effectiveness in order to maintain the accreditation. As we will see, performance 
aspects will be more related to the evaluation procedure of the system, connected to the 
distribution of resources. The access to the system could be defined also as “direct” because, once 
accredited, the operators does not need any further contractual agreement or tendering procedure 
to participate to the delivery of services and to the distribution of resources (Violini and Cerlini, 
2011). This structure of accreditation adopted by Lombardy has been then functional to the 
realization of a quasi-market model based on the competition of the operators. It is for this reason 
that accreditation has been regulated in a “soft and direct” way. It facilitates the participation of 
non-public providers and makes CPIs fully equalized to them, in terms of powers and tasks, in 
order to push them into the competitive mechanism.  
The most important aspect to understand the regulation of the relationship between public and 
private operators built during these years by Lombard policy-makers rises from the first principle 
specified in the regional law 22/2006: the freedom of choice for the users, an issue strictly 
consistent with the design introduced by Biagi Reform51. This principle, then, finding in the case 
of Lombardy its operational translation in the development of the quasi-market model voucher-
based. From the point of view of the allocation of public resources, this means that the resources 
are assigned, by the regional administration, directly in the hands of the users. In this way, 
operators should compete each other in order to attract voucher to themselves, “selling” their 
services and gaining resources associated to the vouchers. Thus, we find a clear separation 
between financing function (regional government), purchasing function (users) and delivery 
function (operators) (figure 4.1). In this sense, the entrance to this system is regulated through the 
accreditation and the kind of “soft and direct” regime of Lombardy makes it easier the 
involvement of private providers, in order to achieve that level of competition between operators 
conceived as a mean to improve quality of services in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency 
in the use of public resources. 
  
                                                        
51 “Regions […] create appropriate lists for the accreditation of public and private operators operating in their territory 
in compliance with the guidelines defined by them in accordance with article 3 of Legislative Decree 21 April 2000, 
n. 181, and subsequent modifications, and of the following principles and criteria: guarantee of free choice for 
citizens, within a network of qualified operators, appropriate for size and distribution to the demand expressed by the 
territory itself” (Art. 7, c. 1, lect. a, decree 276/2003). 
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Fig.4.1 Structure of the Lombard quasi-market model 
 
 
 
To understand this model, we should enlarge our view and look also at the other social policy 
areas in Lombardy. Precisely, starting from the reform of the regional health service at the end of 
the Nineties (r.l. 31/1997), the freedom of choice principle for the user has been followed not only 
for the labour market reform in 2006, but also for the reform of the educational and training 
system, with the r.l. 19/2007 and for the reform of the social-assistance sector occurred with r.l. 
3/2008. These reforms took place in a decade from 2000 to 2010, which saw the realization of the 
"Lombard model" in all the social policy areas.  
Competition, as a common issue in all of them, has represented the mechanism more functional 
to the freedom of choice for the citizens. This principle, as we have seen, has become the core 
value around which regional policy-makers have built up the system. In this building process an 
important consideration should be made upon the relevant ideological factors influencing choices 
policy-makers did in that period, considering the strength of actors’ coalitions. In these respects, 
Roberto Formigoni has been four-time elected president of the regional government (1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010), heading it for almost eighteen years.  
This figure, as many other exponents of Lombard politics and administration, came from the 
movement known as Comunione e Liberazione52. This movement has always been characterized 
                                                        
52 This Catholic ecclesial movement was founded in Italy by the priest and theologian Luigi Giussani. It was born 
from the intention of reconstructing a Christian presence in the student environment. In 1954 Giussani founded 
Gioventù Studentesca (GS), a movement that initially took place within the Azione cattolica in the Berchet high 
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by a radical critique of Italian public intervention in social policies, considered strongly intrusive 
and inefficient. According to this thought, such a kind of welfare state would not be able to grant 
services of good quality or even to effectively protect the weaker segments of the population. It 
was represented as obstacle to the civil society, preventing this one from exploiting its potential. 
The critical issues of public intervention, in this view, would contrast with the potential strength 
of civil society in its various articulations, with the crucial role of Third Sector and the family 
inside it. Social policies, instead, should leave space to civil society and enhancing it fully, 
transforming public welfare from an obstacle, in this conception, to an instrument for its 
development. Reforms should not, therefore, take on tasks that civil society can already do, but 
make every effort to put its various expressions to the point of acting with the greatest possible 
autonomy (Vittadini, 2002).  
In these terms this model is very reliant on the principle of subsidiarity, characterized by the idea 
that individual self-responsibility becomes decisive both in private affairs and in public sphere. 
The emphasis placed on citizens' freedom of action is therefore the result of the conviction of the 
potential that civil society exploits when it is left free to act constructively (id.). The public actor 
should only regulate the initiatives respondent to the needs of the community that social groups 
autonomously promote. This is the reason why the State becomes no longer the exclusive provider 
of services, but it should be intended as the guarantor of a system populated by “self-responsible 
citizens” (question marks of the author)(Abelli, 2005).  
As a consequence of this ideological convictions, the critique towards strong public 
interventionism finds its answer in the set of solutions developed by the New Public Management 
paradigm. This can be considered consistent with the main ideological framework seen for three 
main aspects:  
- citizens are no longer conceived as users but as consumers, with freedom of choice among services 
expressing their preferences; 
- the introduction of a market logic represented by the competition between providers in order to 
replace the public actor in being respondent to citizens’ needs; 
- the development of systems for the measurement and evaluation of the performance.  
 
Freedom of choice for the users, in fact, can only be realized when they are aware of the 
effectiveness and capacity of the operators among which they can choose. According to the design 
of r.l. 22/2006, the evaluation process should be based on the achievement of the objectives set 
by regional administration, the consistency between interventions and employment opportunities 
for users. To enforce this mechanism, regional decision-makers has connected the distribution of 
the resources to the evaluation process. In particular, from r.l 22/2006 it has been established that 
                                                        
school of Milan, where the priest dedicated himself to the teaching of the Catholic religion. The movement, which in 
1969 will take the current name of Comunione e Liberazione (CL), has been based on the conviction that the Christian 
event, lived in eucharist, is the foundation of the authentic liberation of man. The main aims of the ecclesial movement 
are the mature Christian education of its members and collaboration in the mission of the Church in all areas of 
contemporary society (Giussani, 2003). 
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a share of at least the 75% of resources should be assigned on the basis of the evaluated 
performance of the providers.  
In this view, each provider should receive a numerical score related to its performance based on 
specific evaluation criteria, thus introducing a quantitative logic in the evaluation process, aiming 
at realizing a rating system. This task should be entrusted to an independent evaluator, chosen by 
means of public tendering procedures, with the aim of disseminating the data resulting from the 
evaluation process in the context of a public ranking (D’Onofrio and Morocco 2013).  
The aim of the regional government chaired by Formigoni has been to aggregate all these 
principles, common to different social policy areas, in a local pact that would have represented 
the basis for further developments. To these purposes, Formigoni’s government after his election 
for the last mandate, in 2010, was intended to realize a “Pact for Welfare”. However, a political 
scandal broking out in 2013 led towards the anticipated breakdown of this regional government, 
causing also the fact that this political initiative has never been completed and did not receive any 
official signature. Nevertheless, despite this non-complete process, we can consider its contents 
as a term of reference for the consolidation of the Lombard model, leaving aside the aspect that it 
had to be abandoned for exogenous problems.  
In order to follow this line of reasoning we can consider two institutional documents to understand 
the main features of this pact: the guidelines inspiring preliminary consultation, with the final 
report after it (regional decrees 3481/2011 and 4296/2012), and Formigoni’s end-of-term report 
of his last mandate, including a substantial chapter related to social policies53. The consultation 
resulted in many meetings with different actors of the territory, among municipalities, provinces, 
local health authorities, social partners, both public and private stakeholders54.  
We can synthetize two “keywords” emerging from this consultation and that, subsequently, 
should have been included in the “Pact for Welfare”: individualization and subsidiarity.  
The stressed concept of the individual at the centre of the system is consistent with the workfare 
perspective assumed by this region. The workfare view, in particular, was the answer to the 
political choice of regional decision-makers in favour of a “welfare of responsibility”, in which 
individual capacity and potential should be enhanced in a protagonist role of “social 
entrepreneurship”, for the very first satisfaction of social needs. The reference is clearly on the 
individualization of measures. Measures should be targeted on individual needs and then 
accounted in a multidimensional perspective. The concept of individual responsibility is therefore 
strictly connected with that of freedom of choice for the selection of providers, in order to simplify 
                                                        
53 We have first of all to specify that this initiative have not concerned specifically LMPs, but it was oriented mainly 
to care services. However, as we have already said, Lombard model has been characterized in all field of social 
policies by the same main principles and then, according to our perspective, it has been solved by a common pattern 
of governance regarding care services as well as LMPs. 
54 Precisely, it had been made 20 meetings with regional welfare general administration, 15 with social directors of 
local health authorities, about 40 distinguishing by bilateral meetings and round tables with social partners (not only 
unions but also other organizations such as forum of families, catholic organizations, Third sector forum and other 
associations dealing with assistance purposes) and with institutional actors (province administrations, hospital 
administrations, INPS, INAIL, prefectures).  
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access to services and stimulate users’ participation, enhancing the quality of the system. 
Subsidiarity, that we have already mentioned, appears to be related to that of structural 
governance. Indeed, it refers, from the horizontal dimension, to the relationship between different 
operators, and from the vertical dimension, to the relationship between different levels of 
government. The latter concerns, in particular, the role of the regional government, committed to 
define standards for the accreditation and to assess the performances achieved. The former regards 
the involvement of private providers, recalling the typical values already described of market 
exposure of the system and trust given to the role of Third sector organizations, in the aspiration 
to realize a system in which resources and interventions should not continue to rely exclusively 
on public institutions.  
Apart from the fact that the “Pact for Welfare” has never been formally produced and officially 
signed, due to the breakdown of Formigoni’s regional government experience, employment 
services have been developed around these same principles, immediately after the 2006 regional 
reform and continuing with progressive adaptations and improvements.  
As we have seen the logic determined by freedom of choice for users in the access of services, in 
the context of a quasi-market, has been regulated by the mechanism of voucher, conceived as a 
“purchasing-title” for the selection of services. In the Lombard model such a framework has led 
to the design of the so called sistema dotale, from the name dote (literally “endowment”) with 
which has been called the voucher system. The evolution of this kind of system has registered a 
substantial change in its structure in 2013, passing from multiple schemes to a single one.  
Until 2013 vouchers were assigned to particular categories of subjects, identified from time to 
time as recipients of specific initiatives. The recipients of the initiatives could obtain vouchers 
through a procedure that took place entirely on-line. Each individual could benefit, in a single 
year, of more than one dote, until a maximum spending limit. 
The two main programs were Dote Lavoro and the Dote Formazione. Recipients of Dote Lavoro 
were citizens resident in Lombardy aged less than 64 proving to be people looking for 
employment, including workers expelled from the labour market due to company crises, subjects 
with no experience, not exclusively recipients of UBs, workers involved in outplacement 
processes and workers belonging to disadvantaged categories, suspended from the extraordinary 
re-integration funds.  
The value of a voucher was on average about 1.500 euros. In addition, to those subjects whose 
social and economic conditions made necessary further support, a contribution of up to 3,000 
euros was foreseen (equal to 300 euros for each month, up to a maximum of 10 months). For the 
purposes of remuneration for accredited institutions, Lombardy region recognized from 700 to 
1.300 euros to the operator who took in charge a jobseeker, being able to get him a job with a 
duration not less than 6/12 months. 
As regards Dote Formazione the objective was to promote employability and increase the level 
of skills and life-long learning, with particular attention to those who were at risk of exclusion 
from the labour market.  
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To access Dote Formazione it was necessary to be resident or domiciled in Lombardy and to be 
unemployed with age not superior to 35 and holding a secondary education title.  
The amount of a single voucher for the provision of services of the regional vocational education 
and training system amounted to a maximum of 5,000 euros in relation to the type and quantity 
of services used. It was possible to use one or more training services provided by an operator 
accredited by the region for a maximum duration of 24 months starting from the date of 
assignment of the dote. 
In addition to this two "basic" programs in 2009 and in response to the effects of the economic 
crisis, “Dote system” was integrated by specific devices aimed at supporting specific targets with 
the delivery of ALMP, such as: recipients of social shock absorbers in derogation (Dote Lavoro 
ammortizzatori sociali in deroga); people with disabilities (Dote lavoro persone con disabilità); 
disadvantaged subjects (Dote soggetti deboli); police force operators (Dote formazione operatori 
di polizia); temporary workers (Dote lavoratori in somministration) and advanced training (Dote  
A first potential problem of the previous system was to be found in the kind of services delivered. 
To the beneficiaries of Dote Lavoro were often offered orientation and scouting activities, 
complemented by training courses. The skill-balance was a less frequent service but still relevant, 
while support for self-entrepreneurship was the least common service. 
In general, it emerged that job-matching was less frequent compared to the training activities.  
Moreover, towards those who had lost their jobs, it was evident the difficulty of settling the 
training path undertaken with concrete possibilities of placement.  
On the other hand, the training was provided in the absence of an explicit demand for skills from 
firms. Sometimes it was also complained an inadequate attitude on the part of the training 
agencies, organizing pre-packaged and standardized courses, poorly responsive to the needs of 
workers (Expert Italia, 2009). 
A second problem of the previous “Dote system” concerned the criticalities of the competitive 
model. The market share of private provider was about the 70% in the system and public operators 
proved often to be unable to compete. In addition, the probability of opportunistic behaviour by 
private providers was always high, with the classical risks of creaming and parking.  
It appeared a scenario in which the private operators operated in sectors traditionally covered by 
public employment centres (such as orientation and job-search training) while there has been a 
scarce presence in services less covered by public operators and needing more specialization, such 
as job-matching (Eupolis, 2014). 
In other words, the private provider naturally tends to accomplish for the most part vocational 
training and orientation, obviously easier tasks to carry out, while ignoring, probably because not 
economically convenient, the action for which they have been explicitly involved, the job-
matching.  
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Starting from October 2013, all these criticalities led to the shift towards the definition of a single 
scheme, the Dote Unica Lavoro55, replacing the previous multiple types of vouchers, which will 
be our object of evaluation. This program has soon become the centre of the regional planning for 
ESF, both at the end of the 2007-2013 cycle and at the core of the 2014-2020 one. The recipients 
can only be residents or domiciled in Lombardy and should be in particular: young unemployed 
up to 29 years, unemployed (regardless of previous employment) whether they perceive benefits 
or not, but also workers of companies located in Lombardy, in the presence of specific conditions 
(cessation of activity, bankruptcy proceedings, solidarity contracts, layoffs). In order to overcome 
problems of moral hazard of the previous systems it has been changed the structure of payments 
for private providers, introducing the mechanism of “targeting” and making the reimbursement 
of the provider “outcome based” (Bruttel 2005). Recipients have been divided according to their 
level of employability, in such a way that each target receives a total budget available, 
proportioned to the level of employability. This action is implemented by means of the profiling 
phase and could be performed both by public and private operators, according to the user’s 
preference.  
The amount of the voucher is calculated in terms of time spent without work, for the main part.  
This criterion is, then, combined with other three variables influencing the probability to get a 
job: age, gender and education. Each of these variables is articulated in different specific 
conditions, each one giving a score.  
The sum of the scores determines the person's four possible need bands (fasce d’aiuto), 
corresponding to different level of assistance intensity: 
 - target 1 "low intensity" (1-49 points): this includes people able to place or being reintegrated to 
the labour market independently or requiring minimal support; 
- target 2 "medium intensity" (50-74 points): this category includes people who need intensive 
services for placement or reintegration to the labour market; 
- target 3 "high intensity" (75-100 points): this category includes people who need intensive 
services for a medium / long period and strong individual support for placement or reintegration 
in the labour market;  
- target 4 "other assistance" (0 points): this includes people who need services to maintain their 
position in the labour market. 
More precisely, the amount of the voucher grows in relation to the fascia d’aiuto assigned, 
meaning that the profiling phase determines ex-ante the expected remuneration for the provider.  
It follows, then, the elaboration of a "personalized insertion plan" (PIP), a plan defining services 
tailored to the needs of the voucher recipients, establishing mutual commitments between user 
                                                        
55 Decree of the regional general director for education, training and work 9254/2013  
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and operator. PIP should specify a tutor guiding the user during all phases of implementation of 
the voucher, sketching a timesheet of the interventions.  
The interventions are chosen within a unique basket of active labour market measures: 
“acceptance and orientation” (“access to services, specialized interview, definition of the path, 
skill assessment, analysis of the attitudes towards entrepreneurship, support to network creation, 
orientation and job-search training, continuous accompaniment”), “skill consolidation” 
(“coaching, tutoring and accompaniment to the internship / work experience, certification of skills 
acquired in non-formal and informal areas, promotion of knowledge specific to business 
management, training activities”) “services for job-placement and / or self-entrepreneurship” 
(“job-matching, support to new business)”. The maximum duration of the program varies 
according to the fascia di aiuto assigned, in particular it is equal to six months for targets 2, 3 and 
4, only three months in the case of target 1. On the basis of the outcome-based structure of 
payments the reimbursement of the voucher to the provider is recognized only in case of a 
“successful employment outcome”, defined as a work contract of duration of at least six months. 
If at the end of the first program, precisely at the end of the last measure activated, the successful 
employment result is not achieved, the user may apply again to the program. Being able to access 
up to a maximum of three vouchers in a year (the so called borsellino dote).  
The configuration of DUL program have respected also the criteria established from r.l. 22/2006 
regarding the attachment between the distribution of resources and the evaluation process, by 
means of a share of the 75% of all the resourced assigned. This assignment distinguishes between 
two components: a “fixed” and a “performance” one.  
The fixed component has a total weight of about 25% and allows all operators to participate in 
the distribution, 40% is proportional to the value of the vouchers charged in previous years, 
recognizing the value of operators who demonstrate greater capacity and effectiveness. The last 
35% is destined to operators which, on the basis of the vouchers charged in previous years, have 
shown a performance above the average in terms of placement of the participants to the program. 
De facto, operators which do not meet the objectives set by the regional plan are excluded from 
the distribution. 
Considering all the mechanisms structuring Lombard PES governance related to the involvement 
of private providers, we can state that the DUL program can approximate the mechanisms we 
have seen from principal-agent theory aimed at avoiding the risk of opportunistic behaviour from 
the side of the private providers involved (Bruttel, 2005). The outcome-based and targeted 
remuneration should correspond to the structure of incentives supposed to be able to maximize 
the utility of both provider and government; the evaluation process determining the distribution 
of resources on the basis of the performance of the operators should correspond to the information 
supposed to be able to increase the governments’ information about the effective providers’ 
efforts; the accreditation provide those standards for the access to the services that should 
correspond to public regulation concerning the way the providers have to deliver services (Table 
4.1 ). We have already said and we will see again later on that this represent an important aspect 
in confronting the DUL program with the AdR.  
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Tab. 4.1 Mechanisms present in the DUL program to mitigate opportunistic behaviour according to Bruttel (2005) 
Incentives: 
The agent’s maximization of its own profits also 
maximizes the utility of the government 
 
Payment structure:  
Outcome-based payments and targeting  
Information: 
Increase the governments’ information about effective 
providers’ efforts 
Evaluation process: 
 Strong evaluation of the providers, in order to assign 
resources on the basis of their performance  
Control:  
Rules and regulation that state how providers have to 
deliver their services 
 
Accreditation regime:  
quality standards at the access and guarantee a 
minimum level of service 
 
 
4.1.3. After the Jobs Act 
 
Despite showing a very similar configuration with the design introduced by the decree 150/2015 
for what has concerned new ALMP instruments such as the AdR, regional policy makers have 
soon seemed to be worried about the possibility of any possibility of modification induced by the 
central level. For this reason, soon after the September of 2015, on December it was signed the 
agreement between the national government and Lombardy.  
The defence of the Lombard PES governance can be seen in particular on the regulation of the 
profiling phase, which is not exclusively assigned to CPIs in the DUL program, differently from 
the Adr. As we have seen, this for Lombardy should have resulted in a strict limitation, respect to 
the prerogatives gained by private operators, able to provide profiling by themselves. The 
agreement, in these respects, have ensured that not only this phase but all the fields of 
interventions regarding employment services specified by the decree should rely on the regional 
network putting public and private operators on the same floor. At the same time, all the 
interventions outlined by the decree 150/2015 should be delivered inside the framework of the 
DUL program (table 4.2). This in order to continue to give to this program the maximum centrality 
in the regional model.  
 
Tab. 4.2 Comparison between active labour market measures provided in the DUL program and those classified by 
the decree 150/2015 
List of active labour market measures provided in the DUL program List of services to be provided by 
regions according to decree 
150/2015 (art. 18, c.1) 
Acceptance and orientation Access to services  basic orientation, skills analysis in 
relation to the local labour market 
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situation and profiling (art.18, c.1, 
lett. a) 
Specialized interview specialized and individualized 
orientation, through the assessment 
of skills and analysis of any needs in 
terms of training, work experience 
or other active labour policy 
measures, with reference to the 
adequacy of the job demand profile 
expressed at territorial, national and 
European level (art. 18, c.1, lect. c) 
Definition of the path  
Skill assessment  
Analysis of the attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship 
individualized orientation to self-
employment and tutoring for the 
steps following the start-up of the 
company (art. 18, c.1, lect. d) 
Support to network creation  
Orientation and job-search training  help in finding a job, even through 
group sessions, within three months 
of registration (art. 18, c.1, lect. b) 
Continuous accompaniment 
Consolidation of skills Coaching  
Tutoring and accompaniment to the 
internship / work experience 
promotion of work experience for 
the purpose of increasing skills, 
including through internships (art. 
18, c.1, lect. g) 
Certification of skills acquired in 
non-formal and informal areas 
 
Promotion of knowledge specific to 
business management 
individualized orientation to self-
employment and tutoring for the 
phases following the start-up of the 
company (art. 18, c.1, lect. d) 
Training activities start-up of training activities for the 
purposes of professional 
qualification and retraining, self-
employment and immediate work 
placement (art. 18, c.1, lect. e) 
Services for job placement and / or 
self-entrepreneurship 
Job-matching  
Business support  
 
 
From the year 2015 the configuration of the DUL program has also been progressively updated 
by regional policy-makers. Despite having recognized an important role to private providers, these 
kinds of modification followed some considerations related to the effects of such a kind of 
involvement, trying to avoid unintended consequences. In particular we can register further 
changes in the distribution of resources, according to changes in the composition of targets.  
The consideration of the most disadvantaged targets on the labour market has led to the 
introduction of a new “band” corresponding to a new level of assistance intensity. This has been 
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the case of the new Fascia 3 Plus, representing a particular “spin-off” of the band Fascia 3- high 
intensity assistance. This has been addressed to unemployed people in strong conditions of 
disadvantage, on the basis of the following criteria: unemployment exceeding 36 months; family 
income not exceeding 18.000 euros; being not recipients of other benefits. Only for this new band 
has been established that these recipients receive a "participation fee" for their participation to the 
program. Such a change has been accompanied by changes in the structure of components at the 
basis of the evaluation the performance. In particular, in the new configuration for the distribution 
of resources it has been introduced a specific component of "taking charge of disadvantaged 
groups”. This has been a specific provision for operators respecting regional criteria addressed to 
the assistance of jobseekers in high condition of disadvantage. In addition to the fixed component 
of 25%, for these "qualified" operators has been foreseen a 20% of the total distribution of 
resources, of which: 10% of the total allocation of resources proportionally to the placements of 
Fascia 3, 10% of the total allocation of resources proportionally to take charge in the Fascia 3 
Plus. As a consequence, the performance component has been lowered to 55%, of which: 25% is 
assigned proportionally to the placement results achieved, 30% to operators above the average of 
the employment results.  
 
 
4.2. The evaluation of the model  
 
The evaluation of the DUL program would make us able to get a first answer for our two guiding 
hypotheses regarding the consequences of a quasi-market model in terms of effectiveness and 
equity. With regard to this, as we have seen, this program has been equipped with incentives 
supposed to avoid the opportunistic behaviour of private providers, common also to the AdR 
scheme. To this purpose we will evaluate DUL observing its first period of implementation, from 
the 1st of January 2014 until the 30th of September 2015, in the area of the Metropolitan City of 
Milan. That is, the period from the start of the program and the situation preceding the new 
national reform for ALMPs and PES introduced with the decree 150/2015. Table 4.3 presents the 
total number of measures delivered within the DUL program in the period observed using the list 
of active labour market measures already listed in the previous table 4.2.   
We have simplified these measures in four main categories of ALMPs: “basic services” (servizi 
di base), “individual orientation” (accoglienza e orientamento), corresponding both to a general 
employment assistance and soft-skills courses like job-search training, “skill consolidation” 
(consolidamento competenze), corresponding to more specific hard-skill training; “services for 
job-placement”, corresponding to job-matching/placement services. One of the most interesting 
features for this case of study is that all the 10.823 jobseekers treated are assisted by means of 
placement services as final tool delivered. This is an important aspect to get a first insight of this 
model. In the table 4.3 we can see how the measure are cumulated for the jobseekers treated.    
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Tab.4.3 Measures delivered with the DUL program in the period of observation and total number of jobseekers 
treated with different combination of them.  
Type of measures  
Basic services 
 
Individual 
orientation 
Consolidation 
of skills 
Job-matchiing/ 
Placement 
services 
N. of jobseeker 
treated with the 
combination 
    1.730 
    7.937 
    1.156 
 
Table 4.3 clearly shows how the final tool delivered is always represented by placement. However 
the most recurrent path corresponds to a first approach with PES characterized by the first two 
steps of soft employment assistance. Just a small part of the jobseekers joins hard-skill training. 
On the contrary, there is another small proportion which after a very first access to the services is 
addressed directly to the placement, even skipping further soft measures.  
With regard to the costs incurred for the first implementation of the program (from October 2013 
to June 2015), 48 millions of euro have been invested from the budget of the 2007-2013 ESF 
cycle. The subsequent financing of DUL, from June 2015 and so on, has registered an additional 
60 millions of euro from the 2014-2020 ESF cycle. In both the cycles the DUL program has 
represented the central scheme around which the policy-makers set the main goals of LMPs. The 
resources for DUL, in particular, have been addressed to promote the activation of the long-term 
unemployed and of those with the greatest difficulty of placement, as well as the support of people 
at risk of long-term unemployment, by means of interventions favouring adaptation to the 
changing conditions of the economic context and the updating of skills throughout the working 
life.  
 
4.2.1. Design of contracting  
 
More generally, and as already anticipated, the DUL program, characterized as a quasi-market 
model, exposes itself to a number of possible problems. Competitive experiences of this kind are 
exposed to the risk that the economic interest, considered in its original intentions as a vehicle of 
effectiveness and efficiency, may lead private providers to try to minimize the risk of failure in 
placement. That is, if the ultimate goal of private providers is to get voucher reimbursement, they 
will tend to follow the easiest way to achieve this objective. In the case of the DUL program, the 
regional administration exposes itself to the risk of being not able to observe the actual efforts 
made by the operators to achieve the placement of the users in charge. Providers, in particular, 
may only make use of jobseekers who are easy to place, that is, those more skilled and which 
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require less expensive interventions (creaming). Likewise, private operators may shift public 
resources to interventions for which achievement of the results is easier, such as orientation 
activities, where it is more difficult to find evidence of the effectiveness of the interventions, 
looking for the easiest way to get a remuneration (parking).  
Therefore, we know that if the institutional design for the involvement of private operators is not 
able to disincentive the opportunistic behavioural phenomena, employment results will inevitably 
be suboptimal in terms of equity.  
We move from the consideration that the model drawn up by Lombardy, with the creation of the 
DUL program, can be related to the incentives proposed by Bruttel (2005) to avoid the moral 
hazard risks of the principal agent theory, which anticipates the policy design of the AdR 
introduced by the decree 150/2015. We focus then on the design of the payment structure for 
private providers, supposed to be able to align agent's interests with those of the principal. We 
have already mentioned that payments are necessarily considered outcome-based, since they are 
constrained to the achievement of a certain employment outcome for the jobseeker in charge. We 
have seen also that this program makes the payments depending on different user targets, so that 
the remuneration is as bigger for the operator as higher is the level of disadvantage of the user. 
Targeting and outcome-based payments are present also in the AdR scheme. It is for this that our 
evaluation of the Lombard model represents an interesting opportunity, not only to confirm or not 
our main hypotheses, but also, more specifically, to test whether these incentives - targeting and 
outcome-based payments - applied to quasi-market models are actually able to mitigate the 
opportunistic behaviour of private providers.  
 
4.2.2. Data, identification and estimation strategy  
 
Data and characteristics of the sample  
 
Our analysis focuses on the area of the Metropolitan City of Milan, as representative of the 
regional system. We observe the first two years of implementation of the DUL program, including 
in the analysis all the services recorded from the 1st of January 2014 and the 30th of September 
2015, just until the introduction of the new norms from the decree 150/2015. For each of these 
years, it has been possible to observe the employment result of all the subjects for a period of time 
of at least two years. The data used come from the union of three administrative archives, provided 
by the labour market observatory of the Metropolitan City of Milan (Osservatorio del Mercato 
del Lavoro di Milano - OML) and by the regional agency for work and education (Agenzia 
Regionale Istruzione Formazione e Lavoro - ARIFL). We have been able to build a dataset of 
26,251 observations crossing the fiscal codes of the observed subjects over three types of 
information. The first corresponds to the certification of unemployment status (DID) provided by 
the OML. The second information is provided by ARIFL and refers to the measures received by 
jobseekers who have subscribed at least once the DUL program within the same time range. In 
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our analysis, we are considering only the first participation of the subjects, from the beginning of 
their unemployment spell. The last information is represented by the compulsory communications 
of employment (comunicazioni obbligatorie), representing records of each employment contract 
signed, its extension and termination on the territory, provided by the OML, covering the four-
years period 2014-2015-2016-2017 and we will rely on them for the analysis of the employment 
outcomes after the program. To these, we have added the compulsory communications of the 
previous period respect to the one in which we observe the program, over the three-year period 
2011-2012-2013, in such a way as to reconstruct the labour market history of the subjects 
observed. For this reason, we have taken into consideration only those subjects whose labour 
market history can be reconstructed from the 1st of January of the 2011 until the 31st of December 
of the 201756. 
 
Identification strategy 
 
The information at our disposal has allowed us to build five independent variables: age, gender, 
education, citizenship, duration of unemployment57 spell and month of registration.  
The “treatment group” is made up of 9.862 jobseekers who have participated to the program 
between the 1st of January 2014 and the 30th of September 2015. These are people who are 
unemployed at the beginning of the program. As we have already said, although program allows 
repetitions and the possibility to obtain more than one voucher, only data concerning the first 
participation to the program is considered. 
The “control group” consists of 16.389 observations. These are unemployed subjects having the 
last certification of unemployment recorded between the 1st of January 2014 and the 30th of 
September 2015 and did not participate to the program during this period. The mandatory 
communications, finally, allow us to build the outcome variables for both the two groups. 
  
                                                        
56 We have to remember that we cannot observe a subject finding a a job in a territory other than Milan in the same period of 
observation, because he is recorded in another district. The criterion we use - taking into account only those subjects whose labour 
market history can be reconstructed from 2011 to 2016 - allows us to partially overcome this administrative limitation, since we 
are considering only people who live and work in the province of Milan. 
57 Regarding unemployment spell, using the COs it has been possible to summarize the previous work history of the 
subjects by means of the construction of a dummy variable (1 = employed, 0 = unemployed), for each month, in the 
period between 1st of January 2011 and the 31st of December 2016. Indeed, at the time of the combination with the 
data of the COs for the three-years period 2011-2012-2103, many of the subjects included in the treatment database 
lacked information about a previous labour market history traceable month for month, as for the rest of the sample. 
However, it has been easy to recover for this lack by using the information contained in the treatment database, 
finding recorded the voice related to the unemployment spell of the subjects at the time of registration for the 
participation to the program. This allowed us to standardize this type of information to that obtained starting from the 
dummies on the monthly employment condition of all the other subjects, resulting in a single variable "duration of 
unemployment spell" valid for all the units. 
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Estimation Strategy 
 
The probability to be treated has been estimated by means of a probit regression that has as 
dependent variable this probability and as independent variables the observable characteristics of 
the subjects (table 4.4). 
 
Tab. 4.4 Probit regression of the probability to participate to the DUL program  
Variables Propensity 
score 
    
Age  
15-29 (ref.) - 
30-44 0.398***  
(0.021) 
Over-45 0.531***  
(0.023) 
Gender  
  
Female -0.097***  
(0.017) 
Education  
Compulsory (ref.) - 
Secondary 0.183***  
(0.023) 
Tertiary 0.132***  
(0.027) 
Citizenship  
  
Foreigner -0.882***  
(0.026) 
Unemployment spell  
< 1 year (ref.) - 
1-2 years 0.356*** 
 (0.025) 
> 2 years 0.133*** 
 (0.019) 
Month of registration  
January (ref.) - 
February 0.092***  
(0.034) 
March 0.089***  
(0.033) 
April -0.228*** 
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(0.037) 
May 0.168***  
(0.035) 
June 0.084**  
(0.034) 
July -0.375***  
(0.034) 
August -0.260***  
(0.045) 
September 0.058*  
(0.034) 
October 0.065  
(0.039) 
November -0.226***  
(0.050) 
December -0.466 
 (0.055) 
Constant -0.645***  
(0.055) 
Observations 26,251 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table 4.4 shows us the characteristics influencing the probability to participate to the DUL 
program. We can see that this probability increases as age grows, an aspect that could be due to 
the start of the Youth Guarantee Program in the same period redirecting to it many among the 
youngest jobseekers. Having high degrees of education is another characteristic that influence the 
probability to be part of the treatment, in particular for those with high school diploma. The 
propensity score is also positive associated with longer period of unemployment, in particular 
those between one and two year of unemployment. On this point we have already considered from 
the ESF planned policy aims that long-term unemployed subjects represent one of the main targets 
to whom is explicitly addressed the DUL program. On the contrary being a woman and a foreign 
jobseeker are characteristics which decrease the probability to participate to the DUL program. 
Concerning the period of registration there could be just a slight evidence of seasonality of the 
employment. The probability to enter in the treatment, respect to the beginning of our window of 
observation, is higher for winter period (February and March) and that preceding (May and June) 
and following summer (September and October).   
The analysis has been limited only to those observations on the common support. This restriction 
has implied the exclusion of 7 treated units from the support.  
The table 4.5 shows the balancing test we have perform to verify the balance between treatment 
and control group.  
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Tab. 4.5 Balancing test 
Variable        Sample Mean Colonna1 %reduct t-test 
       Treated Control %bias bias  p>t 
Age      
30-44  0,45246   0,43395 3,7 
 
0,003 
 0,45246   0,4505 0,4 89,4 0,779 
over 45 
   
 0,35391   0,25035 22,7 
 
0,000 
 0,35391   0,35029 0,8 96,5 0,591 
Gender      
female  0,49792   0,52072 -4,6 
 
0,000 
 0,49792   0,48677 2,2 51,1 0,113 
Education      
Secondary  0,60679   0,52468 16,6 
 
0,000 
 0,60679   0,61737 -2,1 87,1 0,123 
tertiary  0,22241   0,21862 0,9 
 
0,470 
 0,22241   0,22372 -0,3 65,4 -0,823 
Citizenship      
foreigner  0,0663   0,25328 -52,8 
 
0,000 
 0,0663   0,06988 -1,0 98,1 0,313 
Unemployment spell      
1-2 years  0,16634   0,10342 18,5  0,000 
  0,16634   0,166 0,1 99,5 0,948 
> 2 years  0,27501   0,24193 7,6  0,000 
  0,27501   0,27254 0,6 92,5 0,695 
Month of registration      
February                   0,1186   0,09281 8,4 
 
0,000 
 0,1186   0,11405 1,5 82,4 0,314 
March                      0,1184   0,09885 6,3 
 
0,000 
 0,1184   0,11524 1,0 83,8 0,485 
April                      0,06451 0,09067 -9,8 
 
0,000 
 0,06451  0,06451 0,0 100,0 1,000 
May                        0,10987  0,08115 9,8 
 
0,000 
 0,10987  0,11665 -2,3 76,4 0,128 
June                       0,1052    0,08445 7,1 
 
0,000 
 0,1052    0,1053 -0,0 99,5 0,982 
July                       0,08208  0,13405 -16,8 
 
-0,000 
 0,08208  0,07843 1,2 93,0  0,340 
August                     0,03523  0,05388 -9,0 
 
 0,000 
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 0,03523  0,03792 -1,3 85,6  0,309 
September                  0,11195  0,09848 4,4 
 
 0,000 
 0,11195  0,11322 -0,4 90,5  0,775 
October                    0,06689  0,06083 2,5 
 
 0,049 
 0,06689  0,07362 -2,8 -11,1  0,062 
November                   0,02977  0 ,04045 -5,8 
 
 0,000 
 0,02977   0,02963   0,1 98,7  0,953 
December  0,02035   0,03856 -10,8   0,000 
  0,02035   0,01774   1,5  85,7  0,176 
 
 
Considering that after the matching the mean of the bias is equal to 1%, we can say that the 
matching procedure sufficiently balance the distribution of all covariates between the two groups 
(Caliendo and Kopening, 2005). 
In the next paragraphs we will move towards our two steps of evaluation. 
 
4.2.3. Impact on the probability to be employed 
 
We have first measured the impact of the program considering only the employment condition at 
a certain period after the beginning of the program, considering all the possible employment 
contracts obtained by jobseekers, in order to evaluate what could be the attachment to the local 
labour market after the DUL participation. As we can see at the top of the table 4.6, treaties have 
a probability to be employed, at a period of 6 months after program, greater than 19 percentage 
points higher than controls. With regard to the 12-month effect, we can observe how the impact 
of the program is reduced, even though there is still a considerable effect of 14 percentage points. 
 
Tab. 4.6 Impact evaluating the employment condition at a certain point in time after the beginning of the treatment 
Matching after 3 months after 6 months after 12 months after 18 months after 24 months 
Before matching 0,175 
(0,006) 
0,185 
(0,005) 
0,136 
(0,005) 
0,144 
(0,005) 
0,128 
(0,006) 
ATT After 
matching 
     0,201*** 
(0,006) 
0,201*** 
(0,006) 
0,158*** 
(0,005) 
0,168*** 
(0,005) 
0,150*** 
(0,006) 
Mahalanobis 0,205 
(0,007) 
0,204 
(0,006) 
0,158 
(0,006) 
0,170 
(0,006) 
0,150 
(0,007) 
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In all the cases we can see a very high impact. In particular, the probability of being employed in 
the short-term period is 20 percentage points superior for those undertaking the program respect 
to the non-participants. Mahalanobis gives always comparable estimations. Until two years of 
distance from the beginning of the treatment, despite slightly decreasing, the impact remains 
considerable on the long-term.  
 
Fig. 4.2 ATT over time  
 
  
 
More in detail, after balancing for the observable characteristics, the probability of being 
employed increases in every case, suggesting that we are in presence of a negative selection at the 
entrance of the program. Considering the characteristics that would affect the probability of being 
part of the program (table 4.4), this would mean that there is a strong incidence exerted by two of 
them, such as the old age and the longer period of unemployment, lasting more than a year, 
generally associated with greater difficulty to get a job.  
These first results already show a great level of effectiveness of the DUL program. Those who 
decide to participate have much more chances to be employed and able to remain attached on the 
labour market, even on the long-term. We know from the design of the program that in order to 
get the remuneration attached to the voucher the providers should be able to place participants on 
jobs with a minimum duration of at least six months. In the second step of evaluation we will take 
in consideration just this aspect, distinguishing the first employment contract that the subjects are 
able to get after the treatment on the basis of its duration. We will then perform the matching 
changing in turn the outcome variable to find out: the probability to get an employment contract 
of at least 6 months of duration, of more than 12 months, more than 18 months and at least 24 
months. In this way we should be able to distinguish between the impact of short-term versus 
long-term contracts got as first entrance to the labour market after the treatment.  
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In order to go deeper on the incentive of outcome-based payments for the providers able to place 
the participants on jobs lasting at least 6 months, we decide to distinguish also as outcome variable 
the probability to get as first employment contract with a duration of at least 6 months but 
maximum 12. Looking at this specific outcome we may have the opportunity to find out to what 
extent there is a reliance on short-term contracts, representing the evidence of a possible 
opportunistic behaviour of the providers.  
 
Tab. 4.7 Impact evaluating the first employment contract obtained of: at least 6 months of duration, at least 6 months 
and maximum 12 months of duration, more than 12 months of duration, more than 18 months of duration, more than 
24 months of duration.  
Matching at least 6 
months of 
duration 
at least 6 
months and 
maximum 12 of 
duration 
more than 12 
months of 
duration 
more than 18 
months of 
duration 
at least 24 
months of 
duration 
Before matching 0.148 
(0,004) 
0.083 
(0,003) 
0.064 
(0,003) 
0.049 
(0,003) 
0.044 
(0,002) 
ATT  
After matching 
0.160*** 
(0,005) 
0.086*** 
(0,004) 
0.074*** 
(0,003) 
0.059*** 
(0,003) 
0.055*** 
(0,002) 
Mahalanobis 0,161 
(0,005) 
0,086 
(0,004) 
0,075 
(0,003) 
0.060 
(0,003) 
0,056 
(0,003) 
 
 
In the first case, the effect is still high, showing a probability of getting this type of contract 
superior for the treaties by 15 percentage points. Considering contracts of a duration of at least 
one year, the effect is reduced considerably. The probability of getting a job of at least one year 
after the DUL program is more than 7 percentage points higher than those who do not participate 
to the program. This is a substantial reduction, even in relation to the effect found taking into 
account all the employment relationships after the program, especially for the comparable period 
of 12 months after the beginning of the treatment (table 4.6). This means that only in about half 
of the cases which determine the employment condition after 12 months, as in that evidence, this 
is represented by the first contract obtained after the program.  
 The effect is exactly the difference between the one observed considering only contracts with a 
duration of at least 6 months and the effect observed taking into account only contracts of a 
duration of at least one year. What turns out is that more than half of the effect of contracts with 
minimum duration of at least 6 months is due to short-term contracts, expiring within one year. A 
result that we could associate with the incentive of outcome-based payments, where for an 
operator it is sufficient to provide a contract of at least 180 days of duration to get the remuneration 
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of the voucher. We could therefore suppose that the 8.3% percentage points effect of the program 
might be due to opportunistic behaviour of the providers. 
However, when we look at longer contractual durations, it turns out that the impact is stabilized 
around 5 percentage points. This means that the program is still effective even from the point of 
view of long-term contracts.  
More in general, we can collect so far sufficient elements to get a preliminary confirmation of our 
first main hypothesis, claiming that the quasi-market model developed by Lombardy region with 
the DUL program returns a very good level of effectiveness.   
Anyway, we need to answer more fully about the possible risk of opportunistic behaviour of the 
providers. In the next paragraph we will look more closely at the relationship between the short-
term contract got after the participation – synthetized in the outcome already analysed of contracts 
lasting at least 6 months and maximum 12 – and the personal observable characteristics of the 
recipients of the program. We will focus now on the incentive of “targeting”, which makes the 
remuneration bigger growing the disadvantaged conditions of the participants. This exercise will 
give us the possibility to answer to the second main hypothesis of our work, affirming that the 
larger participation of private providers exposes employment services to the risk of moral hazard.  
 
4.2.4. Effects observing personal characteristics  
 
As we have discussed in the previous paragraph, the prevalence of short-term contracts as first 
employment relationship obtained after the DUL program leads us to suppose that we may be in 
presence of opportunistic behaviour of the providers. 
We have already explained how the incentives of the DUL program are designed in such a way 
as to increase the remuneration for the operator in relation to the level of disadvantage of the 
jobseeker in charge. Likewise, this aspect does not exclude that providers may also prefer a lower 
but easier gain by continuing to concentrate efforts on those who provide less risk and are easiest 
to place. What we should verify is, therefore, the degree to which operators are sensible to the 
incentive of targeting designed by the program. To better specify our second main hypothesis, we 
have then formulated two alternative sub-hypotheses.  
The first one refers to the case where providers are sensible to the incentive of the system. 
Opportunistic behaviour would arise from the tendency to maximize profits through the placement 
of the most disadvantaged jobseekers, providing higher earnings, on contracts of duration just 
sufficient to get the voucher reimbursement. In this case, we expect to find that the individual 
characteristics associated with greater employment difficulties would increase the probability to 
get short-term contracts after the program, rather than long-duration contracts.  
The second one refers to the case where operators are not sensible to the incentives of the system. 
Opportunistic behaviour would arise from the tendency to minimize costs through placement of 
the jobseekers easiest to place, without necessarily seeking the maximum possible gain, but 
certainly implying less resources, on contracts of duration just sufficient to get the voucher 
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reimbursement. In this second case we expect to find that the individual characteristics associated 
with lesser employment difficulties would increase the probability to get short-term contracts after 
the program, rather than longer duration contracts. 
To test these alternative sub-hypotheses, we use the tool of the multinomial logistic regression, 
through which we analyse the effects of the characteristics of subjects on the probability to obtain 
a short-term contract, rather than long-term one. 
In particular, we focus on the interaction between the participation to the program (treatment) and 
the personal observable characteristics at our disposal, as in the models explained in paragraph 
3.6.2. The dependent variable distinguishes three categories: get no employment, get a short-term 
contract (between 6 and 12 months of duration) and get a long-term contract (at least 12 months 
of duration). The latter is used as reference category58.  
 
Tab.4.8 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of duration between 6 
and 12 months or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Coefficients related to the probability of get a short-term 
contract rather than long-term one. Interaction effects between participation to the program and age. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: employed with a 
contract of more than 12 months of duration) 
Employed with a contract of duration  
between 6 and 12 months 
    
Age  
15-29 (ref.) -1.059*** 
30-44 (0.0941)  
-1.887*** 
Over-45 (0.111) 
Treatment  
Treated -1.747*** 
 (0.106) 
Treatment*Age  
T* 30-44 1.816*** 
 (0.141) 
T* over-45 2.153*** 
 (0.157) 
Gender  
  
female -0.428*** 
 (0.056) 
Education  
compulsory(ref.) - 
secondary 1.027*** 
 (0.080) 
                                                        
58 For simplicity, and given our specific interests, we do not include the results regarding probability to get no employment. 
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tertiary 1.612*** 
 (0.095) 
Citizenship  
  
foreigner -1.279*** 
 (0.077) 
Unemployment spell  
Less than 1 year (ref.)  
More than 1 year and less than 2 0.208*** 
 (0.087) 
More than 2 years 0.388***  
(0.072) 
  
Constant 0.772***   
(0.114)    
 
Observations 26.251  
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.8 shows the interaction between age and treatment. We can see how the probability of 
getting a short-term contract, rather than a long-term one, among subjects not participating to the 
program, decreases as the age grows. The coefficients of interaction between age and treatment 
are positive and statistically significant. In particular, what is of main interest, is that this positive 
effect is reversed with the trend of the local labour market, meaning that probably the operators 
counteract the trend subjects may find if they do not participate to the program.  
 
 
Tab. 4.9  Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of duration between 6 
and 12 months or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Coefficients related to the probability of get a short-term 
contract rather than long-term one. Interaction effects between participation to the program and gender. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
  (Reference category: employed with a 
contract of more than 12 months of duration) 
 Employed with a contract of duration  
between 6 and 12 months 
Age  
15-29 (ref.)  
30-44 -0.151***  
(0.070) 
Over-45 -0.689***  
(0.077) 
Gender  
  
Female -0.730*** 
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(0.085) 
Treatment  
Treated -0.728***  
(0.084) 
Treatment*Gender  
T*female 0.659***  
(0.115) 
Education  
compulsory(ref.)  
secondary 0.979***  
(0.080) 
tertiary 1.507***  
(0.094) 
Citizenship  
  
foreigner -1.349***  
(0.081) 
Unemployment spell  
Less than 1 year (ref.)  
More than 1 year and less than 2 0.230***  
(0.088) 
More than 2 years 0.437***  
(0.072) 
Constant 0.371***  
(0.129)   
Observation 26.251 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.9 shows the interaction between the participation to the program and gender. Even in this 
case we find that the operators counteract the main effect. Therefore, women have less chances 
respect to men to get a short-term contract with respect to contract of longer duration, but those 
who participate to the DUL program have more probability respect to male jobseekers to find 
such kind of positions.  
 
 
Tab. 4.10  Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of duration between 
6 and 12 months or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Coefficients related to the probability of get a short-term 
contract rather than long-term one. Interaction effects between participation to the program and education. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
  (Reference category: employed with a 
contract of more than 12 months of duration) 
 Employed with a contract of duration  
between 6 and 12 months 
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Age  
15-29 (ref.)  
30-44 -0.162***  
(0.069) 
Over-45 -0.726***  
(0.077) 
Gender  
  
Female -0.352***  
(0.058) 
Education  
compulsory(ref) - 
secondary 1.593***  
(0.116) 
tertiary 2.768***  
(0.158) 
Treatment  
Treated 0.883***  
(0.147) 
Treatment*Education  
T*secondary -1.415***  
(0.164) 
T*tertiary -2.325***  
(0.202) 
Citizenship  
  
foreigner -1.184***  
(0.083) 
Unemployment spell  
Less than 1 year (ref.)  
More than 1 year and less than 2 0.223***  
(0.087) 
More than 2 years 0.432***  
(0.072) 
Constant -0.347  
(0.132)   
Observation 26.251 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.10 shows how the probability of getting short-term contracts, rather than long-term 
contracts, among non-participants increases as the level of education grows. The interaction terms 
between education and treatment are instead negative and statistically significant, reversing the 
sign of the effect of education among the participants. The participation to the program therefore 
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increases the probability of short-term employment among the less educated, in contrast to the 
"natural" trend of the local labour market.  
 
Tab. 4.11  Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of duration between 
6 and 12 months or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Coefficients related to the probability of get a short-term 
contract rather than long-term one. Interaction effects between participation to the program and citizenship. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
  (Reference category: employed with a 
contract of more than 12 months of duration)  
Employed with a contract of duration  
between 6 and 12 months 
Age  
15-29 (ref.)  
30-44 -0.125*  
(0.069) 
Over-45 -0.656***  
(0.077) 
Gender  
  
Female -0.365***  
(0.058) 
Education  
compulsory(ref)  
secondary 0.931***  
(0.080) 
tertiary 1.441***  
(0.094) 
Citizenship  
  
foreigner -1.836***  
(0.102) 
Treatment  
Treated -0.647***  
(0.071) 
Treatment*Citizenship  
T*foreigner 1.454***  
(0.171) 
Unemployment spell  
Less than 1 year (ref.)  
More than 1 year and less than 2 0.229***  
(0.087) 
More than 2 years 0.442***  
(0.072) 
Constant 0.384***  
(0.125) 
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Observation 26.251 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From table 4.11 we can consider the interaction between being a foreigner and participating to the 
DUL program. This aspect represents another evidence of an opposite sign between the interaction 
term and the main effect. Foreign workers on the local labour market have less chances respect to 
Italians to get a short-term contract rather than remaining. Those who participate to the program, 
on the contrary, register a higher probability to get a long-term contract.  
 
 
Tab. 4.12  Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of duration between 
6 and 12 months or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Coefficients related to the probability of get a short-term 
contract rather than long-term one. Interaction effects between participation to the program and unemployment spell. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
  (Reference category: employed 
with a contract of more than 12 
months of duration) 
 Employed with a contract of 
duration  between 6 and 12 
months 
Age  
15-29 (ref.)  
30-44 -0.112  
(0.066) 
Over-45 -0.642***  
(0.074) 
Gender  
  
Female -0.367***  
(0.056) 
Education  
compulsory(ref)  
secondary 0.988***  
(0.075) 
tertiary 1.503***  
(0.094) 
Citizenship  
  
foreigner -1.310***  
(0.075) 
Unemployment spell  
Less than 1 year (ref.)  
More than 1 year and less than 2 0.506*** 
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 (0.161) 
More than 2 years 0.743*** 
 (0.111) 
Treatment  
Treated -0.219*** 
 (0.071) 
Treatment*Unemployment spell  
T* more than 1 year and less than 2 -0.387*** 
 (0.194) 
T* more than 2 years -0.507*** 
 (0.147) 
Constant -0.011  
(0.099)  
 
Observation 26.251 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, with table 4.12 we observe the interaction between the participation to the program and 
the unemployment spell. We can see, first of all, that the probability to get short-term rather than 
long-term contracts among non-participants increases as the duration of the unemployment spell 
grows. The interaction term has an opposite sign and it is statistically significant. Participating to 
the program therefore increases the probability to get short-term contracts among subjects with 
shorter periods of unemployment. 
To help the interpretation of the multinomial logistic regressions performed so far we plot in fig. 
4.3 the predicted probability of obtaining short-term employment by each of the interaction terms 
analysed. The picture is more helpful for the case of gender, foreign citizenship and 
unemployment spell, where we can see that marginal effects follow reversed directions. Further 
interpretation, instead, would need for age and education where the predicted probability is always 
superior for those treated  but direction of the marginal effects is the same, decreasing as age 
grows and increasing as education increases.  
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Fig. 4.3 Predicted probability of obtaining a short-term contract by treatment and observable characteristics 
 
a) Age 
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b) Gender 
 
 
c) Education 
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d) Citizenship 
 
 
e) Unemployment Spell 
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4.2.5. Comments and potential critique  
 
The results in terms of effectiveness show us a system which can achieve a very strong 
employment impact. Taking into account all the employment relationships that the jobseekers can 
get after the program, we can see how the effect remains very high both after 6 months and after 
one year, regardless the number of jobs got by the same subject. So far, this could represent a very 
first evidence to confirm our first main hypothesis. In particular, the presence of the incentive of 
outcome-based payment for private providers might effectively contribute to boost the 
employment results. In relation to this incentive, private providers receive voucher reimbursement 
only if jobseekers in charge are able to get a work contract of at least 6 months of duration. When 
we look at the first employment contract got after the program we find again high employment 
impact, but at the same time there is a strong recourse to short-term contracts and precarious jobs. 
At this stage we have developed two further sub-hypotheses following the second main one, 
wondering whether private providers are effectively sensible to the incentive of targeting.  
In this respect, it is possible to find the presence of a parking phenomenon, to the extent that part 
of the participants would end up being "parked" on jobs that are going to end in short time. It 
should be specified that the DUL program avoids the risk of parking, in the strict sense, just with 
the prevision of outcome-based payments, which implies the voucher reimbursement only when 
a job is effectively found. Therefore, providers cannot escape the proof of effectiveness by shifting 
their efforts towards activities that are ambiguous to evaluate. However, representing the parking 
a situation in which the operator is only concerned with the achievement of the easiest way to get 
a remuneration, in our case this would just correspond to the situation where a subject is placed 
on a short-term contract, just sufficient to grant the faster way to get the remuneration. Then, we 
have seen how this massive recourse to short-term contracts is related also to a phenomenon of 
creaming, observing how those being more likely to be employed with these employment 
relationships are the subjects with more disadvantageous characteristics. Incentives, indeed, are 
such as to ensure higher remuneration by placing the hardest to place on “easier-to-use” jobs, in 
order to offset the high cost of taking in charge the most disadvantaged. 
This would allow providers to continue to place the most skilled subjects on more stable contracts 
and more structured job-placement projects. Even if there aren’t the same opportunities for 
earnings, this would nevertheless enable operators to be respondent to the demands of qualified 
personnel from the firms of the territory. 
These results would stimulate some suggestions respect to the aim of introducing, at national 
level, schemes based on a quasi-market model and specifically with the incentives we have 
observed. The level of effectiveness is very impressive but decreasing over time. This would 
probably mean that there might be a quick job-entry approach. This could be consistent with the 
workfare perspective of the Lombard model as demonstrated by the total reliance on job-
matching/placement among the measures delivered in the program. Despite the great level of 
effectiveness, from the point of view of the equity of the outcomes, we have seen how the 
incentive of targeting, linking the value of earnings proportionally to the level of disadvantage of 
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the subjects, is not effective at all to mitigate opportunistic behaviour of the providers. However, 
we have found that providers are respondent to the incentives of the system. This means that 
operators are induced to take on the most disadvantaged people. Out of the employment services, 
the “natural” trend of the labour market of Milan, in the time window we have observed, shows 
the placement of young and well-educated subjects on short-term contracts. On the contrary, 
operators seem to contrast this tendency. We wonder to what extent, in the absence of these 
incentives, operators could continue to place disadvantaged subjects on both short-term and 
longer-term contracts. However, the minimum duration of contracts required to obtain the 
remuneration linked to the voucher entails a high exposure to opportunistic behavioural risks and 
therefore requires the need to be revised if it is decided to apply an active labour market policy 
program similar to DUL on the national scale. 
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5.  THE CASE OF EMILIA-ROMAGNA 
 
 
5.1. The development of the model 
 
5.1.1. Before the decentralization 
 
Emilia-Romagna, before the decentralization, has been characterized by a system of vocational 
training respondent to the needs of local businesses but at the same time with the mission to 
include weakest targets of people, as youth, long-term unemployed, women and disabled. The 
system was also designed to be responsive to changes in technologies and industrial innovation 
and oriented towards experimental solutions to intervene on the labour market and better the 
matching between labour demand and supply.  
First intervention on vocational training occurred with regional law 24/1979. The first objective 
of this law was to integrate and reduce the gap between educational system and local labour 
market. It’s for this reason that much attention was addressed to the target of youth unemployed, 
in order to facilitate their first entrance to the labour market. More in general, in the distribution 
of resources descending from the ESF, Emilia-Romagna has always confirmed this attention for 
weak categories on the labour market. The participation of other non-public operators at the 
initiatives of the ESF has not been limited, with the involvement of both for-profit and no-profit, 
engaged through the instrument of the public agreement.  
Placement of young jobseekers came to be realized also relying on incentives to self-
entrepreneurship. Among this kind of interventions, we can find regional law 29/1987 providing 
subsidies for start-ups realized by young jobseekers, trying also to keep on encouraging 
investments on technologies and industrial innovations. In this context acquired a particular role 
also the business form of the cooperative, very recurrent on this territory. That of 1987, however, 
represented also a package containing the widest spectrum of measures, in which there was again 
the element of the search for inclusion of the weakest categories.  
In addition to youth, specific targets of these measures were represented by women and disabled 
people. In the first case, female participation in the labour market had been encouraged, through 
self-entrepreneurship too, and also placing much emphasis on equality with male workers.  
 This provision also included a very first experimental idea of local employment services, aimed 
at favouring the matching between job demand and supply, conceived from the point of view of 
services limited to support a very first form of orientation.  
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It was not already emerged any attitude towards private actors. More in general, a common trend 
in all the interventions on the labour market by Emilia-Romagna followed a continuous attention 
to the participation of a plurality of social and institutional actors, both in the programming and 
implementation phases of all the measures.  
In the same way, Emilia-Romagna in many aspects anticipated the devolution subsequently 
introduced by the Bassanini reform, realizing an articulate design of functions devolved to the 
provinces. In this period, it was created also a regional labour market observatory. An organization 
arisen from the first need to create a centre for the collection of information and monitoring local 
labour market trends. 
The set of interventions seen, although oriented towards specific objectives, did not seem to be 
integrated within an organic discipline. Different measures seemed to be overlapped on each 
other, but never within a logic of integration. This type of local organic reform came at mid-
nineties, with regional law 45/1996, where also the concept of active labour policy came to 
fruition, integrating the existing measures with vocational training.  
Basically, from the point of view of the main contents, we could find:  
- a first definition of the internship as tool addressed to youth unemployment,  
- the provision of outplacement programmes for workers involved in collective dismissals,  
- projects for public works.  
At the same time, from the organizational perspective, we could find the attempt to empower the 
experimental project of local employment services. Respect to the very first provision at the end 
of the eighties, pubic operators were demanded to a very first management of the matching 
between labour demand and supply. It is in these respects that the internship became an incisive 
tool, as placement measure most used for youth unemployment and often also included among 
the measures applied in cases of outplacement programs addressed to the category of workers 
involved in collective dismissals.  
 
5.1.2. After the decentralization 
 
Emilia-Romagna has been the first region to implement the decentralization introduced with 
“Bassanini Reform”, first with r.l. 25/1998 and then with r.l. 7/2000.  
We can synthetize three main goals to be pursued with the new PES model emerging in this phase 
implementing the “Bassanini Reform”: efficiency on the labour market; improvement of the 
matching function; integration between LMPs and education; modernization of monitoring 
systems to analyse the labour market. This, however, without forgetting the emphasis on the equal 
conditions of access for all the citizens to the labour market. An element that, as we have seen, is 
typical of the Emilian case.  The organizational tasks of the new system were now demanded to 
the provinces. Old offices were replaced creating 35 CPIs, respecting the proportion of one per 
100 thousand inhabitants. The real challenge for these new institutions was to replace the only 
bureaucratic activities of the old offices with the new mission of delivering ALMPs. Here we can 
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find a very first discipline regarding the involvement of private providers, where it was established 
that CPIs might make partnership with other entities operating on the labour market, both public 
and private. The reference was to the new temporary employment agencies, at that time recently 
introduced by Treu Reform. However, this discipline was limited to state that this involvement 
should be regulated after public tendering procedures and on the basis of qualitative standards 
defined by the regional government. Finally, in order to improve the information function, in this 
period we find also the born of a technical regional agency (Agenzia Emilia-Romagna Lavoro).  
The real milestone by means of which emerged definitively the Emilia-Romagna model has been 
represented by regional law 17/2005, achieving a definitive organic reform of labour market 
policies.  
In particular, this reform has been the result of the entire reorganization and completion of the 
regional system for employment services following Biagi Reform. It can be analysed using to the 
distinction between operational and formal policies we have already seen.  
As reform of formal policies, it has included both the provision of new ALMPs and administrative 
functions redefined by law 181/2000. In particular, bureaucratic procedures then consisted of: 
- the release of the certificate of employment status;  
- the management of compulsory communications of employment; 
- the management of special placement procedures for disabled (so called collocamento 
mirato) 
In addition to these activities, we can distinguish a new configuration of ALMPs according to four 
main categories: 
- information and orientation, both for employers and for jobseekers;  
- initiatives to improve matching between labour demand and supply; 
- initiatives to improve employability through personalized measures;  
- special programs to support employment for disadvantaged categories.  
 
As reform of operational policies, law 17/2005 showed a clearer definition of the role of the 
regional level respect to the provincial one. Functions of coordination and planning were assigned 
to the region, the management of employment services to the provinces.  
The emerging regional PES governance showed also a clearer and defined attitude towards private 
operators. As we have already said, Biagi Reform provided a tool for structuration of the 
involvement of private providers, the regional accreditation regime. Emilia-Romagna has soon 
showed a very hostile attitude towards this new device, being afraid from the consequences of an 
excessive marketization of services. It would have taken 13 years, as we will see later, to the 
definitive implementation of its accreditation regime. Nevertheless, with law 17/2005 Emilia-
Romagna already specified some criteria in the event of a future implementation of the 
accreditation regime. In doing so, local policy-makers anticipated some restrictions to the 
accreditation, specifying ex-ante particular conditions for the involvement of non-public 
operators. In particular, we can distinguish three main forms of restrictions, intervening on formal 
and operational aspects of the accreditation, related to: the procedures required, the function 
 168 
conceived for the private operators and the contents of the interventions admitted for private 
providers. The first restriction, related to the procedure, requires that the complete implementation 
of the accreditation should have always been followed by a subsequent phase of public tendering 
procedure. This meaning that the single accreditation alone is not sufficient to be involved in PES. 
The second restriction regards the function and the role assigned to private providers and it 
represents the main trait for the regulation of the relationship between public and private operators 
in Emilia-Romagna, stating and highlighting that the involvement of private providers should be 
intended always as integrative and in support, never as substitutive, of public operators. The 
contracting-out, then, should not be conceived as a way to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
of the system by replacing public with private, but in terms of improving the quality of services 
providing more specialized services in addition to those of the public and of which the public 
operator is not provided. This regulation has expressed a clear distance from a logic of 
competition, claiming for a different more collaborative and complementary logic. 
The third restriction, concerning contents supported by private operators, is expressed by the ex-
ante standardization of all the interventions considered for the entire regional system of PES. This 
specification has been conceived for all the actors of the system, not only privates, but also 
provinces, in order to create clear spaces and borders for their respective actions. This 
standardization should ensure homogeneous levels of intervention throughout the region, 
identifying optimal levels then used to set accreditation criteria  
Table 5.1 synthetizes these restrictions, distinguishing area, structure and aim of the restrictions.  
 
Tab. 5.1 Restrictions to the accreditation for employment services in Emilia-Romagna. 
Area of restriction Structure of the restriction Aim of the restriction 
1. Procedure Public tendering procedures always 
required after the accreditation  
The accreditation alone not 
sufficient to be involved  
2. Functions  Private providers always as 
integrative, in support of public 
operators and never in substitution of 
them 
Clear distance from a logic of 
competition in favour of a 
more complementary design.  
3. Contents  Ex-ante standardization of services 
for the action of the providers 
Create clear spaces and 
borders for all the actors of 
the regional system.  
Guarantee homogeneity of 
intervention throughout the 
region, identifying optimal 
levels then used to define 
accreditation criteria  
 
 
The standardization of the services had been achieved only four years after, with a regional decree 
adopted on the 14tth of December 2009 (n. 1988) (table 5.2).  
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Tab. 5.2 First standardization of the services in 2009, distinguishing by jobseekers and employers.  
Services for jobseekers Services for employers 
Information Information 
Access to the services Access to the intermediation system 
Orientation interview Jobs-matching 
Orientation and self-promotion Management of the compulsory hiring 
Skill certification Management of the compulsory communications 
Assistance actions for training and placement  
Access to the intermediation system  
Jobs-matching  
Hiring procedures for the public sector  
Management of the compulsory employment of diabled  
Management of the unemployment status  
Management of the work dossier  
Management of the mobility lists  
 
 
Despite the fact that the process of standardization should have been definitely completed by the 
1st of January 2010, then activating the subsequent implementation of the accreditation, this 
operation was newly delayed because of the breakdown of the economic crisis. The difficult 
economic situation has been translated in a context where employment services ended up being 
inundated with workers who received social shock absorbers and mobility allowances in 
derogation. At that time, energies and resources of the employment services no longer went into 
the investment of the standardization that was planned but were heavily concentrated on the 
support for company crises, protocols and agreements with provinces, putting the regional 
department for work and social policies on the front line.  
During these years, the lack of the accreditation regime did not certainly correspond to a system 
which was not operative. The involvement of private providers has been always implemented, 
relying on the channels still defined by “Bassanini Reform”, competitive tendering procedures or 
agreements.  
As previously mentioned, the possibility that the ESF can directly assign resources to regions then  
enabled Emilia-Romagna to apply an exit strategy. Exit from the national legislation, defending, 
on the basis of a political choice, its own idea of limitation of private providers, conceiving the 
accreditation as a tool favouring an easier and faster entrance of private providers into the system. 
The “regional operational program of the ESF for the years 2007-2013 can show a confirmation 
of this orientation, where there is a clear specification of its features concerning the relationship 
between different operators: 
 
“More specifically, Emilia-Romagna region intends to propose to the regional system a model of governance based 
on territorial cohesion and inter-institutional cooperation which stimulates, on the one hand, the concertation and 
implementation of shared policies among the various subjects, to encourage overall system development, on the other 
the realization of consistent practices of good administration in the public sector. The governance model that will 
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address the 2007-2013 EU programming period should enable the regional system to achieve the highest levels of 
effectiveness required by the relevance of the objectives set by the Region. […] This requires a greater degree of 
cooperation among the actors of the system, together with the correct and effective identification of the relevant levels 
of responsibility and competence regarding planning and implementation of the active labour policies that will be co-
financed by the ESF.” 
Source: Regional operative program Emilia-Romagna 2007-2013, section 3.3.2 “Social partners”, p. 50.  
 
 On the basis of this programming phase the region has kept on involving private providers still 
holding the public actor, both provinces and region, at the core management of the system. At the 
end of this ESF cycle, in 2014, however, regional policy-makers continued to wait to complete 
the implementation of the accreditation since, as we know, the new national government led by 
Matteo Renzi reopened the debate on the opportunity for a new process of labour market reform. 
The new national procedure for the accreditation introduced by the decree 150/2015, indeed, has 
then forced regional policy-makers to define once and for all their own regulation, in order to 
avoid the risk of being bypassed from the new channel set at the national level. However, this 
implementation has been completed not before a significant political initiative that, in our 
analysis, we can consider as consolidation of the Emilian PES model. This is represented by the 
“Pact for Labour”, a local pact on the basis of the initiative of the new regional government, 
related to a large injection of resources for investments59, reporting the signature of many social 
partners active on the territory, on the July of 201560, after a wide consultation phase started one 
year before. The pact contains all the features that we can consider as typical of this model:  
- the attention for the quality of employment,  
- the importance of equal-opportunity on the labour market, concentrating efforts on the 
weakest categories on the labour market,   
- the emphasis on consultation of social-partners in decision-making processes,  
- the improvement of school to work transitions,  
- the strategic role assigned to investments on innovations and technologies, 
Some other important values, connected to major global changes and needs, have been also 
developed inside the pact, like legality culture, administrative simplification and sustainability of 
the economic development.  
In this context, conceived as a strategic priority for achieving the objectives of the pact has been 
also the of the creation of a new regional employment agency (Agenzia regionale per il lavoro), 
now with managerial powers (differently from the technical organism previously introduced in 
                                                        
59 About 15 billion of euros for the period 2015-2020,   
60 The “Pact for Labour” has been signed on the 20th of July 2015, from the President of Emilia-Romagna Stefano 
Bonaccini with CGIL, CISL, UIL, ANCI, UPI, Legautonomie, UNICEM, AGCI, Confcooperative, Legacoop, CNA, 
Confartigianato, Confcommercio, Confesercenti, CIA, Coldiretti, Confagricoltura, Confindustria, Confapindustria, 
Confservizi, Unioncamere, ABI, Third Sector Forum, University of Bologna, University of Modena and Reggio 
Emilia, University of Parma, University of Ferrara, Regional Educational Office, the Metropolitan City of Bologna, 
8 provinces administrations and 9 provincial capital-cities.  
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2005) with the aim to reorganize the public employment centres, as consequence of the national 
institutional reorganization following the Delrio Reform. 
The task of the regional agency has been intended to implement the political guidelines produced 
by the regional government, shared with local institutions and discussed with social partners, in 
order to coordinate and strengthen the network of regional PES. In this frame, looking at the future 
introduction of the accreditation, the pact describes the idea of an “active network for 
employment” to connect different actors involved but, once again, remarking the fundamental 
aspect, already introduced by the regional legislation of the 2005, that private providers should be 
involved only following an integrative and supporting way, never substitutive, respect to public 
operators. 
 
5.1.3. After the Jobs Act  
 
The definitive implementation of the Emilian accreditation regime comes at the end of 2016, one 
year after the approval of the decree 150/2015. However, soon after the introduction of the decree 
150/2015 in September, already one month after, on the 18th of October the regional government 
signed an agreement with the Ministry Labour and Social Policies. We identify with this 
agreement, again with a symmetrical evolution respect to what happened at the same time for 
Lombardy, the process of “defence” and “adaptation” of the Emilia-Romagna PES model carried 
out by regional policy-makers.   
At the core of this act there is the relationship between the regional government and the role of 
the ANPAL. The region has committed to recognize powers and tasks of the new state agency, 
firstly in its role of monitoring and coordination for the achievement of the essential levels of 
services, but at the same time recognizing also the implementation of the AdR and the new 
national accreditation regime. We can synthetize the correspondent “exchange-gain” for Emilia-
Romagna into the “operational autonomy” left to the region, giving us rooms to talk about the 
attempt to preserve the main features of the Emilian PES model.  Despite the fact that this kind of 
agreements were intended by national policy-makers also to regulate a possible sharing of 
functions with the agency61, Emilia-Romagna decided to not allow specific transfers to the 
agency. Regional policy-makers affirm the complete operational management of PES in the hands 
of regional administration62, that in Emilia-Romagna had already taken place with the realization 
of the local network for employment services and the born of the regional agency. In addition to 
this, and most important, the region has gained the recognition of the main trait of its governance 
                                                        
61 The decree 150/2015, at the art. 11, 1st comma, lecter e), specifies that on the basis of the agreement between 
Ministry and regional government it could be possible to specially transfer to ANPAL one of the activities listed in 
the decree at the art. 18, 1st comma, as activities considered as “employment services and ALMP”, institutionally in 
the hands of regions.  
62 In particular, art. 1, 5th comma, says “ the Emilia-Romagna Region is responsible for the operational management 
of the ALMPs and the responsibility for the public territorial articulations assigned to them. “ 
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concerning the involvement of private providers, confirming that private providers have to be 
considered only in an integrative way and never in substitution of public operators. In these terms, 
the “operational autonomy” comes to be expressed above all in the way Emilia-Romagna has 
continued to follow its own governance model reflecting the way in which the involvement of 
private providers is conceived.  
The agreement then created ground to definitively set the regional accreditation regime, one year 
later, on November 2016 (with regional decree no. 1959).  
Differently from the accreditation regime of Lombardy, this is the case of an “heavy 
accreditation”, in relation to its structure and, in particular, from the point of view of the requisites 
that the applicant provider must be able to demonstrate to get the accreditation and to maintain it 
over time, since it is not recognized on permanent basis.  
The most important element concerning the design of Emilian accreditation regime can be 
considered its division in two main areas, each one then resulting in two different lists of 
accredited operators. It is possible to identify a first area of accreditation concerning “standard 
interventions”, conceived for jobseekers and employers, and a second area concerning 
“interventions for the inclusion”, specially oriented towards most disadvantaged categories (table 
5.3). This specification has then replaced the standardization of services established in 2009.  
 
Tab. 5.3 The two areas of accreditation for Emilia-Romagna PES, with a correspondent new standardization of 
services.  
Area of accreditation  1 Services for jobseekers Information 
Matching 
Promotion of mobility opportunities 
Training 
Promotion of self-employment 
Orientation 
Certification of skills 
Services for employers Information 
Assistance to firms’ professional 
needs 
Matching 
Area of accreditation 2  Services for jobseekers Support to the placement and the 
social inclusion of disadvantaged 
people.  
 
 
In this context private provider once accredited takes part to the “active network for the 
employment”. According to the area of accreditation they want to apply they should demonstrate 
the fulfilment of particular requirements, concerning stuffs, networking capacity and, for the 
maintenance of the accreditation status, also targets to be fulfilled in terms of effectiveness of 
their performance. In particular, the main distinction between the two areas comes to be related 
 173 
to networking capacity. This feature should be intended as the commitment for the candidate 
provider to demonstrate its ability in having built in recent years relationships with other actors 
involved in the same mission of activation, not only companies but also universities, schools and 
public institutions for example. On this point, the second area of accreditation, more oriented 
towards social inclusion, specifies the commitment to demonstrate also relationships with public 
institutions involved in social policies and health care services on the territory. Relationship to be 
demonstrated by means of agreements or contracts with an object related to categories most 
disadvantaged. This is interesting because it could be easily connected to that we have seen being 
a very essential trait in the nature of the Emilian LMPs, the emphasis and the attention on the 
weakest targets. An aspect which is then strictly related to the idea of limitation of private 
providers, in the fear for opportunistic behaviour of private providers. In other words, with the 
fear that these people come to be abandoned or forgotten by the system. 
While in the case of Lombardy the accreditation seems to be the first starting point for the 
development and the full operability of that model, in the case of Emilia-Romagna it appears 
almost the final step of the building of this model, where its main identity trait for a long time has 
corresponded to the simple fact of the absence of any accreditation regime, representing this a 
signal of the political choice of counteracting a greater exposure of the system to the market.    
Many of these novelties are still in course of implementation, being first introduced during 2017.  
 
 
5.2. The evaluation of the model 
 
The late regulation of the accreditation regime, for this region, as we have already said, has not 
meant that this region had not developed its own model. Despite some exchange-gain in terms of 
autonomy with the agreement signed with the Labour Ministry, Emilia-Romagna has accepted 
both the new national accreditation criteria and the new AdR scheme. Moving from the 
consideration that the implementation of such scheme, relying on the competition of the operators 
and then requiring a larger market share of services, could be a serious challenge for this region, 
we then try to evaluate Emilian system of PES, looking at the period immediately preceding the 
new national reform and observing the area of the Metropolitan City of Bologna. That is, the last 
period we can observe concerning this case in its “pure” governance model, without the possible 
influence of the changes required by the national reform for ALMPs and PES occurred with the 
decree 150/2015.  
 This would allow us to understand the characteristics of a model supposed to be the opposite 
respect to the Lombard one, and then also respect to the that proposed at the national level.  
Considering that we are interested in the situation preceding the new national reform for ALMPs 
and PES introduced with the decree 150/2015 we will evaluate Emilia-Romagna’s system relying 
on measures defined according to the first standardization of services in 2009, listed in table 5.2, 
which has been valid for the period of our interest, until the introduction of the accreditation 
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regimes for private providers occurred in 2016, providing a new standardization. In the table 5.4 
we have simplified these measures using three categories similar to those already applied for the 
case of Milan: “individual orientation and self-promotion” (orientamento e autopromozione), 
corresponding both to a general employment assistance and soft-skills courses (mainly job-search 
training activities); “training assistance” (azioni di accompagnamento per l’inserimento 
professionale e la formazione), corresponding to hard-skill training; “access to the intermediation 
system and job-matching” (accesso al sistema di intermediazione e incontro domanda/offerta), 
corresponding to job-matching.   
Differently from the case of the Metropolitan City of Milan, in this case we are able to observe 
only ALMPs delivered in the year 2015, then restricted from the 1st of January to the 20th of 
September in order to cover the period preceding the national reform.  
Table 5.4 shows how the measure are cumulated for the jobseekers treated. 
 
Tab.5.4  Measures delivered in the Emilian system in the period of observation and total number of jobseekers treated 
with different combination of them.  
Individual 
orientation and 
self-promotion 
Training 
Assistance 
Access to the 
intermediation 
system and job-
matching 
N. of jobseeker 
treated with the 
combination 
   1.059 
   438 
   5.539 
 
In this case placement services do not always correspond to the final tool delivered, although 
representing the prevailing measure applied here as well. The path appears quite simple. There is 
a first step characterized by orientation and soft-skill training; it could represent either the only 
tool applied - and there is a substantial number of jobseekers who stop their path here -, or 
jobseekers may be then addressed alternatively towards hard-skill training and placement as final 
measures. Hard-skill training represent just a small proportion, probably due to cost reasons. The 
general picture shows that approximately the 20% of the final measures delivered is represented 
by soft (mainly) and hard(partially) skill training.  
The initiatives object of our observation corresponds to the first ones implemented from the ESF 
cycle 2014-2020. In this context, the priorities addressed for the employment chapter by this 
region are on the path of the policy style we have considered also in the previous paragraphs: to 
act on the skill level and enhance the employability of people in order to better support both 
school-to-work and job-to-job transitions. The goals for which the resources are addressed refer 
also to the activation of NEETs, the need to cope the gender-gap, adaptability and responsiveness 
of the workers respect to changing conditions of the local economic context and the modernization 
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of the system of employment services. About the costs, resources addressed for LMPs are the 
62,4% of the total of 786milions destined for the six years period.  
 
5.2.1. Design of contracting 
 
Emilia-Romagna system, as already largely said, can be approximated as the case in which the 
market share of PES is the least extensive and the centrality of the public actor remains maximum. 
It’s enough to recall that this is a case in which a competitive framework for the relationship 
between public and private operators has been explicitly refused, despite the topic has gained new 
attention with the last reform of ALMPs. Policy-makers, in this case, beware from the possibility 
that an excessive involvement of private providers may be associated with the attempt to minimize 
the risk of failure in placement, tending to follow the easiest way to achieve the goal to get public 
funds. Here we should recall our guiding hypotheses. As we have already considered talking about 
the case of the Metropolitan City of Milan, according to literature on marketization of employment 
services, the reasons to increase market exposure should be found in the possibility that this can 
enhance the effectiveness of the employment services. This has been our first hypothesis, already 
quite confirmed by the experience of the DUL program in Lombardy region. In order to continue 
our analysis on this point, we have now to transfer this consideration on the case of Emilia-
Romagna region and develop the same hypothesis observing the Metropolitan City of Bologna. 
In consideration of this, we should expect a very low level of effectiveness respect to the case of 
Lombardy, as a consequence of the limited market share of services. At the same time, recalling 
our second hypothesis, we know from principal-agent theory that moral hazard occurs when the 
government is not sufficiently able to observe the actions that a contracted private provider 
undertakes. In the case of Emilia-Romagna, the role of the public actor, still at the core 
management of the system, should make the administration in a position able to maintain a 
maximum control over the agents, making more observable the behaviour of private providers 
and reducing possibilities for moral hazard.  
 
5.2.2. Data, identification and estimation strategy 
 
Data and characteristics of the sample 
 
We have chosen to focus on the area of the Metropolitan City of Bologna, considering it 
representative of the regional system as well as we have done for Milan in the case of Lombardy.  
For the period considered, the nine months preceding the “Jobs Act “(referring to the decree 
150/2015), it has been possible to observe the employment result of all the subjects for a period 
of time of at least two years. The data in this case come from the regional labour agency of the 
Emilia-Romagna – Agenzia regionale per il Lavoro dell’Emilia-Romagna, combining 
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information related to the certification of unemployment status (DID), the records about measures 
delivered and the contracts signed on the territory by means of the compulsory communications 
of employment (CO), taking into account their extension and termination and covering the three-
years period 2015-2016-2017, for the observation of the employment outcomes after the program. 
We have been then able to build a dataset of 20.014 observations which crosses the fiscal codes 
of the observed subjects over the three types of information. As we have already done for the 
previous case of Milan, to these we have added the compulsory communications of the previous 
period respect to the one in which we observe the program. However, differently from that of 
Milan where we went far until the 2011, in this case we have been able to go back only until the 
2013, then our window to observe previous labour market history of the subjects corresponds to 
the two-years period 2013-2014. As a consequence, we have considered only those subjects whose 
labour market history can be reconstructed from the entire period of observation going from the 
1st of January of the 2013 until the 31st of December of the 201763.   
 
Identification strategy 
 
The information at our disposal has allowed us to manage six independent variables: age, gender, 
education, citizenship, maximum level of qualification achieved in the previous period, duration 
of unemployment spell and month of registration. The unemployment spell has been obtained 
from the CO summarizing the previous labour market history of the subjects by means of the 
construction of a dummy variable (1 = employed, 0 = unemployed), for each month and for all 
the subjects, in the period between 1st of January 2011 and the 31st of December 2016. The 
“treatment group” is made up of 7.036 jobseekers participating to any program delivered by 
operators of the metropolitan area of Bologna between the 1st of January 2015 and the 30th of 
September 2015. Following the same approach by Sianesi (2004), we will evaluate the Emilian 
system in its totality, considering all the various measures applied aggregated as it was a single 
“program”. The “treatment” then will correspond to any initiative a first-time unemployed in the 
period observed can join.  
We have excluded subjects who participated to an active labour market initiative in the previous 
year. The “control group” consists of 12.978 jobseekers. These are unemployed subjects having 
the last certification of unemployment recorded in the same period and did not participate to any 
initiative. The compulsory communications, finally, allow us to build the outcome variables for 
both the two groups.   
 
Estimation Strategy 
 
                                                        
63 Respect to Milan, the administrative records of Bologna present the advantage to make us able also to look at jobs 
found in other territories, despite different jurisdiction. The communication of a new jobs after the registration in an 
employment centre of Bologna has been collected in any case, despite the province in which the position has been 
activated.  
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The probability to be treated (propensity score) has been estimated by means of a progit regression 
that has as dependent variable this probability and as independent variables the observable 
characteristics of the subjects (table 5.5). 
 
Tab 5.5 Probit regression of the probability to participate to an active labour market initiative  
Variables Propensity score  
    
Age  
15-29 (ref.)  
30-44 -0.030  
(0.024) 
Over-45 0.059**  
(0.025) 
Gender  
  
Female 0.014  
(0.019) 
Education  
Compulsory (ref.)  
Secondary 0.086***  
(0.022) 
Tertiary 0.080***  
(0.027) 
Citizenship  
  
Foreigner 0.374***  
(0.021) 
Previous level of qualification 
 
 
Non-qualified professions   (ref.) 
 
 
No experience 0.204**  
(0.079) 
Qualified professions 0.007  
(0.030) 
Executives and mangers -0.032  
(0.038) 
Unemployment spell  
< 1 year (ref.)  
1-2 years -0.056 
 (0.040) 
> 2 years -0.135* 
 (0.073) 
Month of registration  
January -  
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February -0.084***  
(0.039) 
March -0.101***  
(0.039) 
April 0.027  
(0.039) 
May 0.017  
(0.039) 
June 0.104***  
(0.040) 
July 0.166***  
(0.039) 
August 0.083***  
(0.042) 
September 0.107*** 
 (0.038) 
Constant -0.597***  
(0.045)   
Observations 20,014  
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
If we take a first look at the probability to be part of the treatment, that is, in our case, the 
probability to participate to an active labour market initiative in the area of the Metropolitan City 
of Bologna, we can find which are the most influencing characteristics on this propensity. In these 
regards we can observe that the youngest and oldest unemployed, with a good level of education 
and no experience have much higher probability to enter the treatment. The intermediate category 
of the age (between 30 and 45 years old) as well as being a woman and having already qualified 
working experiences, are not characteristics which significantly affect the probability to 
participate to an active labour market initiative. Anyway, other characteristics influencing the 
propensity are more associated to more disadvantaged conditions on the labour market, like in the 
case of foreigners unemployed. In the case of the month of registration there could be the evidence 
of some seasonality, considering, respect to the beginning of our period of observation, that winter 
months, such as February and March, are significant and associate to a negative probability to 
participate to an active labour market initiative, whereas the same probability is positive for all 
the months related to the summer period, from June to September. Probably, this aspect reflects 
the seasonality of those fixed-term contracts ending before summer.  
As for the unemployment spell before the registration, there is a slightly significant lower 
probability in the case of longer duration of unemployment, probably because of the incidence of 
a population of unemployed people more exposed to the fragmentation of careers and more used 
to job-to-job periods, like those who are entitled for unemployment benefits.  
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The analysis has been limited only to those observations on the common support. However, this 
restriction has not implied the exclusion of any treated from the support.  
The table 5.6 shows the balancing test we have performed to verify the balance between treatment 
and control group.  
 
 
Tab. 5.6 Balancing test 
Variable              Mean 
 
%reduct t-test 
Sample Treated Control % bias bias   p>t 
Age  
    
30-44 U 0,36718   0,38165 -3,0 
 
0,044 
M 0,36718   0,36878 -0,3 89,0 0,844 
over 45 
   
U 0,36392   0,35144 2,6 
 
0,078 
M 0,36392   0,36508 -0,2 90,7 0,886 
Gender  
    
female U 0,54319   0,52974 2,7 
 
0,069 
M 0,54319   0,54012 0,6 77,2 0,715 
Education  
    
secondary U 0,4293   0,41586 2,7 
 
0,066 
M 0,4293   0,42976 -0,1 96,6 0,956 
tertiary U 0,22522 0,22492 0,1 
 
0,962 
M 0,22522 0,22308 0,5 -619,5 0,761 
Citizenship  
    
foreigner U 0,33811  0,2213 26,2 
 
0,000 
M 0,33811  0,33487 0,7 97,2 0,684 
Previous level of qualification  
    
no experience U 0,20437  0,18947 3,7 
 
0,011 
M 0,20437  0,20481 -0,1 97,1 0,949 
qualified professions U 0,5429    0,54454 -0,3 
 
0,824 
M 0,5429    0,54379 -0,2 45,7 0,916 
executives and managers U 0,13019   0,15226 -6,3 
 
0,000 
M 0,13019   0,12686  1,0 84,9 0,554 
Unemployment spell      
1-2 years U 0,05134   0,06118 -4,3  0,004 
M 0,05134   0,04892  1,1 75,4 0,509 
> 2 years U 0,21912   0,20727  2,9  0,050 
M 0,21912   0,21892  0,0 98,3 0,977 
Month of registration  
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February                  U 0,09843   0,11959 -6,8 
 
0,000 
M 0,09843   0,09693  0,5 92,9 0,765 
March                     U 0,10339   0,12976 -8,2 
 
0,000 
M 0,10339   0,09997  1,1 87,0 0,502 
April                     U 0,11459   0,11643 -0,6 
 
0,698 
M 0,11459   0,11412  0,1 74,1 0,929 
May                       U 0,11147   0,11442 -0,9 
 
0,529 
M 0,11147   0,1123 -0,3 72,0 0,876 
June                      U 0,10637   0,09585  3,5 
 
0,018 
M 0,10637   0,10933 -1,0 71,8 0,571 
July                      U 0,13076   0,10441  8,2 
 
0,000 
M 0,13076   0,12736  1,1 87,1 0,547 
August                    U 0,0885     0,08091  2,7 
 
0,064 
M 0,0885     0,0901 -0,6 78,9 0,739 
September                 U 0,13799   0,1239  4,2 
 
0,004 
M 0,13799   0,14172 -1,1 73,6 0,524 
 
We can observe from the table 5.6 how the standardized bias is reduced considerably, on average 
0.6%, after the matching, concluding that the matching procedure sufficiently balance the 
distribution of all covariates between the two groups (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005). 
In the next paragraphs we will move towards our two steps of evaluation. 
 
5.2.3. Impact on the probability to be employed  
 
We start from the consideration of all the employment contracts obtained by jobseekers after their 
participation, focusing on the employment status of the subjects at a certain period after the 
beginning of the treatment, in order to evaluate what could be the attachment to the local 
employment circuit after the participation to active labour market initiatives.  
 
Tab. 5.7 Impact evaluating the employment condition at a certain point in time after the beginning of the treatment 
Matching after 3 months after 6 months after 12 months after 18 months after 24 months 
Before matching 0,006 
(0,007) 
0,016 
(0,007) 
0,036 
(0,007) 
0,028 
(0,007) 
0,031 
(0,007) 
ATT After 
matching 
0,004 
(0,008) 
0,013* 
(0,007) 
0,031*** 
(0,007) 
0,023*** 
(0,006) 
0,023*** 
(0,007) 
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Mahalanobis 0,004 
(0,008) 
0,015 
(0,008) 
0,030 
(0,007) 
0,018 
(0,008) 
0,019 
(0,007) 
 
 
We can see from table 5.7 how the effect changes in relation to the reference period. The impact 
is generally low, but always positive. In particular, it tends to grow until one year from the 
beginning of the treatment, and then to decrease after this threshold, remaining 2 percentage points 
superior for those participating to active labour market initiatives respect to the non-participants 
at two years of distance from the treatment, but probably continuing to decrease. Mahalanobis 
approach gives quite comparable estimation, with the only difference of a slightly more 
pronounced reduction on the long run.  
The increase in the effect from 3 to 12 months could be due to the progressive overcoming of an 
initial lock-in effect, as we can see also in figure 5.1. 
 
Fig. 5.1 ATT over time 
 
 
 
These results can represent the evidence that the services are able to provide not a very high level 
of effectiveness, despite we could say still sufficient if we look that a positive impact remains 
even on the long-term. This means that those participating to active labour market initiatives may 
get always a slightly higher probability to be employed respect to those who do not participate. In 
particular, we can register also how, after balancing for the observable characteristics, the 
probability of being employed is quite always a bit reduced, suggesting that we are in presence of 
a little positive selection at the entrance of the program, that is, before the matching the effect of 
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the participation to active labour market initiatives was overestimated. Considering the variables 
that would affect the probability of being part of the program (table 5.5), the positive selection 
could be a consequence of the incidence of those unemployed well-educated and those with short 
period of unemployment spell, characteristics associated with more advantage to get a job.  
To go deeper on these issues, we can now move towards the second step of evaluation, performing 
the impact estimation considering as outcome only the first job got by the subjects after the 
treatment, focusing on the duration of the employment contract to get some conclusion about the 
first entrance in the labour market after the participation to active labour market initiatives.  
We proceed distinguishing as outcome, on the basis of their duration, five kinds of contracts that 
users may get after the program: at least 6 months of duration; maximum 12 months of duration64; 
more than 12, more than 18 and more than 24 months of duration.  
 
Tab. 5.8 Impact evaluating the first employment contract obtained of: at least 6 months of duration, maximum 12 
months of duration, more than 12 months of duration, more than 18 months of duration, more than 24 months of 
duration.  
Matching at least 6 
months of 
duration 
maximum 12 
months of 
duration 
more than 12 
months of 
duration 
more than 18 
months of 
duration 
more than 24 
months of 
duration 
Before matching -0,009 
(0,006) 
-0,013 
(0,006) 
-0,005 
(0,005) 
-0,003 
(0,005) 
-0,006 
(0,005) 
ATT After 
matching 
-0,003 
(0,006) 
-0,006 
(0,006) 
-0,002 
(0,005) 
-0,000 
(0,005) 
-0,003 
(0,005) 
Mahalanobis -0,001 
(0,007) 
-0,003 
(0,007) 
-0,001 
(0,006) 
0,001 
(0,006) 
-0,002 
(0,006) 
 
 
In this second stage we can find that the effect is always completely null, regardless the different 
kind of employment contract considered as first entrance in the labour market after the treatment 
for the jobseekers (table 5.8). In all the cases, changing the outcome variable does not produce 
any difference and it is always non-significant. It seems that, in absence of particular incentives, 
there is no changing behaviour from the side of the operator, neither in sense of opportunism nor 
to better the performance of the operators in terms of effectiveness. The kind of employment 
contract provided by the operators doesn’t matter. This means that the effectiveness of the system, 
                                                        
64 In this case we use a different outcome variable to consider the “short-term contracts” respect to the case of 
Lombardy. Since here we are not considering particular incentives such as outcome-based payments, as in the DUL 
program.   
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in this case, could not be described in terms of the duration of the first employment contract got 
after the treatment.  
 
5.2.4. Effects observing personal characteristics  
 
So far, we have seen how the Emilian system, when looking at the case of the Metropolitan area 
of Bologna, shows a low level of effectiveness. These considerations have allowed us to answer 
to our first hypothesis and confirm what we had already found out observing the case of Milan. 
The larger market share of services really enhances the effectiveness of employment services.  
Anyway, we have still to answer to our second main hypothesis, related more to equity 
considerations and social goals of the Emilian model. This implies the analysis of the interaction 
between the participation to an active labour market initiative and the personal observable 
characteristics of the subjects. In this case we have not developed sub-hypothesis like in the case 
of Milan, because we are not considering specific incentives for the providers, as in DUL program 
for the structure of payments65. We are simply interested in observing which categories of 
jobseekers, and to what extent, in this case where the market share of services is limited, are those 
who can benefit more from the system. We have already analysed, for the case of Lombardy, that 
some rooms for opportunistic behaviour could be find in the difference between the placement on 
short-term contracts of those most disadvantaged jobseekers and on long-term contracts of those 
most advantaged. Now, instead, according to the literature about principal-agent theory we should 
expect that, considering the role of the public actor in this situation, there should be less 
opportunistic behaviour of the operators. In particular, we should find less evidence of operators 
enhancing the placement of those more job-ready and easiest to be placed. We rely again on the 
tool of the multinomial logistic regressions, with exception that, in this case, we decide to change 
the reference category for the dependent variable. We decide to look at the two categories of 
getting a work contract with the duration of maximum one year and getting a work contract of 
more than one year of duration, using as base outcome the probability to remain unemployed.  
 
Tab. 5.9 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 months 
of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active labour 
market initiatives and age. 
 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Employed with a 
contract of 
Employed with a 
contract of more 
                                                        
65 This time we don’t need to find out possible explanation for the behaviour of the providers respect to the particular 
category of the contracts with a duration between 6 and 12 months, as consequence of the existing structure of 
payments of the DUL program. In consideration of this we have decided to limit the analysis to the category of 
contracts lasting maximum 12 months, approximating this as “short-term contracts”.  
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maximum 12 months 
of duration 
than 12 months of 
duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.) - - 
30-44 -0.290*** 
(0.0525) 
-0.428*** 
(0.060) 
Over-45 -0.862*** 
(0.0573) 
-0.803*** 
(0.065) 
Treatment   
Treated -0.062 
(0.065) 
-0.406*** 
(0.080) 
Treatment*Age   
T* 30-44 -0.029 
(0.087) 
0.372*** 
(0.104) 
T* over-45 0.066 
(0.092) 
0.608*** 
(0.106) 
Gender   
   
female -0.288*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.170*** 
(0.040) 
Education   
compulsory(ref.) - - 
secondary 0.181*** 
(0.040) 
0.168*** 
(0.047) 
tertiary 0.124*** 
(0.050) 
0.220*** 
(0.057) 
Citizenship   
   
foreigner -0.361*** 
(0.0423) 
0.068 
(0.046) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.) - - 
no experience 0.678*** 
(0.163) 
0.619*** 
(0.185) 
qualified professions 0.178*** 
(0.058) 
0.265*** 
(0.067) 
executives and managers 0.204*** 
(0.072) 
0.459*** 
(0.083) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.) - - 
More than 1 year and less than 2 -0.673*** 
(0.084) 
-0.547*** 
(0.095) 
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More than 2 years -0.719*** 
(0.153) 
-0.607*** 
(0.173) 
Constant -0.314*** 
(0.073) 
-0.965*** 
(0.085) 
Observations 20,014 20,014 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 shows the interaction between age and treatment. We can see how the interaction term 
reveals that the action of the services makes significant and positive the probability to get a long-
term contract rather than remaining unemployed as the age grows. The particularity of this effect 
is that if we look at the main effect, the same probability is negative and then shows a penalty for 
the older worker (which is significant also for the short-term contract). Putting this in other words, 
the operators are able to counteract this effect and reverse it. The older workers who decide to 
participate to active labour market initiatives have a higher probability to get a long-term contract 
rather remaining unemployed, respect to the trend for them on the local labour market.   
 
Tab. 5.10 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 months 
of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active labour 
market initiatives and gender. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Employed with a 
contract of 
maximum 12 months 
of duration 
Employed with a 
contract of more 
than 12 months of 
duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.)   
30-44 -0.299*** 
(0.043) 
-0.308*** 
(0.050) 
Over-45 -0.837*** 
(0.046) 
-0.591*** 
(0.053) 
Gender   
   
female -0.281*** 
(0.042) 
-0.236*** 
(0.049) 
Treatment   
Treated -0.033 
(0.052) 
-0.149** 
(0.083) 
Treatment*Gender   
T*female -0.016 
(0.072) 
0.162** 
(0.083) 
Education   
Standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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compulsory(ref.)   
secondary 0.182*** 
(0.040) 
0.172*** 
(0.047) 
tertiary 0.127** 
(0.050) 
0.223*** 
(0.057) 
Citizenship   
   
foreigner -0.359*** 
(0.042) 
0.081* 
(0.045) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.)   
no experience 0.681*** 
(0.163) 
0.632*** 
(0.185) 
qualified professions 0.178*** 
(0.058) 
0.272*** 
(0.067) 
executives and managers 0.204*** 
(0.072) 
0.467*** 
(0.083) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.)   
More than 1 year and less than 2  -0.673*** 
(0.084) 
-0.554*** 
(0.094) 
More than 2 years -0.721*** 
(0.153) 
-0.617*** 
(0.172) 
Constant -0.328*** 
(0.071) 
-1.059*** 
(0.084) 
   
Observations 20,014 20,014 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 shows that the probability to get a long-term contract, rather than remaining 
unemployed, grows for female jobseekers when they participate to active labour market 
initiatives. Again, as for age, it seems that the operators are able to counteract the general trend 
on the labour market, reversing the sign of the effect, whereas on the local labour market women 
have a lower probability to get a contract respect to remain unemployed. Again, also here, 
participating to active labour market initiatives shows an opposite effect, positive and significant 
in the case of contracts lasting more than one year.   
 
Tab. 5.11 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 months 
of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active labour 
market initiatives and education. 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Employed with a 
contract of 
maximum 12 
months of duration 
Employed with a 
contract of more 
than 12 months of 
duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.)   
30-44 -0.295*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.317*** 
(0.0504) 
Over-45 -0.838*** 
(0.0468) 
-0.608*** 
(0.0532) 
Gender   
male (ref.)   
female -0.286*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.169*** 
(0.0403) 
Education   
compulsory(ref.)   
secondary 0.243*** 
(0.0497) 
0.235*** 
(0.0582) 
tertiary 0.146** 
(0.0613) 
0.305*** 
(0.0697) 
Treatment   
Treated 0.0541 
(0.0626) 
0.0838 
(0.0719) 
Treatment*Education   
T*secondary -0.185*** 
(0.0827) 
-0.176* 
(0.0954) 
T*tertiary -0.0500 
(0.0973) 
-0.225** 
(0.111) 
Citizenship   
Italian (ref.)   
foreigner -0.360*** 
(0.0423) 
0.0790* 
(0.0460) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.)   
no experience 0.678*** 
(0.163) 
0.537*** 
(0.185) 
qualified professions 0.178*** 
(0.0580) 
0.280*** 
(0.0676) 
executives and managers 0.203*** 
(0.0727) 
0.481*** 
(0.0833) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.)   
More than 1 year and less than 2  -0.696*** 
(0.0846) 
-0.629*** 
(0.0952) 
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More than 2 years -0.703*** 
(0.153) 
-0.511*** 
(0.172) 
Constant -0.206*** 
(0.0834) 
-0.962*** 
(0.103) 
   
Observations 20,014 20,014 
 
 
 
With table 5.11 we can observe how the probability to get contracts rather than remain 
unemployed, when it is considered the interaction with the treatment, decreases as the degree of 
education increases. In particular, we can find that those with the diploma as maximum degree of 
education have a lower probability to get both short-term contracts and long-term ones rather than 
remaining unemployed, with respect to the less educated. In the same way, those with a university 
degree show that the same probability is even lower, but just in the case of long-term contracts. 
This is the third evidence about a “counteraction result” of the operators with respect to the 
“natural” effect of the local labour market, whereas, as one could expect, those with higher 
probability to get an employment contract rather than remaining unemployed should correspond 
to those better educated. This means that, probably, the operators are able to concentrate their 
efforts on those less educated (consistently with the characteristic of being older unemployed), 
who are more penalized on the local labour market. 
 
Tab. 5.12 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 months 
of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active labour 
market initiatives and citizenship. 
Variables  EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Employed with a 
contract of 
maximum 12 
months of duration 
Employed with a 
contract of more 
than 12 months of 
duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.)   
30-44 -0.295*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.320*** 
(0.0504) 
Over-45 -0.839*** 
(0.0468) 
-0.616*** 
(0.0532) 
Gender   
male (ref.)   
female -0.287*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.170*** 
(0.0403) 
Education   
compulsory(ref.)   
Standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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secondary 0.179*** 
(0.0407) 
0.173*** 
(0.0473) 
tertiary 0.129** 
(0.0507) 
0.228*** 
(0.0577) 
Citizenship   
Italian (ref.)   
foreigner -0.353*** 
(0.0539) 
-0.0654 
(0.0599) 
Treatment   
Treated -0.0375 
(0.0419) 
-0.156*** 
(0.0510) 
Treatment*Citizenship   
T*foreigner -0.0145 
(0.0832) 
0.358*** 
(0.0903) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.)   
no experience 0.681*** 
(0.163) 
0.536*** 
(0.185) 
qualified professions 0.178*** 
(0.0580) 
0.279*** 
(0.0676) 
executives and managers 0.204*** 
(0.0727) 
0.489*** 
(0.0833) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.)   
More than 1 year and less than 2  -0.697*** 
(0.0846) 
-0.624*** 
(0.0952) 
More than 2 years -0.707*** 
(0.153) 
-0.528*** 
(0.172) 
Constant -0.176*** 
(0.0820) 
-0.883*** 
(0.099) 
   
Observations 20,014 20,014 
  
 
 
When we look at the citizenship (table 5.12) we can find that the probability to get a contract of 
longer duration rather than remaining unemployed, becomes positive and significant when it is 
taken into consideration the treatment, whereas on the local labour market it is non-significant. 
Looking at the main effect we could only say that foreign workers have a lower probability to 
obtain a short-term contract rather than being unemployed. The interaction term shows, on the 
contrary, that they get more chances to get even long-term contracts when they join active labour 
market initiatives.  
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To conclude our analysis on the interaction between treatment and personal observable 
characteristics of the subjects, here follow the results regarding previous level of qualification and 
duration of unemployment spell (respectively table 5.13 and table 5.14), where we do not find 
any significant effect regarding the interaction terms between these variables and the participation 
to an active labour market initiative.  
 
Tab. 5.13 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 months 
of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active labour 
market initiatives and previous level of qualification.  
Variables  EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Employed with a 
contract of maximum 
12 months of duration 
Employed with a 
contract of more 
than 12 months 
of duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.)   
30-44 -0.294*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.318*** 
(0.0504) 
Over-45 -0.838*** 
(0.0468) 
-0.612*** 
(0.0532) 
Gender   
male (ref.)   
female -0.287*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.170*** 
(0.0403) 
Education   
compulsory(ref.)   
secondary 0.179*** 
(0.0408) 
0.173*** 
(0.0473) 
tertiary 0.129** 
(0.0507) 
0.230*** 
(0.0577) 
Citizenship   
Italian (ref.)   
foreigner -0.356*** 
(0.0423) 
0.0809* 
(0.0460) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.)   
no experience 0.674*** 
(0.170) 
0.584*** 
(0.193) 
qualified professions 0.201*** 
(0.0723) 
0.247*** 
(0.0840) 
 
executives and managers 0.193** 
(0.0880) 
0.439*** 
(0.100) 
Treatment    
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Treated -0.0118 
(0.108) 
-0.102 
(0.127) 
Treatment*Previous level of qualification   
T* no experience 0.0175 
(0.134) 
-0.0773 
(0.159) 
T* qualified professions -0.0640 
(0.119) 
0.0941 
(0.139) 
T* executives and managers 0.0409 
(0.145) 
0.138 
(0.165) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.)   
More than 1 year and less than 2  -0.698*** 
(0.0846) 
-0.630*** 
(0.0952) 
More than 2 years -0.706*** 
(0.153) 
-0.511*** 
(0.172) 
Constant -0.188*** 
(0.0899) 
-0.896*** 
(0.110) 
   
Observations 20,014 20,014 
 
 
 
 
Tab.  5.14 Multinomial logistic regression of the probability of being unemployed, employed with a contract of maximum 12 
months of duration or with a contract of more than 12 months of duration. Interaction effects between participation to active 
labour market initiatives and unemployment spell. 
 
Variables EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME 
 (Reference category: Being unemployed) 
Employed with a 
contract of maximum 
12 months of duration 
Employed with 
a contract of 
more than 12 
months of 
duration 
Age   
15-29 (ref.)   
30-44 -0.294*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.316*** 
(0.0504) 
Over-45 -0.838*** 
(0.0468) 
-0.589*** 
(0.0532) 
Gender   
male (ref.)   
female -0.287*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.178*** 
(0.0403) 
Education   
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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compulsory(ref.)   
secondary 0.179*** 
(0.0408) 
0.172*** 
(0.0473) 
tertiary 0.129** 
(0.0507) 
0.228*** 
(0.0577) 
Citizenship   
Italian (ref.)   
foreigner -0.357*** 
(0.0423) 
0.0812* 
(0.0460) 
Previous level of qualification   
non-qualified professions(ref.)   
no experience 0.693*** 
(0.163) 
0.645*** 
(0.185) 
qualified professions 0.178*** 
(0.0580) 
0.274*** 
(0.0676) 
executives and managers 0.204*** 
(0.0727) 
0.486*** 
(0.0833) 
Unemployment spell   
Less than 1 year (ref.)   
More than 1 year and less than 2  -0.643*** 
(0.100) 
-0.676*** 
(0.120) 
More than 2 years -0.750*** 
(0.156) 
-0.588*** 
(0.175) 
Treatment   
Treated -0.0512 
(0.0423) 
-0.0533 
(0.0482) 
Treatment*Unemployment spell   
T* more than 1 year and less than 2 -0.130 
(0.185) 
0.347 
(0.196) 
T* more than 2 years 0.0840 
(0.0869) 
-0.119 
(0.104) 
Constant -0.320*** 
(0.0698) 
-1.094*** 
(0.0835) 
   
Observations 20,014 20,014 
 
 
 
To help the interpretation of the multinomial logistic regressions performed so far we plot in fig. 
5.2 the predicted probability of obtaining long-term employment by each of the interaction terms 
analysed found with significative effect. The picture is always clear with respect to the findings 
of the regressions. Considering age, gender, education and foreign citizenship we can see how 
marginal effects follow reversed directions, passing from untreated to treated condition.  
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2 Predicted probability of obtaining a long-term contract by treatment and observable characteristics 
 
a) Age 
 
 
b) Gender 
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c) Education 
 
 
d) Citizenship 
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5.2.5. Comments and potential critique 
 
The results in terms of effectiveness show us a system with a quite low employment impact. 
Considering all the employment relationships that the jobseekers can get after active labour 
market initiatives, we can register how the effect is small but still positive, especially after one 
year, characterized by a progressive increase until that period, probably as consequence of the 
overcoming of an initial lock-in effect. It could be considered a sufficient performance if we look 
at the overall Italian context. On the contrary, we could not say the same thing if we look at the 
first employment relationship obtained after the participation to an active labour market initiative. 
There is no effect respect to jobs of particular duration rather than others. Jobseekers participating 
to active labour market initiatives should not expect a greater or lesser effectiveness in terms of 
duration of the job provided, respect to those not participating. This might be an evidence that, in 
absence of particular incentives, there is no changing behaviour from the side of the operator, 
neither in sense of opportunism nor to better the performance of the operators in terms of 
effectiveness. 
 So far, then, we have got further elements to find a confirmation of our first main hypothesis, 
related to the increase in effectiveness lead by a larger market share of services. In context like 
Emilia-Romagna, where there is a limited exposure of the system to the market, the degree of 
effectiveness is low compared to the Lombard system where the exposure can be considered the 
maximum.  
On the contrary, despite participating or not to an active labour market initiative does not return 
any effectiveness in terms of duration of the employment contract obtained after active labour 
market initiatives, the argument is different when we look at the duration of contract in relation 
to personal observable characteristics. This exercise enables us to find out differences between 
participants and not participants in terms of the employment contract obtained after the initiative. 
In this case, where private operators are involved on a lesser extent, we have found that those 
participants with some of the most disadvantaged characteristics, such as older jobseekers, 
women, less educated and foreigners, are positive associated with longer duration of contracts, 
where being part of active labour market programs counteract and reverse the trend for them on 
the local labour market, in the absence of treatment. The aspect that those most disadvantaged 
participating to an active labour market initiative are favoured on placement on longer duration 
contracts appears to be consistent with the aims of the regional programs designed in relation to 
the ESF, where the Emilia-Romagna’s system has explicitly set the goal of fighting against 
precariousness of employment. The central role of the public operators, then, in this case, allows 
the system to take care for less advantaged workers, even on more stable jobs, respect to the 
situation on the local labour market, where they have less chances even for short-term contracts. 
We can find that there is no evidence for creaming and then confirm the second main hypothesis 
saying that the larger market share of services enhances the risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
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Nevertheless, this “equity considerations” can be related to the argument regarding effectiveness 
we have made above. The stronger efforts put to assist those most disadvantaged could be 
probably related with a loss in the overall effectiveness of the system and where the effects can 
be seen more on the long-term, leaving rooms to think about a prevalent orientation towards a 
long-term human-capital development approach.  
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6.     BEYOND MARKETIZATION: FURTHER CHALLENGES FOR PES  
    
 
6.1. The optimal design 
 
Italy has searched for its own declination of the activation paradigm for almost thirty years. In 
relation to this, last labour market reform has attempted to produce a definitive “closure” of the 
“golden triangle” defined by the concept of “flexicurity”, outlined by the trajectory of partial 
convergence started from the nineties that we have examined in the first chapter, which is 
generally associated with institutional mix from the Scandinavian welfare regime and the 
Anglophone one. A wide part of the Jobs Act has been concentrated on changes concerning 
PLMPs. We can synthetize saying that the new measures have attempted to rationalize the 
previous system towards the creation of a main universal insurance scheme, supported by the 
introduction of a social assistance one. At the same time this reform has attempted to lower the 
firing costs for permanent contracts in order to increase flexibility. The last vertex necessary to 
“close” the triangle is the strengthening of ALMPs, historically very weak in the Italian context. 
The decree 150/2015 has attempted to achieve this goal. This reform has renewed the content-
related aspects of ALMPs, redefining the policy tools and trying to strengthen the link between 
active and passive measures by the enhancement of benefit-conditionality. Our focus has been 
more oriented towards the PES governance concerning the involvement of private providers. We 
make use of this dimension as key aspect to analyse Italian regional differentiation. This 
variability has been due both to delays in the implementation of accreditation regimes, the tool 
outlined by the Biagi Reform for regions to define their own contracting-out option, and to precise 
choices made by regional governments concerning the degree of market exposure of their systems. 
This last aspect, which has been of main interest for us, has been a consequence of the willingness 
and suitability to become marketized expressed by regional contexts of policy-making.  
This could be true, in particular, when it is taken into account the resistance to implement an 
accreditation regime manifested by some regions such as Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Marche, 
reflecting the strength of local coalitions around large left-wing parties. Differently from a more 
liberal culture, as in the case of Lombardy, more favourable to market-based mechanisms. The 
topic of territorial fragmentation, and the necessity to overcome it, has been always at the top of 
the public debate concerning Italian PES reform. In particular, this debate has become even 
stronger with the constitutional reform designed by Renzi government, which aimed at realigning 
the competence on employment services between state and regions moving them from the latter 
to the former in order to restore a state-led operated model. The rejection of that reform by mean 
of the referendum held on the 4th December of 2016, then, left the issue open and unchanged. As 
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consequence, the role of the new state agency, conceived in the perspective of the return of the 
policy competence in the hands of the state, has needed to be redefined. However, other novelties 
introduced by the decree 150/2015 have not been abandoned, despite the competence on 
employment services has remained in the hands of the regions. A new national regime of 
accreditation has been implemented, representing a mean to bypass regional channels of 
accreditation if these have set stricter criteria. At the same time, the government has relaunched 
the AdR, as new national active labour market scheme based on a quasi-market model. Therefore, 
the way to overcome regional fragmentation put forward by national policy-makers seems to  
be accompanied by the attempt to promote this model on the whole country.  
An option put forward probably in the belief of the limited effectiveness of public operators.  
We know from the literature we have examined in chapter two that the possible information 
asymmetries which can arise as result of the shift towards the increasing marketization of 
employment services can expose users to the risks of adverse selection. This deals with issues 
concerning equity, assuming that private providers may maximize their own utility assisting only 
those who are less expensive because more skilled and job-ready. In consideration of these well-
known results we have become interested to the implications related to the implementation of this 
quasi-market model in the context of Italian regional PES systems, analysing similar or alternative 
experiences.   
We have chosen to deal with regional fragmentation choosing those which are supposed to be the 
most dissimilar cases of regional PES models concerning the design of public-private contracting 
arrangement: Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. The institutional change of these models has been 
characterized by a common process of layering over time, resulted in two symmetrical but 
divergent trajectories of evolution of their respective models, arising from two very different local 
political systems.      
In the case of Lombardy, we find a system more oriented to a workfare approach, in which the 
activation of the subjects relies first on their own "social entrepreneurship". In this context, the 
marketization should be considered the result of the choice made by policy-makers in order to 
better respond to the freedom of choice and preferences by individuals. It has been realized a 
system in which the complete equalization, in terms of tasks and powers, between public and 
private operators, has been functional to make them compete each-other, setting a quasi-market 
model voucher-based. The larger the market share of employment services the more this should 
lead towards more efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, the current universal active labour 
market program in Lombardy, Dote Unica Lavoro, seems to resemble the design of the AdR, 
giving us the possibility to anticipate some evaluation about this scheme. 
 In the case of Emilia-Romagna, on the contrary, we find a system in which the activation of the 
subjects aims at integration and social cohesion. The public actor here opts to remain at the core 
management of the system. An excessive market exposure of services is beware for the possible 
risks of adverse selection, decreasing the equity of the performance and, thus, discriminating the 
weakest targets. Private operators are involved on complementary basis, when the public operator 
alone is not able to provide specialized knowledge. This case has given us the possibility to 
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compare the quasi-market models with a radically alternative design of public-private contracting 
arrangement.  
We have developed our analysis performing an evaluation of both the systems using the 
metropolitan city areas of each region. Respect to our first main hypothesis, for which a larger 
exposure to the market effectively enhances the effectiveness of the system, we have evaluated 
the two systems observing both the impact respect to the employment condition of the participants 
at different periods after the beginning of the treatment and the impact respect to a different 
duration of the first job obtained after the treatment. On both these two different kinds of outcome 
we have registered a superior level of effectiveness for the case of Lombardy respect to the case 
of Emilia-Romagna. On the basis of this result we should confirm the first main hypothesis. In 
particular the incentive of outcome-based payments, which implies the voucher reimbursement 
only when a job is effectively found, appears to be able to boost effectiveness, but it still leaves 
some rooms for opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, once it is introduced a fixed threshold for the 
reimbursement, this induces the providers to provide contracts with a duration just sufficient to 
fulfil the threshold.  
More in general the impact, in the case of Lombardy, seems to decrease over time, indicating an 
orientation towards a quick job-entry approach, that might be due to the need for the providers to 
get fast remuneration of the vouchers and then to rely on quick job-matching services. This feature 
could be related to the fact that a lot of providers are temporary employment agencies thus able 
to easily place subjects on temporary employment relationships. The priority given to the 
placement, as fast as possible, in this sense, may risk putting in second order further objectives 
more related to the human capital development (Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Marocco, 2013). In 
these respects further research probably would need about “gaming”, a possible third type of 
opportunistic behaviour (Formez, 2017). It corresponds to the situation in which providers and 
recipients agree on a solution to achieve the easiest way to maximize both their utility: to obtain 
the reimbursement for the providers, to get a job for the jobseeker. It is different from creaming 
and parking since the asymmetric information occurs at detrimental of the government but without 
damaging users. It could be the case that providers agree with jobseeker to activate the DUL 
program only once they are sure that they can provide a job. This represents a case which would 
need to be explored by means of qualitative methods.   
Emilia-Romagna shows that the impact tends to increase over one year, then slightly starting to 
decrease, probably indicating an initial lock-in effect. This feature might be due to the fact that 
jobseekers are still participating to training activities on the short-term period and then the system 
might be oriented more towards a long-term human capital development. The level of 
effectiveness in the Emilian case however remains low and always inferior to the Lombard one. 
There is still an overall positive impact over time revealing the attachment of the subject to the 
labour market at some distance from the treatment. But when it is taken into account only the first 
job obtained after the treatment, distinguishing for its duration, the effect becomes null, revealing 
that the participation to active labour market initiatives in this case makes no difference in terms 
of the duration of the employment contract got respect to those not participating. The duration of 
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the first contract got after the treatment, in this sense, is not a characteristic able to describe the 
effectiveness of this system.  
Moreover, the main difference between the two approaches reflects the type of prevailing tool 
applied as well. We have seen that the general set of tools that could be applied in both cases are 
quite comparable. However, the reliance of measures characterized by maximum labour market 
proximity in the case of Lombardy is massively pronounced. In this context job-
matching/placement measures represent the final tool delivered in the totality of the subjects. This 
situation is substantially different from that of Emilia-Romagna, which maintain some rooms for 
softer measures and particularly training.  Further research would need concerning the effects of 
the specific tools applied. Such exercise could be useful in particular for training, comparing it 
with previous studies concerning other regional programs. 
As we were saying, concerning the first employment contract obtained after the treatment, we 
have registered in Milan a substantial concentration of the impact around the minimum threshold 
of duration required by the system to recognize the remuneration to the private providers. We 
have been induced from this to suppose that this could be an evidence of possible opportunistic 
behaviour of the providers. When it has been considered the relationship between this kind of 
contracts and the personal observable characteristics of the subjects we have found that there 
might effectively be some risk aversion from the side of the providers. In particular, the presence 
of incentives related to the structure of payments, such as the “targeting”, is indeed affecting the 
behaviour of the providers. They are induced to assist the most disadvantaged jobseekers, but in 
a way that they are placed on work contracts of short-term duration, just sufficient to get the 
remuneration and to minimize the costs of taking in charge the most disadvantaged. Providers, at 
the same time, are then allowed to continue to place the most skilled subjects on more stable 
contracts and more structured job-placement projects.  
The targeting incentive, linking the value of earnings proportionally to the level of disadvantage 
of the subjects, reveals to be not completely able to mitigate the opportunistic behaviour of the 
providers. Therefore, the equity of outcomes appears to be much superior, as expected, in the case 
of Bologna, where the operators are able to provide more opportunities for the most disadvantaged 
unemployed people. Active labour market initiatives in the area of the metropolitan city of 
Bologna, are able to favour more those most distant from the labour market in finding stable 
positions. Ageing, female gender, less education and foreigner citizenship, in particular, are the 
same features confronted to be affected by creaming in the case of Milan and, on the contrary, 
more helped in the case of Bologna.   
From this exercise we get some important indications. The typical trade-off between effectiveness 
and equity, well-known when studying marketization of employment services, has been 
confirmed. The intuition of Italian policy-makers that the public operator alone could not be very 
effective is right. Nevertheless, once private providers are massively involved, this may imply a 
greater exposure to the risk of opportunistic behaviour. At least, outcome-based payments prove 
to be an incentive able to boost effectiveness but if a fixed threshold for the duration is required, 
the risk is then higher to concentrate contracts around this threshold. On the contrary, we can 
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imagine a situation in which, for instance, the remuneration may be not fixed and set as growing 
over time, thus incentivizing providers to place jobseekers on contracts of longer durations. This 
might help more the most disadvantaged, if we consider that the two incentives related to the 
structure of payments are intertwined and the targeting has shown that providers might be 
effectively sensible to it.  
AdR is characterized by the same incentives and there could be the case that it may reproduce the 
same problems showed with the DUL program in Lombardy. In addition to this, there should be 
notice that, in this case, the presence of private employment agencies is higher respect to many 
other territories. Thus, we cannot be sure that a quasi-market could be well implemented in other 
contexts. On the other side, we can register from the lesson of Emilia-Romagna that a certain 
involvement of private providers could not be ignored. Anyway, once public operator does its job 
it is not always a lost cause. When it is able to concentrate its efforts on those jobseekers most 
distant from the labour market, the role of public operator could not be underestimated. This is 
consistent with the consideration of the public operator concerning employment services, 
generally considered to be more focused on weakest targets (ISFOL, 2012, 2016). At the same 
time, services may become less usable for those most job-ready but needing to be assisted too, for 
example those young and well educated looking for their first experience.  
More in general, an optimal design of public-private contracting arrangement may not be 
identified among our two cases. However, they show that whether to involve private provider on 
larger basis, as in the cases of quasi-market models, there should be a very careful design of all 
those governance mechanisms able to avoid opportunistic behaviour, despite there seems that it 
cannot be fully eliminated. Emilia-Romagna shows the case of a model exclusively relied on 
complementary and project basis, without outcome-based remuneration. A possible compromise 
could be that of keep on relying on this governance but implementing the same incentives related 
to the structure of payments we have seen for DUL and envisaged also by AdR.  
The role of public operators could probably be more effective if they can be empowered in terms 
of resources and staffs, as well as by means of a better interaction between central and local levels. 
This is the case of further main limitations of Italian PES that we will treat in the next paragraphs.  
 
 
6.2. Redefining ANPAL’s role 
 
The implementation of the Jobs Act regarding ALMPs has not been quick and smooth during the 
first years as the cooperation between the stakeholders has remained limited. It remains a crucial 
task to redefine the ANPAL’s role in the changed set-up of the system due to the negative outcome 
of the referendum of 2016 and to lay down its strategy.  
On the one hand, the lack of a clear mission is obstructing cooperation within ANPAL as an 
organization itself (especially regarding the cooperation between ANPAL and its in-house entity 
“ANPAL Servizi”, but also employees from previously different organizations such as from 
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INAPP and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies) as the objectives of the organisation and 
the strategy to achieve the objectives are not understood in the same way by the internal 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the lack of a strategic view is impeding the cooperation of 
ANPAL with other partners in the Network of employment services as there is no clarity what the 
exact role of ANPAL is and what kind of support the regional authorities could expect from it. 
Regarding internal stakeholders, the strategy should for instance treat the “ANPAL Servizi” staff 
as an integral part of the organisation, its extension to the Regions and CPIs. ANPAL should 
define its main clients which should be rather the regions and the CPIs it is serving and not directly 
jobseekers and employers. The strategy should lay down the mission which should be above all 
the provision of support structures, activities and knowledge to these clients, regions and CPIs. 
What this comes down to is that ANPAL has to acknowledge that it is not a mere department in 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies anymore, but an independent entity.  
These aspects are necessary in order to establish the coordination and monitoring mechanisms in 
the system and to support the stakeholders with appropriate tools and measures. 
Indeed, coordinating the system of employment services to overcome the problems of 
fragmentation has been identified as one the main objectives by ANPAL. However, during the 
first years of activity, ANPAL has been struggling in this role and the stakeholders perceive the 
progress to be slow (OECD, 2018). Missing the goal of re-shifting the competence over 
employment services again in the hands of the central level, the law does not provide ANPAL 
with further tools to establish the powers to coordinate the system and it has not been possible to 
apply the available tools fully yet. ANPAL, indeed, has the right to manage labour market 
programmes directly in case the essential service standards are not being respected and to support 
the regions in case the essential service standards are not guaranteed, by managing these services 
directly. Thus, by law ANPAL can intervene in the management of the CPIs in case of bad 
performance. However, the essential service levels and the indicators for monitoring the CPIs 
were agreed upon only in December 2017 in the “triannual strategy” and are not yet fully 
functional as of summer 2018. This means that ANPAL has not been able yet to use these tools 
to coordinate and harmonize the system of employment services. Anyway, these tasks cannot be 
done regardless the capacity to build trust among stakeholders through its activities to encourage 
collaboration in the system. Indeed, even when the appropriate infrastructure and methodologies 
will be eventually developed and imposed, these do not ensure cooperation between the 
stakeholders. Collaboration and trust can be considered the keys for the success of a system with 
many actors, yet these features are perceived to lack by the stakeholders as the conflicts have been 
an historical issue. Though many of the stakeholders share their views about which are the main 
challenges facing the Italian labour market, the ways to solve them are not always shared. The 
huge differences in development level among the regions in terms of employment services make 
it harder to reach agreements on harmonization of services satisfying all counterparts. The 
challenge for ANPAL is thus to propose strategies and methodologies which entail some 
improvements for all the regions, but would not be unreachable for some (OECD, 2018).  
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However, ANPAL is still very new in the role as a coordinator and has not been able to establish 
itself fully as such. The ability of ANPAL to coordinate and harmonize the system depends largely 
on its capabilities to lead the negotiations on implementing the Jobs Act. These capabilities pass 
also from the negotiations to draw up the strategic plans (the triannual strategies, the “Plan to 
strengthen employment services and measures”). As there are more than 20 Regions with different 
levels of development and resources that ought to agree with these plans and methodologies, the 
negotiations are slow and the progress of implementation cumbersome. For example, the 
preparation of the “Plan to strengthen employment services and measures” started in 2016 and 
was agreed upon in the end of 2017. However, the additional hiring and training of the staff for 
the CPIs, which was one of the points in the plan that the Regions looked forward to the most, 
had not started yet by summer 2018. As the progress of reforming the system is thus slow, the 
contributions of ANPAL are less evident for the other stakeholders and thus the credibility of 
ANPAL is harmed.  
A good start has been made to build the IT systems and to develop cooperation with relevant 
partners for data exchange. However, if we look at the first IT applications, the front-line staff in 
the CPIs reveals an increase in workload since the start of the reform and the introduction of these 
new applications. Yet, the staff have not received training on how to use the new systems and are 
not aware of the strategic plans regarding IT developments. This unawareness encourages 
resistance to the reform and further decreases the credibility of ANPAL. Anyway, it has to be kept 
in mind that it takes time to develop an appropriate IT infrastructure that supports the business 
model.  
The quality of the systems developed by ANPAL is of ultimate importance regarding its 
credibility among the stakeholders. The development process should be planned to minimize 
negative side-effects to the staff in the CPIs, above all the integration of different applications and 
their fit to the processes should be given more consideration (OECD, 2018). 
 
 
6.3. The long-lasting demand for resources66 
 
That of resources is an historical strong Italian deficiency concerning its PES system, failing even 
during the years of the harsh economic crisis that would have required instead a strengthening of 
the employment services, in the same way as happened in other European countries (on this point 
see Bergamante and Marocco, 2014).  
As the services are delivered to jobseekers by the staff in the local employment offices, adequate 
front-line human resources are vital to make the changes in the service concept foreseen in the 
strategic plans. However, the number of staff in local offices is currently too low, the infrastructure 
                                                        
66 A version of this paragraph will be published for the OECD research “Connecting people with Jobs: Italy”, of 
which the author has been part of the team.    
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and process design do not support their work process, the qualification of the staff is too low to 
provide quality service and the staff lacks the motivation to implement the new concepts. The 
measures to overcome these obstacles provided in the “Plan to strengthen employment services 
and measures” seem to be not sufficient.  
 
6.3.1. The number of staff is modest 
 
Although the Jobs Act aims at the empowerment of PES, the number of staff in the system of has 
in reality declined since the beginning of the reform. On top of that, the regional disparities 
regarding human resources available in the system have increased. This has led to differences in 
the capabilities to provide active measures between the regions and even within regions. The Plan 
to strengthen employment services and measures, agreed on December 2017, has foreseen 1600 
additional hires, increasing the number of employees barely to the level that existed before the 
reform, but not more than that. In consideration of this, the role of private providers has continued 
to represent  a mean to overcome the shortage of human resources. Nevertheless, even if the 
strategies and processes will be adapted in the Italian PES system, it will not be easy to implement 
ALMPs with the available level of staff as intended in the Jobs Act. 
Just before ANPAL, the new coordinator of employment services, became fully operational, there 
were 7.934 staff members employed in the local CPIs (end of 2016, excluding the autonomous 
province of Bolzano) (ANPAL, 2017b). This is almost 10% less than a year before (data from 
(ISFOL, 2016) while the number of unemployed people decreased only about 1% during the same 
period. The decrease took place partly because the number of additional staff on temporary 
contracts declined (from about 750 to 450 people) and because people on permanent contracts 
reaching retirement age were not substituted with new hires. The use of additional staff members 
on temporary contracts used to be more common practice before the reform while many local 
offices are not able to take advantage of that anymore. The use of additional staff on temporary 
contracts enabled the system not only to have additional workforce, but as it was possible to hire 
people with more specialised skills, it also helped the local employment offices to provide some 
level of active measures. 
In 2017 the decrease in staff numbers continued reaching 7.503 employees by the end of the first 
quarter (ANPAL, 2017b). The changes have increased the disparities in terms of resources 
between regions, as some of them already having relatively low staffing lost employees (such as 
Campania, Puglia, Piedmont) and some regions with relatively higher numbers of staff hired 
additional employees (such as Valle D’Aosta, Trento, Sicily, Sardinia; Fig 6.1). 
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Fig .6.1  Recent changes in PES staff numbers by regions67 
 
Source: ANPAL (2017b), ISFOL (2016), number of unemployed from ISTAT, OECD calculations (2018) 
 
While there are large differences between regions in the indicator of the number of unemployed 
per staff member, the actual caseloads of front-line staff are somewhat more similar across 
regions. On the one hand, the processes are set up differently, thus freeing more resources for the 
front-line counsellors in some offices than in others. On the other hand, the share of potential 
users who actually use the services from local employment offices varies. When taking into 
account that the share of users among the total number of unemployed tends to be lower in those 
                                                        
67 Panel A, B, C: weighted average for Italy. 
Panel C represents the potential caseload per staff member, not the real caseload as not all unemployed register in the 
PES. 
Panel B: Share of unemployed who have contacted PES at any point in the past regardless of the reason (only half of 
the users contacted PES for active job search and a majority contacted PES for administrative reasons). The indicator 
for Trento represents Trentino alto Adige (Trento and Bolzano autonomous regions together). 
Panel A and C: no data available for staff numbers in Autonomous region of Bolzano in 2016. 
020406080
Campania
Puglia
Piemonte
Lombardia
Lazio
Veneto
Abruzzo
ITALY
Calabria
Toscana
Emilia Romagna
Liguria
Molise
Marche
Basilicata
Friuli Venezia Giulia
Sardegna (*)
Sicilia
Umbria
Trentino alto Adige
Valle D'Aosta
Bolzano
B. The share of PES users
compared to all unemployed, 2016
%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
A. Change in staff and in number of unemployed, 2015 to 2016
Change in staff
Change in number of unemployed
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
C mpania
Puglia
Piemonte
Lomb rdia
Lazio
Veneto
Abruzzo
ITALY
Calabria
Toscana
Emil a Romagna
Liguria
Molise
Marche
Basilicata
Friuli Venezia G.
Sardegna
Sicilia
Umbria
Trento
Valle D'Aosta
Bolzano
C. Number of unemployed (aged 15 and over) per staff member
2015
2016
 
 206 
regions where the potential clientele is higher (figure 6.1c), the differences between regions 
become smaller (Fig 6.2). However, the question arises then whether the share of jobseekers using 
the help of PES has declined in those regions because the PES does not have enough resources to 
attend to them. In addition, there are disparities not only between regions but also within regions 
as the local offices previously steered by the provinces have sometimes developed different 
business models and hence some local offices are more capable of delivering ALMPs than others. 
 
Fig. 6.2. Caseloads in PES by regions68 
 
Source: ANPAL (2017b), OECD calculations (2018).  
 
The “Plan to strengthen employment services and measures” foresees 1000 additional front-line 
staff members for the local offices to reinforce the delivery of ALMPs. These additional staff 
members are expected to conduct similar tasks and have similar skills as the front-line officers 
currently. Additionally, 600 people are expected to be hired in local offices for the implementation 
of REI. Thus, these recruits are expected to have a more advanced and specialised set of skills to 
be able to provide social services such as psychological counselling. As we have already 
anticipated, hiring the additional 1.600 officers will increase the number of staff in local offices 
back to the pre-reform level, but not more than that.69 Thus, the plan to strengthen employment 
services will not provide additional human resources to the system in real terms. Nevertheless, 
                                                        
68 The number of PES users in 2016 is used for all three indicators depicted in the graph. PES users defined as 
unemployed who have contacted PES at any point in the past regardless of the reason (only half of the users contacted 
PES for active job search and a majority contacted PES for administrative reasons). 
The baseline for staff numbers is as of 15/03/2017 as in ANPAL (2017[26]), however the number of staff might be 
lower by the time the additional employees will be hired (and thus the caseloads will remain higher). 
No data available for staff numbers in Trentino- Alto Adige in 2016. 
69 In fact, it is lower than the number of personnel in local employment offices during the previous years as the 
number of personnel has continued a decrease already through several years (see for example (Mandrone and 
D'Angelo, 2014[31]). 
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the additional recruitments will help harmonize the resources between regions, also with respect 
to the level of specialised officers. 
The additional 1600 people will be hired using financial resources from the European Social Fund, 
which however is only a temporary solution considering the programming period being up to 
2020. Yet, any more permanent additions of employees to the system are hindered as the number 
of employees in the Italian public sector is capped. It means that any addition of staff to the public 
employment services would have to take place simultaneously with a decrease or relocation of 
staff in the other segments of public sector. As the civil servants in Italy have very high job 
protection, this solution is unlikely for PES system and would need a much wider agreement on 
the reorganization of the public sector in Italy. 
 
6.3.2. Processes are ill-designed 
 
Though the share of PES staff working at least partially in the front office is high at 83.5% 
(ANPAL, 2017b), the share who are dedicated servicing jobseekers is only 30%, being rather low 
compared to the other PESs in the EU (figure 6.3). A large share of personnel is overwhelmed 
with administrative tasks, leaving very limited capacity to serve jobseekers. As the number of 
staff members is scarce to begin with, the set-up of processes leaves basically no capacity for 
counselling and activating jobseekers or reaching out to employers. 
There remain many elements to state that the Italian PES governance, related to its functional 
dimension concerning the relationship with the users, is still far from shifting from an 
administrative towards a managerial approach.  
 The focus on administrative tasks rather than counselling the jobseekers stems partially from the 
organisation culture and the mentality in the CPIs, as a sort of legacy from the previous system 
defined since the Fanfani Reform. This is something that ANPAL cannot influence directly as it 
does not manage the CPIs in the new set-up. Yet, ANPAL plays a role how the central processes 
and systems are set up.  
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Fig. 6.3. Share of staff in PES dedicated to servicing job-seekers in EU, 201770 
. 
 
Source: Peters (2016) 
 
One of the examples of inefficient resource management is the current set-up for the process of 
registering unemployed. Jobseekers are required first to register online through a tool developed 
by ANPAL. However, jobseekers get their status as registered unemployed only after physically 
visiting a CPI and confirming their unemployment status (DID). The forms filled in online are 
printed in the office, signed and then archived. This is merely an administrative act and does not 
involve counselling. This activity absorbs most of the capacity of the front-line officers and is 
viewed by them even more inefficient than the system before the additional online tool was 
implemented. A simplification of this system could save resources while potentially not creating 
grounds for abuse. This online tool and the process of using it should be developed further so that 
the online process should not be duplicated physically in the office. 
Other administrative activities involve for example certifying that the jobseeker is indeed 
registered by the employment office for the sake of being eligible for benefits and services from 
other institutions. This is at the moment time consuming due to the lack of data exchange between 
the different organisations. However, there are plans to develop the necessary tools for data 
exchange and a freely accessible “worker dossier” which should eliminate these administrative 
tasks in the future. Another example of excessive administrative burden can be found in the 
transition of powers to the regions. Under the steering of provinces databases were developed on 
the provincial level, but the data have not been always successfully migrated to the 
regional/national databases creating additional administrative burden for the CPI staff to re-collect 
the data. Thus, some inefficiency stems from the transitional period to the new system. 
Nonetheless, besides the new IT tools not being fully developed (parts of processes not covered), 
they are also prone to breakdowns and not yet fully integrated with each other (multitude of 
                                                        
70 Data for only these PES which deploy staff members servicing job-seekers. No sufficient data available for Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Romania. The data for Spain refers only to benefit officers (excluding 
staff in charge of ALMPs). 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
SE NL SK LT
BE
 - 
VD
AB FR S
I
AT IE UK E
E
HR BG M
T
BE
 - 
AC
TI
RI
S CZ HU LU I
T DE
BE
 - 
FO
RE
M EL
 209 
different applications) or with other processes. For example, a new application developed by 
ANPAL and implemented since the 4th of December 2017 aims at gathering the data about the 
jobseekers in the same manner across Italy and at assuring that the information would be centrally 
available for all registered jobseekers. However, due to the strong focus on the validity of the data, 
it lacks yet efficiency gains in the view of local employment offices. This in turn adds to the low 
buy-in to the reform and the undertakings of ANPAL by the local level staff decreasing their 
morale to contribute to the change. While the IT systems and data exchange between different 
organisations have a huge potential to gain in efficiency by supporting the processes and 
decreasing paperwork, these benefits only emerge when the systems are well designed and 
implemented. Though data validity and strict procedures are important to detect fraud and avoid 
abuse, it is not viable as the central aim of building the IT structures.  
In addition, duties such as accounting, personnel management or archiving are also among the 
responsibilities of the staff members in the local offices, sometimes carried out by the same people 
in charge of servicing jobseekers and employers. These tasks further limit the scarce resources for 
front-line counselling. It means that some efficiency could be gained and more resources could 
be freed up for implementing active measures if some tasks would be outsourced and/or 
consolidated to the regional/national level. The consolidation could involve not only the “back-
office” activities, but also some of the administrative activities regarding the jobseekers. A call 
centre set up by ANPAL on November 2016, for instance, provides information for jobseekers 
and employers, but also to the staff in the CPIs and private service providers concerning mainly 
the IT tools (ANPAL’s portal, DID), the AdR, further employment incentives, Youth Guarantee 
Program (ANPAL, 2018). Considering that during the first year of its activity the call centre was 
contacted about 3.000 times a month which is only about 0.1% of the average number of CPI 
users, there is still some room for developing its activities further, reaching more clients and 
respectively decreasing the administrative burden in the CPIs. 
 
6.3.3. Staff is lacking qualification and motivation 
 
The education level and skills of the employees in the local employment offices is currently low 
making it difficult to provide services of the quality needed to implement the Jobs Act. While the 
new tools and methodologies introduced with the reform require new and even more advanced 
skills, the training of the staff in the local employment offices has not taken place yet. The “Plan 
to strengthen employment services and measures” includes some instruments to address the 
shortage of skills by hiring additional employees with specific skills and by training the staff in 
the local offices. Yet, the training plans need to be developed further to reach all the staff members 
and provide basis for continuous improvement.  
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Just over a quarter of staff (27.9%) has tertiary education while the majority has an upper-
secondary degree and a substantial part of staff has lower secondary education or less71 (12.3%). 
The structure of staff by education level has improved very slightly over the past few years not 
because of hiring new staff members with higher education, but due to the retirement of staff 
members with lower education levels (ANPAL, 2017b; ISFOL, 2016). Indeed, there is a strong 
reverse correlation between age and the level of education in employment offices (figure 6.4). 
There are large variations in the education level across the employment offices. While in Umbria 
and Sardinia more than half of the staff members have tertiary degree, the share of highly educated 
in Basilicata, Sicily and Puglia is less than 15%. As the education level tends to be lower in the 
Regions where also the number of employees in the CPIs is relatively lower, it makes the potential 
to deliver adequate services highly questionable there. Noteworthy is also the blend of Regions in 
the both ends of the scale, diverging from the traditional South-Italy versus North-Italy narrative. 
There is a mix of Regions from the South and North having staff with very low qualifications 
likewise to the Regions in a relatively better situation.  
 
 
Source: Data from ANPAL, 2017b).  
 
The lack of competencies of staff in local employment offices is perceived by all the different 
stakeholders of the PES system to hinder the implementation of ALMPs. This view is shared by 
some staff members themselves making them feel they lack the skills for their jobs and 
demotivating them. The “Plan to strengthen employment services and measures” will help to 
relieve the issue of low competencies to some degree. First, 600 out of the 1.600 additional 
employees to be hired are expected to have specific competencies to be able to help the jobseekers 
furthest from the labour market. Nevertheless, the specialised staff members will constitute only 
                                                        
71 It means that a non-negligible part of the staff has not even completed the compulsory part of the education system. 
Figure 1.4 Share of staff with tertiary degree and the average age by regions, 2016. 
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a small fraction of the total staff being able to deliver also a fraction of services. To increase the 
quality of active measures, it has to be made sure that also the remaining part of the additional 
staff members to be hired will have appropriate qualification levels to support jobseekers and 
employers. 
Secondly, the plan foresees training for the existing employees. ANPAL Servizi, the in-house 
body of ANPAL, is expected to develop a methodology for the training to target the skills the 
staff is lacking. The aim of the training is to harmonize the knowledge and use of the newly 
developed tools and instruments thus harmonising the level of service provision. In particular, the 
skills of using IT tools and databases, skills to match vacancies and jobseekers and the skills to 
analyse the training needs of the jobseekers are targeted. This training is vital to implement the 
reform in the system, i.e., to introduce ALMPs and modernise the processes. The training to 
increase competencies of the front-line staff has to reach all employees of the CPIs, requiring non-
negligible investments of time and financial resources. Additionally, a plan for the continuation 
of the training has to be drawn up to keep the skills of the staff continuously up to date along with 
the improvement of the methodologies, developments of the IT infrastructure and new recruits. 
At the moment, the existing plans do not cover these aspects yet sufficiently (OECD, 2018).  
More in general, the staff members in local employment offices feel unsatisfied with their jobs 
and are unmotivated to contribute to the system. There are a number of underlying causes. The 
lack of staff, insufficient skills and training as well as inefficient processes and support structures 
leading to high workloads are responsible. In addition, the low level of feedback about the work 
performed is degrading motivation. Thus, further developments in the performance management 
system are necessary to overcome that. Secondly, as there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the 
reform (such as arguing about the funding of the staff costs between different levels of 
government) and as the communication about the changes in the system to front-line counsellors 
has been weak, the employees feel insecure and overlooked. Yet, the staff in the CPIs remain in 
the system, because employment possibilities are bleak otherwise. Therefore, the reform in the 
system of employment services has to be implemented with the help of existing employees and 
requires drawing up a communication plan of the reform agenda and the strategy of ANPAL to 
inspire commitment among the front-line staff. The regional units of “ANPAL Servizi” should be 
utilized to implement the communication plan. 
Regardless of the shortage of resources and the disruption from change, staff members in 
employment services usually find motivation to do their in being aware that they are helping the 
jobseekers. They see their efforts paying off when jobseekers get employed, thus feeling their job 
is rewarding. However, in most of the system this aspect of the work is entirely missing. Front-
line employees perceive their tasks to be of administrative nature, not as assisting the jobseekers 
to get back to employment. They do not get the feedback when a person gets employed, neither 
through the tasks they are fulfilling nor through a statistical overview, report or performance 
management system.  
On the one hand, it requires a change in the nature of tasks to shift the focus away from 
administrative activities to more support and counsel the jobseekers and employers. On the other 
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hand, a performance management system including indicators and targets showing the value 
added of the public employment services (such as indicators for labour market integration rates 
and vacancies filled) would make the contributions of the staff more evident. The indicators 
should be broken down at least to a local employment office level to create the feeling of 
ownership among the staff and encourage them to take responsibility for the labour market 
outcomes. These indicators and the respective break-downs were proposed by ANPAL within the 
“triannual strategy” and agreed on by regions on December 2017. As of now, none of the 
monitoring activities has taken place, because the necessary integrated IT systems (SIU) have not 
been fully developed, yet.  
Additionally, the staff of regional ANPAL Servizi can serve as a contact point and mediator 
between ANPAL and the local employment offices to inspire commitment to the reform in the 
local offices and provide feedback of the challenges and needs for adjustment to the reform agenda 
to ANPAL. Regional ANPAL Servizi has to cooperate with regional administrations to fit the 
change agenda provided by ANPAL to the regional plans.  
In the next paragraph we will see how the issue of resources might be remarkably addressed by 
new policy arising in the period in which the author is writing.   
 
6.4. Reading the possible agenda for future PES 
reforms: the “Citizens Income” 
 
The topic of PES limitations has recently risen again in the public debate with the introduction of 
the so called “Citizens Income” (Reddito di Cittadinanza – RdC) on January 2019. This would 
represent a new minimum income scheme: the amount of the benefit is established around a 
“poverty threshold”, corresponding to 780 euros. The recipients are the households which can 
cumulate the following main conditions: being European citizen and resident in Italy from at least 
ten years, having the household income inferior to 9.360 euros. RdC represents a means-tested 
scheme as well as REI, replacing it despite its recent introduction. In particular, this reform has 
become interesting for its declared intention to implement a strict connection between passive and 
active labour market policies. Those who should become the recipients of the RdC should need 
to follow a strict path for the activation following the “Employment Pact” (Patto per il Lavoro) 
agreed with employment services. This agreement has a variant called “Social Inclusion Pact” 
(Patto per l’Inclusione Sociale), activated for cases of high social disadvantage and absorbing the 
whole set of interventions already foreseen for the REI. Therefore, it is evident that the RdC 
should rely on strong mechanisms of conditionality. For what we have seen talking about the 
performance of the Italian PES, these aspects appear clearly far from the current level of the Italian 
system. The implementation of the strict connection between active and passive measures, which 
characterizes RdC goals, requires a massive injection of resources, more than what had to be 
expected from the process of the “Plan to strengthen employment services and measures”. The 
perspective emerging from the 2019 budgetary law is currently moving around a number equal to 
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24 billion of euros until 2021, of which 2 billion of euros should be destined to PES between 2019 
and 2020. 
Much of the public attention has been captured from the enigmatic figure of the “navigator”. The 
navigator should be the specialized figure hired in the process of further strengthening of PES 
necessary to implement the conditionality of RdC. The role of this figure should be that of 
providing advanced support to the jobseekers’ placement. The original intention of the 
government was to hire of six thousands of navigators in charge of ANPAL Servizi. Nevertheless, 
the scope of this process has been reduced by the agreement signed between regions and 
government on March 2019, halving the original number of navigator and considering them as 
technical advisors of the public employment centres. Further massive recruitment should be 
postponed to 2020 and 2021, corresponding to a future total number of seven thousands new 
operators72.        
The functioning of the proposed RdC resembles closely that of the Arbeitslosengeld II in 
Germany. As well as RdC, also in that case the benefit is addressed towards those unemployed 
who are not able to reach a minimum threshold of income (also here about 800 euros), filling the 
gap until it, even for workers receiving a wage inferior to the threshold. Those who receive this 
benefit have to commit to participate to active labour market initiatives following tasks and duties 
agreed with the operators of the PES structure responsible for the Arbeitslosengeld II (the 
“Jobcentres”). At the same time, however, the provision of the benefit is not limited to the delivery 
of the income until the threshold above mentioned. Further money is granted the basis of rent and 
other house expenses recognized, the presence of children and every is recognized by the operator 
as suitable for the improvement of the social disadvantage or the employability of the recipient.  
What is more interesting for the present study is that the RdC has been linked to the reintegration 
voucher – AdR, with the aim of relaunching this policy. Thirty days after the individual activation 
plan is signed with the public employment center, the recipient of the new benefit should receive 
the reintegration voucher. 
However, so far the discussion concerning the relationship between public and private providers 
in the context of the RdC has been quite limited. Indeed, this should be a relevant aspect if we 
consider that the recipients of the RdC are supposed to be the most disadvantage unemployed 
people on the labour market, thus seriously opening the question about the extent of private 
providers’ involvement73. We could even expect that this reform could be also implemented 
insisting on and reproducing the present situation of regional differentiation of contractual 
arrangements.  
                                                        
72 On this point it is helpful the reconstruction of Giubileo, F. and Pastore, F. (2019),  Reddito di cittadinanza, c’è il 
rischio che i navigator siano più preparati dei loro capi, article on website 
(https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/03/19/reddito-di-cittadinanza-ce-il-rischio-che-i-navigator-siano-piu-
preparati-dei-loro-capi/5045397/).  
73 Something has been said by the Five Star Movement, as electoral proposal in terms of “avoiding private temporary 
employment agencies” (https://www.movimento5stelle.it/parlamento/pdf/volantino_RdC_diritti_v3r1.pdf) 
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There should be clearly recognized, instead, the aspect that in recent years the interest for Italian 
PES is growing on the agenda, after long times in which this subject had previously receiving 
marginal attention just timid and inadequate responses.   
We have already observed a renewed interest from the Jobs Act, by means of the decree 150/2015, 
which has put in place some promising elements. However, as we have seen, the implementation 
of this reform, as well as all future ones, will largely depend on the capacity of the policy-makers 
to take simultaneously and carefully into account all the factors we have described as main 
limitation of the Italian PES.    
 
6.5. The German lesson 
 
The search for a “one-fits-all” governance for all the Italian regions, given our findings, comes to 
be a real chimera. Anyway, this must not represent an obstacle in the search for alternative policy 
proposals. In particular, from our experience we can find some interesting rooms to look at the 
German system of PES as the one implementing a governance model in the middle of the trade-
off between effectiveness and equity74.  
More in general, it’s not a novelty that, especially with the Jobs Act, policy makers have been 
explicitly declared that the German regulation of the labour market represented a “model” to 
follow75.  
Before 2004 Germany showed a labour market performance not so superior respect to Italy. Hartz 
Reforms can be considered one of the main factors (despite not the only one76) determining the 
reversal of that situation and the rediscovered success of German labour market. As we have seen, 
“Hartz Reforms” consisted of four different legislative packages intervening by reducing the 
generosity of previous UBs system, introducing new low-wage subsidies, reorganizing PES, 
creating more flexibility on work contracts. Concerning the delivery of UBs Germany is 
characterized by a binary system, dividing the delivery of the insurance scheme (Arbeitslosengeld 
I) from that of the social assistance one (Arbeitslosengeld II). This corresponds to two different 
PES structures at the local level: the “employment agencies” for the first and the “Jobcentres” for 
the second. The stakeholders of this system declare that the reasons behind the split is essentially 
due to a substantial difference between the two categories of recipients. Especially the 
management of ALGII and the active measures delivered to its recipients require very special 
                                                        
74 At the time of writing the author is performing further research about the case of Germany. Some of the information 
that follow here correspond to some very preliminary insights got from stakeholders interviewed in the region of 
North-Rhine Westfalia and at the federal level during the period from April to August 2018. Precisely the author has 
interviewed 3 figures from the federal employment agency, 3 from the regional directorate, 3 from Zentral and Sud 
Jobcentres of the city of Cologne and 2 from the employment agency of the same district.  
75 This has been a public statement of the former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
(https://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/05/31/matteo-renzi-germania-modello-europa-cambia-verso_n_5422298.html) 
76 On this point see Ferrera (2014), Minijob e servizi all’impiego, il modello Tedesco, article on website 
(https://maurizioferrera.wordpress.com/2014/11/25/minijob-e-servizi-allimpiego-il-modello-tedesco/) 
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preparation from the staff, since they are dealing with a situation of very high distance from the 
labour market. Operators have to consider this more disadvantaged situation and even the risk of 
exposure to social stigma for the recipients going to their structure. Employment services hence 
should not only be able to activate jobseekers and offer them suitable job-offers but also to deal 
with their social conditions, being prepared to all the set of possible problematic issues may arise. 
This aspect deals with resources, staff skills, staff motivation and both functional and structural 
governance aspects of this system.  
In both the two kind of local PES offices, the staff is organized to work in teams, dealing with 
different stages of assistance: some teams work with the orientation and first contact, some others 
on the front-line counselling and some others in the back-office. There is a clear separation of 
roles, in which, in particular, the back-office require very specialized skills concerning the issue 
of the computation of the exact amount of resources to be delivered to the recipients. On this 
point, if we think at the recent introduction of the REI in Italy, for instance, and especially the 
introduction of the RdC we have to register a very high distance respect to the situation described 
in Germany. In the context of the hard situation concerning resources and staff interesting Italian 
PES, REI (today, and probably RdC tomorrow) represents a further element to be managed in a 
situation of already deep overload for the operators.  
At the same time, and more in general for PES, the German regulation of the labour market 
emerged with the Hartz Reforms, seem to show a much higher managerial approach in relation to 
the functional governance of PES. NPM principles have been implemented emphasizing the 
dimension of the MBO in a top-down configuration which is able to manage the differentiation 
between local labour markets. Here the federal agency has not simply tasks of coordination but 
represent the real headquarter of all the LMPs of the country. It projects policies and takes decision 
for the local structures. The MBO approach is set around targets defined according to a continuous 
“performance dialogue” with local authorities, of which the aim is exactly to take into account the 
variability of local labour markets. Following the top-down line once the target at the superior 
level is set, i.e. between State and regions, the negotiation moves towards the next level, until the 
local structure is achieved and targets are defined even inside local offices and among operators, 
for Jobcentres as well as for employment agencies.  
We have seen how much that of a managerial approach represents another precarious issue in the 
Italian context, despite many attempts from the early two-thousands until now to introduce tools 
supposed to incentivize this dimension. Here comes again the argument of the resources. In the 
German context, the distribution of resources largely depends on the set of targets between the 
federal-level and the sub-national ones. This means that the local structures should receive 
resources only when they agree on objectives to be achieved on the labour market and these are 
effectively achieved.  
The Italian context of regional PESs are still relying on the ESF to finance their policies at the 
local level. Despite this represents a fundamental source in the context of social policies, we have 
seen that it may also put in place a potential possibility of exit for regions respect to the decisions 
taken at the national level. A massive injection of resources from states to regions, to the extent 
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that this becomes the main entrance of resources for regional PESs, might then help also to make 
regions more accountable. At the same time this situation should enhance also ANPAL’s role of 
coordination. 
The large amount of resources for PES proposed by the new government may catch this 
dimension. A massive public investment then should firstly help according to these lines: not only 
to improve resources and staffs, but also as strategic device to strengthen the relationship between 
national and sub-national levels, making the latter more accountable. However, there is a third 
and last one, but not least, concerning the role of private providers. A system with more resources 
may not need anymore to contract-out services, especially when there is the fear of opportunistic 
behaviour from the side of the private providers. In the German context active labour market 
initiatives are carried out on the major part by public operators. An adequate amount of resources 
allows them to hold the core functions of the system. Private are involved on project-basis for 
specific needs. Emblematic is the role of their “reintegration voucher”, which has already 
introduced a quasi-market similar to that of the AdR. This tool is considered by the stakeholders 
as very marginal, a sort of extrema ratio or a provision delivered on explicit request from the user. 
The basic issue of the public operators becomes: “why should we leave to private providers what 
we are to do on our own?” (quotation marks of the author). On the contrary, the AdR has been 
represented in the Italian context as scheme which can aspire to become the universal one, 
collecting all the active labour market initiatives already existing today. The situation in the 
middle of the trade-off between economic and social goals, or we would say better between 
effectiveness/efficiency and equity, can be easily seen in the combination of aspects of a well-
designed MBO approach, able to overcome the regional labour market differences relying on a 
deep process of performance oriented negotiations between the federal level and the local ones, 
and of a prominent role for public operators, where the involvement of private providers is very 
limited. The governance concerning the relationship between different levels of government 
should increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the system setting clearly the targets to be 
achieved on the local level, making the distribution of resources depending on the achievement 
of these targets, in a context in which the ESF resources are not decisive for the implementation 
of ALMPs. At the same time the last share of public investments makes the operator on the local 
level able to provide on themselves for the delivery of active labour market initiatives, in a context 
in which the need to rely on private providers is less pronounced, minimizing the risk for 
opportunistic behaviour. Anyway, the minor market exposure of services would not mean alone 
that the adverse selection of the jobseekers is completely avoided. Operators at the local levels 
receive constantly pressure by their superior levels in relation to the achievement of the targets 
agreed with the federal management and this would not exclude that, due to these performance 
targets to be achieved, the same public operator could be responsible for adverse selection. For 
example, imaging the situation in which to decrease the unemployment it’s easy to “park” a 
jobseeker to soft-skill training measures. However, these aspects should not undermine the main 
features that Italy can learn from the German lesson, moving from the consideration of similar 
features between the two contexts: a situation of high regionalism, a national agency and a late 
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approach towards flexicurity. A better specification of the distribution of competences between 
different levels of government and a massive injection of public resources, in order to make the 
ESF less decisive, to empower public staff skills and to minimize the need to involve private 
providers, may represent the right combination for Italian PES.  
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